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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report has been prepared against a background of considerable 
uncertainty in global financial markets which arose from the difficulties in the 
US subprime mortgage market. It is unclear at the time of writing how long 
this uncertainty will persist and what its impacts might ultimately be on the real 
economy. Hence, our forecasts need to be read in this broader context and the 
associated downside risks understood.  
 
Before looking at the forecasts, we assess the most recent outturns. Global 
economic growth decelerated slightly in the first half of 2007, but has remained 
buoyant. This was partly due to the ongoing integration of the emerging 
economies in the world economy. The Euro Area’s performance was also 
favourable, but the economic upturn lost some momentum in the first half of 
2007. Quarterly real GDP growth in the Euro Area slowed to 0.3 per cent in 
the second quarter of 2007, down from a stronger than expected 0.5 per cent 
in the first quarter.  
 
There is an impression that actual economic developments in the second 
quarter could have been somewhat stronger than is implied by recent national 
account statistics. While the observation of a slowdown in real GDP growth in 
the second quarter is based on “hard” data currently available for output and 
demand, it is clearly at odds with business and consumer surveys which have 
been reliable gauges of economic activity in the past and which indicate much 
stronger growth. 
 
A continued strong expansion of economic activity in the Euro Area is also 
suggested by the strong performance in the labour market. Employment grew 
by another 0.5 per cent in the second quarter, bringing annual growth to 1.7 
per cent. Unemployment continued to decline steadily and fell to 6.9 per cent, 
down from 7.1 per cent in March and 7.5 per cent in December last year.  
 
Wage growth remains moderate at the aggregate Euro Area level. Despite the 
substantial decline in unemployment, average earnings can be expected to rise 
by just 2.8 per cent this year. Annual inflation in the Euro Area continued to be 
below the 2 per cent threshold for 12 consecutive months, coming in at 1.7 per 
cent in August. Inflation has remained modest despite the substantial impact of 
the VAT increase in Germany that lifted the price level in the Euro Area by 
close to 0.3 per cent. 
 
The generally high level of confidence and a high backlog of orders, along with 
first indicators from the production side, suggest a rebound of economic 
growth in the third quarter. Looking further ahead, and as mentioned at the 
outset of this Summary, the outlook is obviously clouded by the recent events 
in financial markets and the uncertainty about their impact on the real 
economy. It is difficult to assess at the current juncture to what extent and for 
how long financing conditions for firms and household will be negatively 
affected and what impact the current developments will have on business 
sentiment and consumer confidence. 
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With the major caveat of high uncertainty about the evolution of the situation 
in financial markets, we forecast the economic expansion in the Euro Area to 
remain strong in the second half of 2007 bringing growth for the full year to 
2.7 per cent and we expect it to slow moderately in 2008 and 2009 to around 2 
¼ per cent, a level of growth which is close to the growth of potential output.  
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for the Euro Area 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
        
Output Growth Rate  0.8 1.8 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.1 
Inflation Rate 
(Harmonised) 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.0 
Unemployment Rate  8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.0 6.5 6.2 
Govt. balance as % of GDP  -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -1.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 
        
 
Growth in private consumption is expected to accelerate markedly in 2008 to 
2.5 per cent, up from 1.7 per cent this year. Growth in private investment is 
projected to lose momentum with the slowdown concentrated in residential 
investment as a consequence of less buoyant housing markets in a number of 
countries.  Exports should continue to rise but at a decelerating pace as a 
consequence of more moderate growth in world output and slower domestic 
demand growth in the US in particular. With import growth slowing less, we 
expect no significant contribution to overall growth from net exports this year 
and next. More moderate economic growth will be reflected in slower 
employment growth, and the unemployment rate is expected to decline less 
rapidly to a level of 6.5 per cent this year and 6.2 per cent in 2009. Inflation 
should remain benign with the HICP continuing to rise by around 2 per cent. 
 
As regards individual countries within the Euro Area, real GDP in Germany is 
projected to increase by 2.2 per cent next year, followed by 2 per cent growth 
in 2009. Unemployment will continue to fall and could drop below 6 per cent 
in 2009. Consumer prices are expected to rise by 2 per cent this year. Despite 
the impact of higher VAT (estimated at more than 1 percentage point) 
disappearing, inflation will moderate only slightly over the next two years as a 
result of a significant pick-up in unit labour costs and higher food prices. 
 
We forecast French GDP to grow by 1.9 per cent in 2007. Domestic demand 
will remain the major engine for growth, rising by 2.3 per cent. Both 
household’s consumption and government expenditure will rise by around 2.3 
per cent, while private investment growth will stay close to 4 per cent. Net 
external trade will remain the main factor dampening GDP growth, for the 
fifth year in a row, reducing GDP growth by 0.3 percentage point this year as 
in 2006.  
 
For Italy, the changed international context will reduce growth prospects for 
next year to 1.4 per cent and so Italy is likely to grow at a rate below the Euro 
Area average again. Much of the slowdown will be due to household 
consumption expenditure for the following reasons: the ending of the effects 
of consumption-related incentives, consumer spending that is likely to be 
affected by worsening consumer confidence and by the somewhat tighter 
credit condition. 
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The forecasts are based on the following set of assumptions. Oil prices will 
average US$66.6 per barrel in 2007, US$70.9 in 2008 and US$70.0 in 2009. The 
dollar/euro exchange rate will average 1.39 in 2008 and 1.40 in 2009. The 
assumptions for commodity prices, exchange rates and interest rates used in 
the forecast were constructed by consensus, as the average projections of the 
10 member Institutes. These are broadly consistent with current financial 
market expectations and forward markets, as the majority of Institutes use this 
information in constructing their own forecasts.  
 
We expect the US economy to grow by 1.9 per cent this year and by 2 per cent 
in 2008, both forecasts having been revised downwards since our Spring 
report. Our growth projection for Japan has also been revised downwards. We 
now expect growth of 2 per cent this year and 1.7 per cent in 2008.  
 
Major risks to the forecast relate to the impact on the real economy of the 
current turmoil in the financial markets, although the usual suspects (high and 
volatile oil prices, current account deficit in the US) are still present. It is clear 
that some pension funds, insurance companies, banks and other investors have 
experienced severe losses. Investors in general have become more risk averse 
and this is likely to persist for some time. This will negatively affect investment 
and consumption and thus economic growth and employment. Falling 
consumer and producer confidence may also dampen short-term demand in 
the advanced economies. The size of the negative impact on the real economy 
is highly uncertain, but it seems clear that the US housing market will be hit 
very hard. 
 
The report contains analyses of a number of additional issues. We look at some 
of the factors behind developments in the level of house building in a selection 
of euro-area countries. We also identify which regions face the highest risk of 
succumbing to a similar house-building downturn as that seen in the US. 
Focusing on our findings with regard to Spain, we expect the housing 
investment ratio, which has been supported by speculative activity, to revert 
towards historical norms over the coming years. While we project a soft 
landing of the housing market in our baseline forecast, this could be associated 
with a sharp correction in the housing market in some Euro Area economies, 
as experienced in the US.  
 
The Spanish housing market is looked at again, in a section on house prices 
and banking crises. If banks and other lenders were to become concerned 
about lending to house builders in Spain then the spread between their 
borrowing rates and market rates, the quality spread, could rise. We undertake 
a simulation in which house prices in Euopre fall by 5 per cent and Spain 
experiences a rise in the quality spread that is sufficient to slow output growth 
to zero in each quarter of 2008. The results suggest that private sector 
investment growth drops to an annual rate of -15 per cent in Spain by the last 
quarter of 2008.  
 
In the general context of uncertainty in international financial markets, we 
consider the potential recessionary impacts of a banking crisis. Our hope and 
expectation is that the current crisis is a short-term blip in the liquidity of the 
banking sector. Our simulations suggest that the effects of such a “blip” on the 
potential output of the Euro Area would be quite limited. Hence we have not 
made major changes to our forecast for 2008. However, if a full-blown banking 
crisis were to develop, then we could see several years of stagnation. There 
would be the danger that even if such a crisis were to originate in the US, 
contagion would see it spread immediately to Europe. It is the task of the Fed, 
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the ECB and the other European central banks to ensure that such a crisis 
does not happen. 
 
On monetary policy, we assume that the ECB will raise rates by 25 basis points 
before the end of the year. That said, the ECB will certainly watch 
developments in the economy closely and will also take account of moves in 
the exchange rate. There is a relatively large chance that the ECB will drop 
another rate hike from the agenda in the event that the economic environment 
should look less reassuring than projected here, especially in the event that the 
Fed cuts interest rates aggressively.  
 
On fiscal policy, with GDP growth decelerating from 2.7 per cent in 2007 to 
2.1 per cent in 2009 and a close to neutral fiscal stance, the Euro Area deficit 
should remain at around –1 per cent of GDP. This would mean that the 
objective of 0 per cent of GDP deficits in 2010 would be difficult to reach at 
the Euro Area level. Within the Euro Area, the most striking development as 
compared to recent history would perhaps be the decoupling of government 
balances developments between Germany, which is running small government 
surpluses over the forecast horizon, and France, which is at risk of breaching 
the 3 per cent of GDP limit for deficits.  
 
In the Special Topic of this report, an analysis of the European Social Model(s) 
(ESM) is undertaken. Three different views are presented on the future of the 
ESM. The first stresses the importance of guaranteeing social cohesion in the 
Member States, by reducing income inequalities and ensuring a high level of 
social protection, in particular for people who cannot work, because of their 
age, their handicap, their family situation or the economic situation. The 
disincentive effect of social protection is judged to be of second order and it is 
considered that rich countries can accept it. The second expresses the 
importance of restoring work incentives, by accepting initially some increase in 
income inequalities. Making work pay will increase production and will give 
more resources to the social security system, ensuring its financial 
sustainability. The third suggests a new architecture of welfare states in Europe, 
inspired by the Scandinavian model, so that the impact of social protection as a 
productive factor increases.  
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1. OUTLOOK FOR THE 
EURO AREA 
Global economic growth decelerated slightly in the first half of 2007, but 
has remained buoyant. This was partly due to the ongoing integration of the 
emerging economies in the world economy. The Euro Area’s performance was 
also favourable, with unemployment falling to its lowest rate in more than a 
quarter of a century. Despite the unusually long global upswing and record 
high oil prices, inflation is still relatively moderate.  
1.1 
Overview 
 
However, the outlook is obviously clouded by the recent events in financial 
markets. The uncertainty about their impact on the real economy constitutes a 
major risk to our forecast. In July, news of substantial losses on US subprime 
mortgages led to worldwide turbulence in financial markets. Inter-bank loans 
dried up as it was unclear how much counterparts had lost on the US mortgage 
market through new financial products like CDOs. Moreover, declining 
interest of investors in asset-backed commercial paper required central banks 
to inject liquidity in the money markets. The credit crisis has certainly made 
investors more risk averse. The turmoil in credit markets initially led to a fall in 
share prices, but not at an alarming rate and since mid-August some of the lost 
ground has been recovered. The Fed lowered its benchmark interest rate by 50 
basis points on September 18, while the ECB refrained from increasing the 
refi-rate, contrary to earlier expectations. The Fed is expected to loosen 
monetary policy further in the near future, but the ECB may stick to its 
objective of inflation control. The US economy will probably be affected most 
by the financial problems, particularly through the housing market. As a 
consequence, the short-term outlook for GDP growth in the United States has 
been lowered to approximately 2 per cent in 2007 and 2008, but growth in the 
US should accelerate in 2009. 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for the Euro Area 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
        
Output Growth Rate  0.8 1.8 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.1 
Inflation Rate 
(Harmonised) 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.0 
Unemployment Rate  8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.0 6.5 6.2 
Govt. balance as % of GDP  -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -1.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 
        
 
GDP in the Euro Area increased by 2.7 per cent at an annual rate in the first 
half of 2007 compared to the second half of last year. This was substantially 
above its potential growth rate, but less than the growth rate over the course of 
last year. The slight deceleration was mostly due to the German VAT hike 
adversely impacting German consumption. The continuing above-trend 
growth led to a further drop in unemployment, to its lowest level in more than 
1 
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a quarter of a century. GDP growth in the Euro Area is forecast to fall back 
from 2.7 per cent in 2007 to 2.3 per cent in 2008 and 2.1 per cent in the year 
after. Euro Area unemployment is expected to fall further from 7.0 per cent in 
2007 to 6.2 per cent of the labour force in 2009. Inflation is expected to 
remain contained over the forecast horizon at around 2 per cent and net 
government borrowing is anticipated to stabilize at 1 per cent of GDP.  
  
Table 1.2:  GDP Growth Forecasts in Autumn 2007 and Spring 2007 
  World Japan US Euro Area China 
  Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn 
2007 4.8 5.1 2.3 2.0 2.4 1.9 2.5 2.7 9.8 10.9 
2008 4.5 4.8 2.1 1.7 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.3 9.1 9.8 
 
 
Table 1.2 compares the current EUROFRAME-EFN forecast for GDP 
growth in major regions with the Spring forecast. Growth projections for the 
Euro Area have hardly changed, but growth in the US and Japan is now 
forecast to be lower in 2007 and 2008. On the other hand, production in the 
emerging markets, particularly in China, is increasing more rapidly, pushing up 
growth forecasts for the world, in spite of the problems in the financial 
markets.  
 
Major risks to the forecast relate to the impact on the real economy of the 
current turmoil in the financial markets, although the usual suspects (high and 
volatile oil prices, current account deficit in the US) are still present. It is clear 
that some pension funds, insurance companies, banks and other investors have 
experienced severe losses. Investors in general have become more risk averse 
and this is likely to persist for some time. This will negatively affect investment 
and consumption and thus economic growth and employment. Falling 
consumer and producer confidence may also dampen short-term demand in 
the advanced economies. The size of the negative impact on the real economy 
is highly uncertain, but it seems clear that the US housing market will be hit 
very hard. Therefore, the impact on the US economy is likely to be (much) 
bigger than on the European economy. Possible effects of a more severe 
financial crisis are analyzed in more detail in Section 1.4. 
   
1.2 
Global Outlook 1.2.1 KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
Below we discuss the key developments in commodity and financial markets 
underlying the current forecasts. 
OIL PRICES 
Growing demand for oil in a strongly expanding world economy and tight 
supply conditions sent oil prices up again over the course of the year. In 
January, the Brent crude spot price declined to $54 per barrel and in response 
OPEC lowered its official output by 1.7 mbd. In addition Nigerian output fell 
by 0.5 mbd because of internal political turmoil. Consequently oil prices shot 
up to almost $75 per barrel for Brent in the third quarter of this year, setting 
new nominal records.  
 
Most of the extra demand originated in the Emerging Economies, particularly 
in China. The projected modest slowdown of unusually strong growth in the 
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world economy is insufficient to stop the rising trend in oil demand, although 
high prices are likely to have a tempering effect. Oil supply in non-OPEC 
countries will only rise marginally in the short run. Although OPEC remains 
cautious about increasing supply, it recently announced a production increase 
of 0.5 mbd from November. OPEC mentioned the emphasis on bio-fuels in 
the high-income countries as one reason for keeping up-stream investments in 
check. We expect oil prices1 to remain high over the forecast horizon at 
approximately $70 per barrel. 
INTEREST RATES 
The turmoil in financial markets, originating from defaults on American 
subprime mortgage loans, is having a noticeable effect on interest rates in the 
US and also in Europe. Yields on short-term paper have soared as inter-bank 
loans have dried up. Central Banks attempt to counteract the problem by 
providing ample liquidity, but tensions are likely to remain as long as the extent 
of the damage is unknown. The Fed lowered its rate by 50 basis points on 
September 18 whereas, contrary to expectations, the ECB did not increase the 
refi-rate in September. The outlook for interest rates critically depends on how 
the problems in the financial markets evolve. We assume a gradual return to 
normal spreads between official rates and 3-months paper in the fourth quarter 
of this year. Moreover, we expect the Fed to lower its rate between now and 
early next year by another 50 basis points. We still believe that a rate increase 
of 25 basis points by the ECB is likely in December, but a more aggressive 
policy change by the Fed may put pressure on the ECB to refrain from a 
further rise or even open the way to some decline of the refi-rate. 
 
Government bonds rallied substantially in recent weeks as they were obviously 
seen as a safe haven. The yield for 10-year government bonds fell by more 
than 50 basis points in the United States and Europe alike. As the financial 
markets calm down, long-term interest rates will probably go up again to 
approximately 4¾ per cent in the US and 4½ per cent in the Euro Area. 
 
Refinancing conditions in the corporate sector deteriorated as a consequence 
of declining equity prices, higher risk premia on corporate bonds and credit 
rationing. This situation may persist for some time, negatively affecting 
investments. 
EXCHANGE RATES 
The euro continued its upward trend against the US dollar and the Japanese 
yen over the course of this year. Against the dollar, the euro rose to over 1.40. 
This partly reflected (anticipated) interest rate reductions in the United States, 
but the slowdown of the US economy and the ongoing large deficit on the 
current account probably contributed as well. We do not foresee a 
strengthening of the dollar or a further decline, although the risks are on the 
downside. Very recently the yen has appreciated somewhat as carry trade 
unwound on the back of increasing uncertainty in financial markets. We 
assume a very gradual recovery of the yen versus the euro over the forecast 
horizon. The British pound has recently weakened against the dollar and the 
euro, but is expected to hold its ground over the forecast horizon. 
 
EQUITY MARKETS 
Equity prices fell in July amidst increasing uncertainty in the financial markets, 
but have recovered somewhat since mid-August. Surprisingly, US shares have 
                                                 
1 Based on the average of Brent, WTI (Western Texas Intermediate) and Dubai oil prices. 
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held up reasonably well, whereas markets in Japan, France and Italy showed 
more significant drops, but even here the drop did not wipe out more than had 
been gained since the beginning of the year. Moreover, much of the decline 
was concentrated in financials, leaving other sectors relatively untouched. We 
assume a very gradual recovery of equity prices over the forecast period.  
1.2.2 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
North America 
In the US, the turmoil in the financial markets occurred in an environment 
characterised by decelerating private consumption growth, falling housing 
investment and upward pressure on the price level. Expectations suddenly 
shifted from the risk of inflation to the risk of a sharp slowdown in economic 
growth. Notwithstanding the fact that the subprime market is only around 10 
per cent of the overall mortgage market (21 per cent including (sub prime) 
mortgages rated alt-A), the miss-pricing of both part of the subprimes as well 
as some of the financial instruments developed to diversify the risk linked to 
subprime mortgages, contributed to the turmoil. As the delinquency in 
subprime mortgages grew, global financial markets became more volatile and 
increasingly risk-averse (see Box 1 on the US Mortgage Market). Increasing 
demand for liquidity by the banking system could not be met and the spreads 
on Treasury bond yields dramatically widened. The Federal Reserve intervened 
and tried to restore liquidity and orderly conditions in financial markets in 
many ways. It provided the banking system with a huge amount of liquidity, on 
August 17th it reduced the discount rate by 50 basis points and accepted asset-
backed commercial paper as collateral for discount window borrowing as well 
as allowing short term financing up to 30 days. On September 18th, it reduced 
both the federal fund target rate and the discount rate by 50 basis points. At 
the same time, nevertheless, it was signalled that monetary policy would not be 
used to shield investors from losses so as to back moral hazard. 
 
The expected adjustment effects of the financial markets on the whole 
economy are not only through the deterioration of confidence, but may also 
lead to tighter financing conditions for households and firms. This will 
certainly be a temporary process, but it exacerbates the problems in the 
housing market and represents an important downside risk to our forecast (see 
Section 1.4). We are projecting lower US GDP growth (1.9 and 2 per cent, 
respectively in 2007 and 2008) due to expected weaker housing investment and 
lower house prices. GDP growth is forecast to be 2.4 per cent in 2009. The 
projected soft landing of the US economy will see the economy returning to its 
potential growth rate in the second part of 2009.  
 
In the first half of 2007 GDP growth in q-o-q terms was very volatile. Growth 
rebounded in the second quarter (1 per cent q-o-q), with net exports, fixed 
non-residential investment and government spending all making positive 
contributions to growth, after an unexpectedly strong deceleration of growth 
in the first three months of the year (0.2 per cent q-o-q). At the same time, 
private consumption growth continued to decelerate and housing investment 
dropped further. On the whole GDP growth in the first six months of 2007 
was weaker when compared with the second semester of 2006 (1.7 per cent 
and 2.5 per cent in y-o-y terms respectively) mainly due to the dramatic drop in 
housing investment (-16.5 per cent y-o-y, -10.6 per cent in the second part of 
2006). With respect to the housing market, prices stagnated on a q-o-q basis in 
the second quarter of the 2007, according to the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (see Figure 1.2.1). 
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Figure 1.2.1 US House Prices 
United States: OFHEO House Price Index (1980 Q1 = 100)
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The financial market turmoil is likely to intensify the downturn in housing by 
reducing the availability of credit and leading to the tightening of lending 
standards. In addition, housing starts and permits are trending down whereas 
inventories of new homes remain at very high levels. We expect house prices 
to decline in the second half of 2007 and in 2008. Housing investment is also 
expected to decline further over the next 9-12 months, with an annual average 
decline of 6.9 per cent expected in 2008. Since the peak in 2005 the volume of 
housing investment is forecast to decline by a cumulative 26 per cent by mid 
2008, that is a correction in line with that which occurred in the second part of 
the eighties (24 percentage points), but less than that at the end of seventies 
and the early part of the eighties (44 percentage points) (see Figure 1.2.2). 
Beyond the direct impact of housing investment on GDP growth, a significant 
negative effect is likely to occur on private consumption. The drop in house 
prices will reduce nominal housing wealth and hence total wealth which will 
negatively affect consumption expenditure. This effect could be intensified by 
a simultaneous decline in employment. In July and August total employment 
fell in q-o-q terms due to falls in the construction and manufacturing sectors, 
and payroll employment also fell in August.  
 
Figure 1.2.2. US Housing Investment 
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With respect to inflation, the most recent data show some improvement in 
underlying pressures. In the second quarter of 2007, core inflation, based on 
PCE excluding food and energy, was under 2 per cent (1.8 per cent) after 3 
consecutives quarters above 2 per cent (the implicit target of the Fed). On the 
other hand, the expected persistence of high energy prices due to relatively 
strong demand, matched with tight supply conditions, will lead to growth in 
the consumption deflator of around 2.5 per cent in 2008 before easing in 2009. 
 
The expected deceleration in domestic demand growth, especially in private 
consumption, will reduce import growth and net exports are expected to make 
a positive contribution to GDP growth in 2007-2009, having made a negative 
contribution to growth from 2000 to 2005. Despite a deterioration in the terms 
of trade, due to the depreciation of the dollar, this allows the current account 
deficit to improve by around one percentage point of GDP by 2009.  
 
For North America as whole the second quarter of 2007 proved to be strong: 
the Mexican GDP growth rate accelerated (1.3 per cent q-o-q), whereas 
Canada continued to experience more steady growth with GDP growing by 
around 1 per cent (q-o-q). For the whole region, GDP grew 1.8 per cent y-o-y 
in the first semester, following growth of 3 per cent in 2006. The July inflation 
release showed signs of stabilisation in the area, after upside pressures in the 
first part of the year. In Canada the permanence of inflation above the central 
bank target rate prompted a 25 basis points rise in the refinancing interest rates 
in July. The expected deceleration of US economic growth driven by domestic 
demand will negatively affect the whole region through weaker demand for 
Canadian and Mexican goods. We are projecting GDP growth rates of 2.1 per 
cent, 2.3 per cent and 2.6 per cent, respectively for 2007, 2008 and 2009.   
 
BOX 1: The US Mortgage Market 
 
In July, problems in the US market for subprime mortgages triggered 
worldwide turbulence in financial markets(a). Subprime mortgages are 
residential loans to borrowers with a poor credit history, and provided without 
a full income documentation. The debt service-to-income ratio of these 
mortgages is above 55 per cent, while the mortgage loan-to-value ratio is over 
85 per cent(b). In recent years, the market for subprime mortgages has seen 
extremely rapid growth. This has contributed to a rise in homeownership from 
65 per cent of US households in 1995 to 68 per cent in the second quarter of 
2007. Subprime mortgages were 20 per cent of all mortgages originating in 
2006, compared with a share of 36 per cent of prime mortgages, 15 per cent of 
jumbo mortgages and 25 per cent of Alt-A mortgages. Subprime mortgages 
were 10 per cent of the outstanding mortgages at the end of 2006. At the same 
time, only 2 per cent of the total outstanding mortgages were government 
guaranteed, down from 9 per cent in 1996. 
 
Most subprime mortgages which originated in 2005 and 2006 have an 
adjustable rate, with a below-market rate in the first two years (‘teaser rate’). As 
a consequence, debt servicing costs can rise by 50 per cent after two years, 
even if market interest rates do not rise. Mostly due to a relaxation of lending 
standards, adjustable-rate subprime mortgages have shown a very rapid rise in 
delinquency. In July, serious delinquencies on those mortgages were up to 
almost 15 per cent, more than double the rate in mid-2005. This delinquency 
rate is much higher than the rate of 5.5 per cent on fixed-rate subprime 
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mortgages in July, 3 per cent on Alt-A mortgages (up from 1 per cent mid-
2005) and 1 per cent on prime and jumbo mortgages(c). Subprime lending 
amounted to around 1200 billion dollar in 2005 and 2006. Assuming a default 
rate of 20 per cent on those mortgages and a recovery rate of 60 per cent, the 
losses for the financial sector on those mortgages alone could be around 100 
billion dollars. Apart from causing heavy losses for the financial sector, 
defaults by distressed borrowers is deepening the  housing market crisis.  
 
In recent years, most mortgages are not held by the originating enterprise but 
are securitised as mortgage-backed bonds. The privately owned government-
sponsored enterprises Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae are responsible for most 
securitisation, but only take care of prime mortgages. Currently 56 per cent of 
US home mortgages are securitised, up from 10 per cent in 1980 and less than 
1 per cent in 1970. Securitisation is extended by collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs)(d). By spreading the risk and facilitating the trading of risks, 
securitisation has raised the supply of mortgages and therefore home 
ownership. Unfortunately, it has also weakened incentives to underwrite 
carefully and has contributed to the relaxation of loan standards. This can be 
characterised as a classical principal-agent problem. Furthermore, it probably 
placed risks in the hands of investors who are ill-equipped to handle it. 
 
As a consequence of increased risk aversion, almost no subprime mortgages 
were issued in July and August. Issuance of securities backed by non-prime 
mortgages has fallen sharply as it is very hard for investors to know who will 
experience credit losses. Furthermore, interest of investors in mortgage backed 
commercial paper dropped dramatically. This has forced “special purpose 
vehicles” or “conduits” normally financed by asset-backed commercial paper 
to draw on back-up liquidity facilities of affiliated banks.  
 
(a) In early February, there was already substantial turbulence after a major 
bank announced that more funds would have to be set aside to cover bad 
debts in its subprime lending portfolio. 
(b) The traditional prime mortgage is provided to borrowers with a good credit 
history and requires proof-of-income documentation. The debt service-to-
income ratio is less than 55 per cent, while the mortgage loan-to-value ratio is 
less than 85 per cent. Prime mortgages are capped at 417,000 dollar. Jumbo 
mortgages have the same characteristics as prime mortgages but are bigger 
than 417,000 dollar. Alt-A mortgages are between prime and subprime 
mortgages and are not based on full income documentation of the borrower. 
See J. Kiff and P Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent 
Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets, IMF Working Paper 
wp/07/188, 2007.  
(c)Based on F.S. Mishkin, Outlook and risks for the U.S. Economy, speech to 
the Money Marketeers of the New York University, 10 September 2007.  
(d) CDOs are certificates that entitles the bearer to draw the interest and 
principal payments from a pool of mortgages bonds. 
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Asia 
In the first part of 2007, economic growth in Asian countries, excluding Japan, 
was very good due to both strong consumption and investment while exports 
showed a mixed picture in terms of growth, even though they grew at a good 
pace in annual terms. China and India reached new records in GDP growth 
rates. China continues to try to cool down the economy mainly using monetary 
instruments but without much success. In contrast, Japanese GDP contracted 
in the second quarter (-0.3 per cent over the previous quarter), mainly because 
of a sharp decrease in all categories of investments: public and private both in 
housing and in machinery and equipment, and also due to the poor 
performance of exports. The picture for inflation is a little more worrying for 
different reasons: in Japan prices represent a problem because of the 
persistence of zero or negative inflation, however on the other hand, prices of 
consumption goods are growing in China, while in India inflation remains 
stable at high levels.  
 
In Japan the quarterly path of GDP continues to be quite variable with 
negative and positive increases following each other within a few quarters. The 
most recent data seem to point towards a further slowdown in the economy, as 
suggested by the decrease in industrial production, the sharp contraction of 
sales and orders in addition to the difficulties experienced by exporters in the 
European and US markets (while export growth in Asia continues to be in 
double digits). Political turmoil following the result of recent elections, which 
were very negative for the ruling party and for the premier, and his resignation, 
add some uncertainty to the coming quarters. Small positive signals coming 
from the labour market (declining unemployment in a rising labour force) are 
partly offset by a flat income situation due to firm’s policy of labour cost 
restraint and a wave of substitution of retiring high-wage baby-boomers with 
low-wage new graduates.  
 
We don’t expect a rapid recovery for the Japanese economy because of a 
number of negative signals ranging from domestic demand to the global 
economic environment; in a framework where both fiscal and monetary policy 
are having difficulty finding instruments to revive growth given the constraints 
they are facing. As far as monetary policy is concerned, the Bank of Japan will 
give up the interest rate hike desired within the year: the slowdown in 
economic activity goes side by side with the inflation rate around zero (but the 
core is below zero). Moreover the yen has appreciated somewhat since June, 
on the wave of a partial unwinding of carry trade triggered by lower interest 
rates in the US. A deceleration in sales growth, in the context of weaker 
domestic demand (and falling household confidence) and a lower level of 
imports of trade partners could slacken investment growth in the short term.  
 
The Chinese economy has been continuing to grow at a very fast pace, around 
11.9 per cent in annual terms in the second quarter (y-o-y). All the components 
of the economy appear to be contributing with investment playing the main 
role (it was still accelerating in July) together with consumption and very 
buoyant exports. The central bank is trying to cool down both economic 
growth and the speculation in the stock market. Many measures have been 
taken to increase the cost of investment (five consecutive rate hikes this year), 
to constrain bank credit (increasing the reserve ratio seven times this year to 
12.5 per cent) and to boost deposits against stock investing (by lowering taxes 
on current account deposit returns and by allowing larger investment abroad 
for the private sector). Also the government is trying to curb investment, 
delaying approval of some local projects particularly in its fastest growing 
regions (with investment in the first seven months of the year up by almost 50 
per cent). A rising problem for China is inflation which is currently running at 
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6.5 per cent in annual terms (highest in 10 years) due mainly to food prices. 
This level is not excessive in absolute terms for a country that is catching-up, 
that has GDP growth of over 11 per cent and given the low starting price level. 
In addition, it is perhaps not completely unwelcome because of its positive 
effect on farmers incomes. To date, popular anger about rising inflation and 
the possibility of a further spillover to the other prices is being avoided (in 
order to do this the government recently froze the state-controlled prices). It 
should be noted that high inflation also contributes to real negative returns on 
deposit accounts favouring an alternative investment in more speculative 
instruments and assets.  
 
The Chinese economy is forecast to grow at fast pace for the next two years, 
with some deceleration mainly due to the increasingly restrictive stance of 
monetary policy and foreign trade. Given the current growth, interest rates and 
money supply appear to be still accommodative but the mood of the 
government and central bank is well explained by the unprecedented number 
of restrictive interventions in the recent months, both with monetary policy 
and administrative measures (these are mainly due to the still poor 
transmission mechanisms in the monetary system). As for the foreign sector, 
the (small) appreciation of the yuan and the slowing down of partner’s demand 
(United States in particular) could dent export performance, even though the 
improving trade with Asian partners could partly offset the lower demand. 
Domestic demand appears very difficult to endogenously slow; interest rates 
hikes and other measures are likely to be repeatedly used in the next quarters 
to curb investments and to stop the inflationary rally in consumer prices. 
Other measures are expected to make use of the large amount of international 
reserves (withdrawing them from the money supply) and to tackle speculation 
in the stock market which may be producing a price bubble.  
  
Non Euro Area European Economies 
The robust pace of UK GDP growth has continued into the first half of this 
year. On an annual basis economic growth has accelerated from 1.6 per cent in 
the second quarter of 2005 to just over 3 per cent in the first half of this year. 
Looking ahead we expect the economy to moderate, with a slowdown in the 
rate of growth of consumer spending. Household consumption expenditure 
has been the prop to the UK economic growth, contributing around ¾ of 
economic growth since 1997. A slowing housing market and increased 
propensity to save are expected to be behind more modest consumer spending 
growth. We expect GDP growth to slow to around 2.2 per cent next year.  
 
The annual rate of inflation in the UK, as measured by the HICP, was at its 
highest level for over a decade in the first quarter of this year, at one point 
moving more than one percentage point above the target rate of 2 per cent per 
annum. But despite the accelerating rate of inflation and a relatively tight 
labour market, average earnings over the first half of this year have been 
weaker than in much of 2006. Since then HICP inflation has moved back 
towards target, even dipping below target in August and September of this 
year. Our projection is for inflation to hover around the Bank of England’s 
target of 2 per cent over the next few years. However, there remain upside 
risks to the inflation outlook, in particular if the recent rise in oil prices were to 
be sustained, although the weakness of the dollar-sterling exchange rate will 
help to mitigate some of the impact from oil.  
 
The credit crunch has taken an interesting turn in the UK financial system. 
Through turmoil in the money markets Northern Rock, the fifth largest 
mortgage lending bank in the UK economy, experienced a liquidity problem 
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such that it had to call on the Bank of England in its capacity as ‘lender of last 
resort’. A significant amount of the funding of Northern Rock’s loan book was 
through borrowing on the money markets in comparison to other UK banks. 
Consequently, when liquidity dried up, the otherwise solvent Northern Rock 
required funding from the Bank of England, at a punitive rate, in order for it 
to keep trading. From a macroeconomic perspective, the major impact of this 
crisis will most probably be a greater slowdown in the housing market than 
had been envisaged previously as households react to the increased 
uncertainty. The Northern Rock crisis has been exacerbated by widening 
spreads in money markets, and the Bank of England has recently stated that it 
will allow borrowing against a wider range of assets in order to “alleviate the 
strains in longer-maturity money markets”. If such spreads prove to be more 
sustained than we anticipate, the Bank of England may have to react in order 
to avoid growth in demand slowing more dramatically, and anticipated interest 
rate rises may not materialise. 
 
Employment demand in the UK economy has proved to be relatively robust, 
but has failed to keep pace with the growing labour force. Increases in the 
unemployment rate have stalled at around 5½ per cent, but we expect the 
upward trend in the unemployment rate to continue after next year in line with 
slower growth. Our forecast is for the unemployment rate to reach almost 6 
per cent by 2009. 
 
After the Chancellor’s exuberance of recent years, the position of the public 
finances appears to be improving. Revisions to data suggest that the 
government’s financial balance improved from -3.4 per cent of GDP in 2005 
to -2.8 per cent in 2006. Due to a planned decline in the government’s share of 
the economy we expect the financial balance to move onto a more sustainable 
footing, and to improve towards 2 per cent of GDP in 2009. 
 
Swedish economic growth increased to 4.5 per cent in 2006 supported by rapid 
investment. This strong growth is expected to slow in 2007-9 as higher interest 
rates and weakening export market growth dampen the domestic demand 
growth. However, growth is expected to continue above the Euro Area 
average. Danish economic growth is already showing signs of slowing from the 
relatively high level of activity. Total output declined in the second quarter and 
growth is expected to be well below the Euro Area average in the forecasting 
period due to e.g. labour shortages and decreasing price competitiveness of 
Danish products. Both Sweden and Denmark remain well-balanced economies 
in terms of current account and general government surpluses in 2007-9. 
 
Growth in the NMS accelerated in 2006 and good economic performance 
continued in the first half of 2007. Again, internal demand proved to be the 
most important contributor to growth. Growth was especially strong in the 
Baltic countries and in Slovakia (at near 10 per cent y-o-y); in Poland and most 
other NMS countries it was more moderate (5-6 per cent y-o-y), whereas it was 
quite weak in Hungary, mostly due to the restrictive fiscal policy. Due to a 
noticeable increase in employment and real wages, private consumption 
expanded strongly. One of the reasons for the strong expansion of investment 
in several countries was the inflow of financial means from the EU funds. 
However, the strong financial situation of companies – for example in Poland - 
played an important role as well. 
 
Due to the improved economic situation in the Euro Area, many of the NMS 
countries experienced a stronger expansion in exports. However, external trade 
developments were quite different: in the Baltic countries, in Poland and 
Bulgaria robust imports were translating into big negative net exports; in the 
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other countries there was a positive or marginally negative contribution to 
GDP from net exports.  
 
The situation in the labour market improved, with the unemployment rate 
falling almost everywhere. Part of this is explained by job emigration to 
Western Europe which lowers the labour force. 
 
Since late 2006 HICP inflation has been rising steadily in NMS thus widening 
the gap vis-à-vis the Euro Area. In the period January-July 2007 the average 
rate of inflation in NMS reached 3.6 per cent y-o-y which was 1.7 percentage 
points above the rate registered in the Euro Area.  This was primarily due to 
price acceleration in Poland (food, fuel), the Czech Republic and the Baltic 
countries (food, tobacco). Most central banks across the region have reacted to 
higher inflation by raising their interest rates, even if interest rates have on 
average increased a little less than in the Euro Area. The positive inflation 
differential with the Euro Area is in line with the ‘catching-up’ of the region as 
manifested in the higher inflation in services (in particular those related to 
utilities and networks), upward adjustments of indirect taxes (e.g. excise on 
tobacco), increasing reputation of goods produced domestically and increasing 
quality of goods and services.    
 
All in all, economic activity during the forecast period will remain strong. We 
anticipate that most of the NMS will continue to experience strong wage 
growth as a result of continued outward migration but also due to productivity 
increases. Therefore consumption will remain an important source of demand 
growth. EU funds from 2007-2013 will be lower so budget investments may 
slow down a little. By contrast, private investment should accelerate. The slow 
down in the world economy may imply some worsening in the foreign trade 
situation in some of the NMS. The GDP growth rate will decrease only 
slightly, from around 6.0 per cent this year to about 5.3 per cent in 2008 and 
4.9 per cent in 2009. Unemployment will continue to fall reaching a rate of just 
above 7 per cent in 2009. 
  
Russia continues to show dynamic development supported by the high 
commodity prices. The economy grew by 6.7 per cent last year. The main 
driving force behind growth was internal demand which accelerated further in 
the first half of 2007. Given high investment needs and increasing profits, 
investment in equipment grew by about 14 per cent (y-o-y). At the same time, 
the rapid increase in wages in 2006 led to a strong expansion of private 
consumption (around 9 per cent). This led to a smaller surplus in the current 
account. 
  
Inflation, measured by the increase of consumer prices, has slowed down. The 
inflation rate, which is expected to be around 8 ½ per cent this year, will 
almost meet the targets of the Central Bank (6.5 – 8 percent). Wage growth is 
strong, but productivity is rising rapidly, too, and the appreciation of the 
rouble in effective terms is contributing to slower inflation. The accumulation 
of reserves in the new Stabilization Fund (see below) is also having a stabilising 
effect on inflation. 
 
Economic activity will continue to be supported by high world market prices 
for oil and other raw materials over the forecast horizon. Real GDP growth 
will remain strong although the y-o-y growth rate will decline slightly in 2008 
to about 6.3 per cent. The sustained growth will be supported by private 
consumption due to the higher wage sum as well as by a strong momentum of 
investment in equipment. The situation in the labour market will improve 
further; the unemployment rate is expected to fall from 8.4 per cent this year 
to 7.4 per cent in 2008.  
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An important new feature of the Russian economy is the Stabilization Fund 
which was founded in 2004 and should in the medium and long term 
contribute to stabilizing economic growth. It is financed through the export 
tolls and mineral resources extraction tax that is imposed upon the surplus 
revenues of the oil extracting companies. These surplus revenues are due to a 
difference between the actual (Urals) oil price and a lower cut-off price, which 
is currently 27 US Dollars. The size of the Stabilization Fund is quite 
impressive: in September 2007 it achieved almost 133 billion US Dollars, 
which represents around 12 per cent of Russian GDP for the current year. The 
use of the accumulated resources is, however, confined to paying off the 
foreign debt and absorbing the excess liquidity in the economy. There are 
many discussions in Russian society about the possibility of using these 
resources for investment and welfare purposes. However, the government 
refuses to do it, saying that it would only destabilize the economy. 
Nevertheless, in the beginning of 2006, a so called Investment Fund was 
created, which is accumulated through a difference between the revenues of 
the Stabilization Fund at the cut-off price and the revenues at cut-off price 
minus 1 US Dollar. In comparison to the Stabilization Fund, the Investment 
Fund is quite small: about 14 billion US Dollars, or 0.3 per cent of Russian 
GDP in 2007. It is a first move at government level which aims to use the 
windfall gains generated by favourable oil price developments for investments 
to modernize the Russian economy. The Investment Fund can be used directly 
for public infrastructure investment or to stimulate private investment in 
infrastructure. 
                       
1.3 Euro Area 
Detail 
EURO AREA FORECAST 
The economic upturn in the Euro Area has lost some momentum in the first 
half of 2007.  This moderation had been expected by EUROFRAME-EFN as 
a consequence of the VAT-rate increase in Germany and the assessment that 
the strong acceleration of growth towards the end of last year in Italy had been 
partly due to special factors. Nonetheless, there were some surprises with 
regard to the quarterly pattern of growth as well as to the composition of 
demand.  
 
Quarterly real GDP growth in the Euro Area slowed to 0.3 per cent in the 
second quarter of 2007, down from a stronger than expected 0.5 per cent in 
the first quarter. This result was significantly below expectations. Stronger 
growth had been anticipated given the remarkably high level of business 
climate indicators and consumer sentiment. Growth was particularly weak in 
most of the larger countries, including Germany, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands. Part of the explanation lies in a return of residential investment 
to normal levels after the strong rise in the first quarter that was to a large 
extent due to unseasonally warm weather and was a major factor behind the 
surprising resilience of growth in the first three months. In addition, the 
recovery of private consumption in Germany from its tax-induced dive in the 
first quarter proved to be more modest than expected, leading to a slower-
than-expected growth rate of 0.5 per cent in the second quarter, following 
stagnation in the beginning of the year. The upturn in corporate investment, 
on the other hand, seems to have remained on track reflecting high utilization 
rates, especially in the industrial sector, high profitability and optimistic 
business expectations. Exports continued to increase, although at lower rates 
than in the second half of last year when export figures in Germany were 
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inflated for statistical reasons.2 Imports at the same time grew at a slightly 
slower rate which led to a positive contribution of net exports to GDP growth 
in both quarters. 
 
There is an impression that actual economic developments in the second 
quarter could have been somewhat stronger than is implied by recent national 
account statistics. While the slowdown in real GDP growth in the second 
quarter is consistent with “hard” data currently available for output and 
demand, such as industrial production and retail sales, it is clearly at odds with 
business and consumer surveys which used to be reliable gauges of economic 
activity in the past and indicate much stronger growth.  
 
A continued strong expansion of economic activity in the Euro Area is also 
suggested by the strong performance in the labour market. Employment grew 
by another 0.5 per cent in the second quarter, bringing annual growth to 1.7 
per cent. Employment growth remained particularly strong in Spain, Finland, 
Austria and Slovenia, and also in Germany after accounting for the weather-
related developments in the construction sector. On the other hand, 
employment rose at a more moderate pace in France, Belgium and also in Italy, 
despite a visible pick-up registered here in the second quarter.  
 
Unemployment continued on its steady decline and fell to 6.9 per cent, down 
from 7.1 per cent in March and 7.5 per cent in December last year. The 
reduction in unemployment since the start of the year was substantial in many 
countries, including Finland, France and Germany although German 
unemployment declined at a slower rate after having fallen like a stone in the 
first months of the year. In other countries the decline in unemployment was 
less pronounced, partly due to the already very low level of unemployment 
(Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia), and to a strong inflow of labour (Spain, 
Austria). In Portugal, unemployment stagnated reflecting sluggish growth in 
the economy, and in Ireland unemployment even rose in recent months as a 
consequence of decreasing activity in residential construction.   
 
Wage growth remains moderate at the aggregate Euro Area level. Despite the 
substantial decline in unemployment, average earnings can be expected to rise 
by just 2.8 per cent this year, translating into unit labour cost growth consistent 
with the ECB target of an inflation rate of below but close to 2 per cent. We 
expect a modest acceleration of wage growth next year and in 2009, reflecting 
increasing tensions in some pockets of the labour market. Most of the increase, 
however, stems from a further pick-up in German wages that can be regarded 
as a return to normality in German wage growth after a period of extremely 
low – or even negative – growth in 2004–5 which had been triggered by 
restructuring in the corporate sector and labour market reforms. An 
acceleration in German wage growth has been underway since last year and is 
expected to continue into 2009. In this process, the gap between wage growth 
in the Euro Area and Germany, respectively, will disappear ending the 
sustained period of real devaluation of the German economy vis-à-vis the rest 
of the Euro Area. With average earnings growth in the total Euro Area 
projected at below 3.5 per cent, risks to price stability from wage cost 
developments will remain limited over the forecast horizon. 
 
Annual inflation in the Euro Area continued to be below the 2 per cent 
threshold for 12 consecutive months, coming in at 1.7 per cent in August. 
Inflation remained modest despite the substantial impact of the VAT increase 
                                                 
2 The German statistical office recorded exports into the national accounts for the third and 
fourth quarters that had actually taken place in the first half of the year but were notified late by 
firms.  
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in Germany that lifted the price level in the Euro Area by close to 0.3 per cent. 
Another factor putting upward pressure on consumer prices was the upward 
movement of some food prices, with large increases in recent months 
reflecting drastically higher world market prices especially for cereals and dairy 
products. On the other hand, energy prices were below the previous year’s 
level or only slightly above, following a number of years with strong rises in 
this component. The core rate of HICP inflation (excluding energy and 
unprocessed food) which had been on an upward trend in 2006, partly due to 
the effect of the higher VAT in Germany being rolled over into consumer 
prices, stopped rising in spring 2007. It has remained stable since then at 
slightly below 2 per cent.  
 
Figure 1.3.1 CPI Inflation in the Euro Area 2003-2007a,b 
 
aChange over previous year. bSolid line: Core inflation,bar chart: headline 
inflation. Source: Thomson Financial Datastream. 
 
2003  2004 2005 2006 2007  
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
per cent 
 
The outlook for production in the near term is still benign, although business 
sentiment has fallen slightly in recent months. The generally high level of 
confidence and a high backlog of orders, along with first indicators from the 
production side, suggest a rebound of economic growth in the third quarter. 
Looking further ahead, the outlook is obviously clouded by the recent events 
in financial markets and the uncertainty about their impact on the real 
economy. It is difficult to assess at the current juncture to what extent and for 
how long financing conditions for firms and household will be negatively 
affected and what impact the current developments will have on business 
sentiment and consumer confidence. In our baseline scenario, we expect 
financial market turmoil to calm down in the course of the coming weeks. In 
this event the negative impact on investment and household consumption 
should be limited. Monetary policy, under this assumption, is expected to 
remain tight with a final rise in the ECB main refinancing rate to 4.25 per cent 
projected for December (see monetary policy section). We do, however, 
discuss alternative scenarios in this report that would lead to a more severe 
reduction in economic momentum and a different path for short term interest 
rates (see Section 1.4). Fiscal policy is expected to be close to neutral next year, 
following a period of substantial reduction in the aggregate deficit in the Euro 
Area. A major stimulus from the fiscal side is projected for France while the 
fiscal impulse in most other countries is small (see fiscal policy section). 
 
With the major caveat of high uncertainty about the evolution of the situation 
in financial markets, we forecast economic expansion in the Euro Area to 
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remain strong in the second half of 2007 bringing growth for the full year to 
2.7 per cent and we expect it to slow moderately in 2008 and 2009 to around 
2¼ per cent, a level of growth which is close to the growth of potential output. 
Growth in private consumption is expected to accelerate markedly in 2008 to 
2.5 per cent, up from 1.7 per cent this year. This will be driven by a recovery in 
consumption in Germany following the VAT-induced stagnation seen this year 
and robust household demand in France as a result of the positive impact of 
tax cuts on real disposable income. Growth in private investment is projected 
to lose momentum with the slowdown concentrated in residential investment 
as a consequence of less buoyant housing markets in a number of countries.  
In addition, monetary tightening and frontloading of corporate investment in 
Germany into 2007 to escape the deterioration of depreciation rules will weigh 
on investment next year. Exports should continue to rise and at a decelerating 
pace as a consequence of more moderate growth in world output in general 
and slower domestic demand growth in the US in particular. With import 
growth slowing less, we expect no significant contribution to overall growth 
from net exports this year and next. More moderate economic growth will be 
reflected in slower employment growth, and the unemployment rate is 
expected to decline less rapidly to a level of 6.5 per cent this year and 6.2 per 
cent in 2009. Inflation should remain benign with the HICP continuing to rise 
by around 2 per cent. 
 
Table 1.3.1   Euro Area Forecasta
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Consumption 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.7 2.4 2.2
Private investment 1.8 3.1 2.8 6.0 4.8 3.3 2.5
Government expenditure 1.8 1.0 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0
Stockbuilding(b) 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Total domestic demand 1.7 2.1 1.9 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.2
Export volumes 1.1 6.5 4.6 8.2 5.8 4.2 3.7
Import volumes 3.2 6.3 5.3 7.8 5.1 4.7 4.0
GDP 0.8 1.8 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.1
Average earnings 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.4 3.4
Harmonised consumer prices 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.0
Private consumption deflator 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.0
Real personal disposable income 0.8 1.6 1.1 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.3
Standardised Unemployment, % 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.0 6.5 6.2
Govt. balance as % of GDP -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -1.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9
Govt. debt as % of GDP 69.3 69.8 70.8 68.9 66.6 64.4 62.7
Current account as % of GDP 0.4 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6
a  GDP data shown in table are adjusted for working-day variation. 
b change as a per cent of GDP. 
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The forecast is based on the following assumptions: 
Oil prices will average US$66.6 per barrel in 2007, US$70.9 in 2008 and 
US$70.0 in 2009.  Our forecast refers to an unweighted average of Brent, WTI 
(Western Texas Intermediate) and Dubai oil prices. 
The dollar/euro exchange rate will average 1.39 in 2008 and 1.40 in 2009. 
Forecasts are based on data available up to mid-September 2007. 
The assumptions for commodity prices, exchange rates and interest rates used 
in the forecast were constructed by consensus, as the average projections of 
the 10 member Institutes. These are broadly consistent with current financial 
market expectations and forward markets, as the majority of Institutes use this 
information in constructing their own forecasts. 
 
EURO AREA HOUSING INVESTMENT IN LIGHT OF ITS 
FUNDAMENTALS 
In light of the recent sharp recession in the US housing market and against the 
backdrop of falling house prices and with construction activity in a number of 
Euro Area countries rising at least as fast as in the US over recent years, 
housing markets could be regarded an obvious risk factor for the Euro Area 
outlook. In Ireland, a smaller Euro Area economy that has experienced 
extremely strong rises in house prices and housing construction in recent years, 
house prices have already peaked and residential investment has started to 
recede. House prices in the larger Euro Area economies have been increasing 
rapidly in Spain, the Netherlands and France. In the following, we look at 
some of the factors behind the housing market developments in these 
countries. We also identify which regions face the highest risk of succumbing 
to a similar housing market downturn as that seen in the US.  
 
The downturn in the US housing market can be viewed as a correction to the 
housing investment to GDP ratio, which inched up from an average of 4½ per 
cent in the 1980s and 1990s to reach 5.6 per cent in volume terms in the third 
quarter of 2005, the highest level since the 1970s. The recent downturn 
brought this ratio back to 4.3 per cent in the second quarter of 2007, and we 
expect it to deteriorate further before reverting to the historical average of 4½ 
per cent over the longer term.  
 
Figure 1.3.2 shows that housing investment to GDP ratios have been differing 
across countries since 1980. While the level of housing investment relative to 
GDP in the 1980s averaged between 4½-5 per cent in Spain, France and Italy, 
comparable to that in the US, housing investment to GDP ratios have been 
consistently higher than that in Germany and the Netherlands. In the 1990s 
these ratios started to diverge across countries, with the average ratio in France 
falling to about 3½ per cent of GDP and in Italy to 4 per cent. The Spanish 
ratio by contrast rose to 5.5 per cent by 1999. Since then the Spanish housing 
investment to GDP ratio has continued to rise sharply, dwarfing the recent rise 
observed in the US. While we have seen a slight rise in the housing investment 
ratios in France and Italy in recent years, they remain well below the 4½ per 
cent average of the 1980s. In Germany the already high housing investment to 
GDP ratio rose sharply in the early 1990s following unification before starting 
a long-lasting decline. Nevertheless housing investment relative to GDP is still 
relatively high by international standards, which is also true in the case of the 
Netherlands. 
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Figure 1.3.2 Housing Investment/GDP (volumes) 
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There are a number of reasons why we might expect housing investment to 
GDP ratios to differ across countries and over time. Preference may differ and 
evolve. Demographics may differ and evolve, and these can affect preferences. 
Interest rate volatility can also affect the evolution over time, as it affects 
investor risk.  
 
Table 1.3.2 reports some key housing market indicators for the 5 countries 
charted above. The number of inhabitants per dwelling is an indication of the 
relative living standards, in terms of housing, across countries. We might 
expect housing investment to GDP ratios to be higher in regions with a 
relatively high housing density, to allow convergence in living standards. 
Housing density in Italy and the Netherlands is high relative to the other 
countries in our sample and indeed the Netherlands has exhibited a relatively 
high housing investment ratio over the last 25 years, although Italy did not.3   
 
Table 1.3.2. Key Housing Indicators for large Euro Area Economies 
 
Population density 
(2005) 
Housing density 
(2001)  
Dwelling size 
(2001)  interest rate volatility(a)
 
(persons per sq km) 
(inhabitants per 
dwelling) 
average m2 per 
capita 1980s 1990s 2000-2006 
France 108.4 2.0 43.9 1.2 1.0 0.3 
Germany 231.0 2.1 42.1 0.9 1.0 0.3 
Italy 194.5 2.7(b) 35.0(b) 2.0 1.7 0.3 
Netherlands 391.5 2.4 41.2 1.0 0.9 0.3 
Spain 85.8 2.0 47.6 2.6 1.8 0.3 
(a) Standard deviation of 3-month money market rates, after removing a common 
trend. 
(b) 1998 
 
Housing density reflects the number of inhabitants per dwelling, but does not 
give any insight into the relative quality or size of housing across countries. 
Average dwelling size per capita is another indication of living standards in 
terms of housing. By this measure, living standards in Europe are generally 
                                                 
3 Analysis based on a larger sample of countries (Holland 2007) suggests that Italy is an 
exception in this regard. 
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relatively low compared to other industrial countries such as Australia, the US 
and Canada. Clearly population density must play a role in this, as the 
opportunity cost of an extra square metre of dwelling space is lower in 
countries with large stocks of undeveloped land. Among European countries, 
average dwelling size per capita is lowest in Italy, followed by the Netherlands 
and is relatively high in Spain. As there is no obvious correlation between 
housing investment ratios and average dwelling size per capita and assuming 
that consumer preferences across the board demand more living space per 
capita, this suggests that supply does not react significantly to rising demand 
pressures in Italy, which could be associated with strong house price growth.  
 
Spain has a relatively low housing density and a high average dwelling size. 
Population density is fairly low by European standards, which is consistent 
with a higher dwelling size, but the figures reported in Table 1.3.2 do little to 
explain the recent surge in Spanish housing investment. One factor that may 
raise housing demand in Spain is the recent rise in population growth, which is 
partly attributable to a surge in immigration. However, housing investment has 
outstripped population growth by a considerable margin, pointing to additional 
factors at work. One such factor could be the decline in interest rate volatility 
experienced in recent years in Spain, although there is not a strong correlation 
between interest rate volatility and housing investment ratios across countries. 
Another important element distinguishing the Spanish housing market from 
those in the other countries discussed here is the large share of holiday homes 
in the stock of housing. Adjusting housing density for holiday homes will yield 
a significantly different picture, as inhabitants per dwelling in residential homes 
is much higher than in holiday homes.  
 
If we think of housing as an investment good, the level of investment should 
be related to the expected return on housing, or the expected sale value of a 
house relative to its construction cost. This can be viewed as an approximation 
of Tobin’s Q ratio for housing. Higher growth in the ratio of the average 
annual growth of house prices relative to housing investment deflators can be 
expected to be associated with a rise in the housing investment ratio. This type 
of speculative investment is not necessarily related to demand pressures, and 
can lead to a sharp turnaround as we have recently observed in the US.  
 
Figure 1.3.3 Housing prices/housing investment deflators 
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France has seen a very strong rise in the return to housing investment in the 
last 5-10 years. Nonetheless, its housing investment to GDP ratios has 
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remained low and stable. This suggests that housing investment may be 
restrained by domestic regulation. Price rises appear to be driven by a shortage 
of supply, and we should not expect a sharp drop in housing investment in 
France. In the Netherlands, the return on housing investment rose sharply in 
the second half of the 1990s, but growth has slowed in recent years. Over this 
period, housing investment to GDP has been very stable, but remains at a high 
level relative to most other economies. The Netherlands is constrained by a 
high population density, so while average dwelling size is on the low side we 
expect the housing investment ratio to recede somewhat over our forecast 
horizon. However, this process is expected to be affected gradually, without a 
sharp contraction in housing investment. 
 
The return on housing investment in Germany has been declining over the last 
15 years, and this has been associated with a decline in the housing investment 
ratio from nearly 8 per cent at the end of 1994 to 5.5 per cent at the end of 
2006. Nonetheless, this remains high relative to most of the other major 
economies, and cannot be explained by demographic developments, as total 
population is expected to stagnate or decline for the next several years. 
Average dwelling size is slightly on the low side, but the fundamentals do not 
support strong housing investment growth over the coming years. Housing 
investment in Germany expanded by 4½ per cent last year, after 10 years of 
weakness and 5 consecutive years of decline. This was, however, probably 
mainly due to the abolition of housing allowances (Eigenheimzulage) for 
buildings permitted after January 1st, 2006. Since building has to be started 
within two years after permission, this legislation led to a sharp but temporary 
increase in housing starts in 2006. Over a longer horizon we expect housing 
investment to grow more slowly than GDP and cannot rule out further 
declines in the short to medium term.  
 
Spain has seen a significant rise in the return on housing investment in the last 
few years. Combined with a reduction in interest rate volatility and a surge in 
population growth, this has been associated with a sharp rise in the housing 
investment ratio. Population growth is expected to moderate over the next few 
years and housing density in Spain is already at relatively low levels. We expect 
the housing investment ratio, which has been supported by speculative activity, 
to revert towards historical norms over the coming years. While we project a 
soft landing of the housing market in our baseline forecast, this could be 
associated with a sharp correction in the housing market in some Euro Area 
economies, as experienced in the US. In Section 1.4.2 we discuss the potential 
impact of a collapse in Spanish housing investment on the Spanish and Euro 
Area economies.  
 
GERMANY  
The cyclical upswing in Germany has lost momentum in the first half of 2007. 
This was in line with expectations, since domestic demand was dampened by 
restrictive fiscal policy measures, in particular the increase of the main VAT 
rate by 3 percentage points to 19 percent at the start of the year. Private 
consumption was especially affected and fell at an annualized rate of 2.1 per 
cent, both as a result of the loss in real incomes that came with the higher 
VAT as well as the response to the advanced purchases in 2006. In addition, 
exports grew markedly slower than in 2006, following reduced momentum in 
industrial production growth abroad. The quarterly pattern of growth, 
however, was somewhat surprising. While q-o-q real GDP growth remained 
astonishingly high, at 0.5 per cent in the first quarter, output expanded by a 
slower than expected 0.3 per cent in the second quarter when aggregate 
capacity utilisation fell for the first time in four quarters. A major factor behind 
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this was residential construction, which benefited from advanced purchases 
and exceptionally mild weather in the first quarter but fell drastically in the 
second quarter. However, industrial production also lost momentum despite 
an extremely positive assessment of current economic conditions by firms, 
strong order inflows and a historically very high backlog of orders. 
 
The situation on the labour market continued to improve, although 
employment grew more slowly in the second quarter than in the first quarter 
and unemployment did not decline as strongly as in the first quarter. In July, 
the rate of unemployment (Eurostat definition) was at 6.4 per cent, more than 
1 percentage point lower than at the start of the year, but only 0.2 percentage 
points down from April. With the VAT hike now nearly fully rolled over into 
consumer prices, inflationary pressures were somewhat lower in recent 
months, despite rising food and energy prices. In August, consumer prices 
exceeded their level one year ago by 2.0 per cent.  
 
The slowdown in activity in the first half of the year does not, in our view, 
imply that the upswing has come to a standstill. Business investment continued 
to grow and firms continued to expand regular employment. Despite some 
decline in recent months, the ifo business climate index is still at a very high 
level by historical standards, as are firms’ assessments of orders at hand. We 
therefore expect the cyclical momentum to be markedly higher in the second 
half of 2007 than in the first half, although growth rates are likely to remain 
below those seen last year. Most importantly, domestic demand growth will 
accelerate as the dampening effects from the VAT hike fade out. Private 
consumption growth is expected to be stimulated by the improvement in the 
labour market and a normalisation of the savings rate. This has risen by a 
remarkable half a percentage point in the first half of 2007. Corporate 
investment growth will remain high driven by the firms wishing to expand 
capacities. In addition, we expect investment from next year to be brought 
forward into 2007 as a reduction in depreciation allowances will become 
effective next year. In addition, export growth will pick up as industrial 
production in the Euro Area should re-accelerate. Overall, real GDP in 2007 
should register growth of 2.7 per cent. Consumer prices are likely to rise by 2 
per cent.  
 
Next year aggregate production will increase at a more moderate pace. 
Domestic demand, however, will remain robust, driven primarily by private 
consumption. With employment rising and wage growth accelerating, 
household real disposable income will grow faster and this will spur 
consumption growth. Investment, by contrast, will slow down due to higher 
financing costs and as a result of the advanced purchases in 2007. Export 
growth should be rather moderate reflecting reduced momentum in the world 
economy. Real GDP is projected to increase by 2.2 per cent next year, 
followed by 2 per cent growth in 2009. Unemployment will continue to fall 
and could drop below 6 per cent in 2009. Consumer prices are expected to rise 
by 2 per cent this year. Despite the impact of higher VAT (estimated at more 
than 1 percentage point) disappearing, inflation will moderate only slightly over 
the next two years as a result of a significant pick-up in unit labour costs and 
higher food prices.  
 
The forecast assumes fiscal policies that are almost neutral in 2008 and 2009, 
with no significant change in the structural general government budget balance 
after two years of substantial fiscal restraint. Government expenditures will 
accelerate somewhat but continue to rise at a slower pace than potential GDP. 
At the same time, corporate tax reform and a lower rate of contribution to the 
social security schemes will reduce the tax burden. With output continuing to 
rise somewhat faster than potential a small surplus in the general government 
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finances can be expected for 2008, after a balancing of the budget being 
achieved this year.  
 
We do not expect the current turmoil on financial markets to cause a credit 
crunch in Germany over the next months, although it is not clear at the 
current juncture to what extent the problems in the banking system will affect 
interest rates for bank loans or credit conditions. These banking problems 
have hit Germany with two mid-sized government-controlled banks having 
had to be rescued,. Unexpectedly tight credit is a major risk to the short-term 
outlook in Germany. 
 
FRANCE  
According to the last release of quarterly national accounts, French GDP grew 
by 0.5 per cent in the first quarter of 2007 and by only 0.3 per cent in the 
second quarter. This brings GDP growth to only 1.3 per cent in the second 
quarter as compared to the same quarter of 2006, well below the average area 
performance of 2.5 per cent. Although the low French GDP growth in recent 
quarters partly reflects weak industrial production growth, it seems low in the 
context of business survey results. For instance, OFCE’s quarterly GDP 
growth rate indicator based on business survey data suggested a GDP growth 
of around 0.7 in the first quarter and 0.6 in the second quarter. The 
divergences between survey data and hard data have increased since 2005 in 
France like in other Euro Area countries. For France, the divergence between 
hard and soft data may perhaps be interpreted as an indication of a future 
upward revision in GDP growth for the first half of the year (as was recently 
the case for annual GDP growth in 2005, now being estimated at 1.7 per cent 
instead of 1.2 per cent a few months ago).   
 
We expect GDP to grow more in line with business survey data in the second 
half of 2007, with quarterly growth rates expected at close to 0.7 per cent, 
slightly below OFCE’s quarterly growth indicator. As far as the third quarter is 
concerned, both survey data available up to July and the industrial production 
index suggest an acceleration of growth, although one has to be cautious 
because we have at this stage mainly information on the first month of the 
quarter and this was before the turmoil in financial markets. The industrial 
production index has risen by 1.3 per cent in July as compared to June mainly 
because of a sharp rebound in the automobile industry (+4.7 per cent). 
Industrial production growth remains fragile, however, with a 0.7 per cent 
increase in the three months up to July 2007 as compared to the same months 
a year earlier.  
 
We forecast French GDP to grow by 1.9 per cent in 2007. Domestic demand 
will remain the major engine for growth, rising by 2.3 per cent. Both 
household’s consumption and government expenditure will rise by around 2.3 
per cent, while private investment growth will stay close to 4 per cent. Net 
external trade will remain the main factor dampening GDP growth, for the 
fifth year in a row, reducing GDP growth by 0.3 percentage point this year as 
in 2006. The corresponding figure, on annual average basis, for 2003 to 2005 
was 0.8 percentage points. French exporters seem to have stopped losing 
market shares since 2006. But import growth remains more rapid than export 
growth due to a relatively robust domestic demand as compared to France’s 
major trading partners.  
 
It is too early to assess whether the past trend in French exporters’ market 
share is over. French export market shares have been more affected than other 
countries, and especially Germany, by the appreciation of the euro from 2002 
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to 2005. The recent rise in the euro and our forecasts for a further appreciation 
lead us to expect a further decline of French exporter’s markets shares in 2008 
and 2009. Net external trade will reduce GDP growth by an annual 0.5 
percentage point up to 2009, under our forecast of rather robust domestic 
demand.  Domestic demand growth will accelerate to 2.9 per cent in 2008 and 
will slowdown slightly to 2.6 per cent in 2009. This will be due to households’ 
consumption (rising by more than 3 per cent) being supported by the 
introduction of significant tax cuts (see fiscal policy section). 
 
French inflation has been among the lowest in the Euro Area over the last few 
months. The harmonised consumer price index rose by an annual 1.2 per cent 
in July in France and by 1.8 per cent in the Euro Area.  French inflation is 
expected to come closer to 2 per cent at the end of this year under the effect of 
past rises in energy prices. However, apart from the energy and some food 
components, there are hardly any signs of inflationary pressures. We expect 
HICP inflation to remain close to 1.7 per cent in 2008 and 2009, below the 2 
per cent area average. Under our GDP growth forecast the unemployment rate 
will continue to decline. In terms of the EUROSTAT standardised measure, it 
will decrease from 8.1 per cent in 2007 to 7.7 per cent in 2009. France will 
remain one of the Euro Area countries with the highest unemployment rates. 
 
In terms of fiscal policy, French prospects seem likely to be at odds with 
developments in neighbouring countries. The government in office since the 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections of last Spring has announced a 
number of fiscal measures, mainly tax cuts benefiting households and 
amounting to 0.7 per cent of GDP. At the time of preparing the forecast, 
detailed budget plans were not available (they will be released on September 
26). Our forecast embeds the new measures announced in terms of revenues. 
On the expenditure side, we have more limited information and we have 
assumed that government spending growth will rise at rates close to the recent 
trend. Under these assumptions, fiscal policy will be clearly expansionary in 
2008, with a fiscal impulse amounting to 0.5 percentage point of GDP, 
whereas the objectives announced in the latest update of the Stability 
Programme at the end of 2006 where of a 0.7 percentage point of GDP fiscal 
tightening. Under our GDP growth forecast and fiscal assumptions, the 
government deficit is at risk of breaching the 3 per cent of GDP limit of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in 2008 and remaining at close to 3 per cent of GDP 
in 2009.  
ITALY  
The Italian economy’s slowdown in the second quarter (0.1 per cent q-o-q) 
was expected and correctly incorporated in our forecasts. The new data does 
not necessitate a revision to our forecast for 2007, but the worsened 
international context will reduce GDP growth to 1.5 per cent in 2008. 
 
In the first six months of this year the pace of GDP growth slowed to 0.2 per 
cent q-o-q from 0.7 per cent q-o-q in the second part of 2006. This mirrored 
the slowdown in industrial production which, after an 18 month recovery, fell 
in the first part of 2007 (-0.8 per cent q-o-q in q1and -0.2 per cent q-o-q in q2). 
Over the same period, increases were recorded in both Germany (2.7 per cent) 
and France (1.3 per cent).  
 
The slowdown is driven by investment (in particular construction) while 
demand for consumer goods is accelerating. This recovery in consumption is 
taking place despite two years of very low growth in household disposable 
income. As consumption growth was driven by durable goods, it appears that 
the fiscal incentives for the purchase of some durable goods are working. Net 
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exports made a negative contribution to GDP growth and exports continue to 
fall (-1 per cent q-o-q in q2 and -0.1 per cent q-o-q in q1). Notwithstanding the 
disappointing performance of exports, in the first six months of the 2007 the 
trade deficit improved relative to the same period of 2006 (from -14 billions of 
euro to -7.3) and in June, after ten months in deficit, it returned positive. 
 
During the summer, according to survey evidence, economic growth would 
have improved slightly but several elements of uncertainty are still present.  
Although the outlooks for investments and exports are more favourable, the 
outlook for consumption is weaker, as signalled by the fall in the index of 
household confidence in August. 
 
For this year we expect GDP to increase by 1.8 per cent while the changed 
international context will reduce growth prospects for next year to 1.5 per cent. 
Much of the slowdown will be due to household consumption expenditure and 
for the following reasons: the ending of the effects of consumption-related 
incentives, worsening consumer confidence and tighter credit conditions. 
Residential investment will also contribute less to GDP growth, in spite of 
fiscal incentives (VAT tax on house restorations was reduced from the 20 to 
10 per cent and a fiscal saving of 55 per cent was introduced for energy saving 
measures). We expect this to continue into 2008. 
 
Inflation is in line with our forecast. The slowdown in headline inflation (1.7 y-
o-y basis in August) has been mainly due to a favourable base effect. However, 
this may already have disappeared in September, when inflation is expected to 
reach 1.8 per cent and then to rise further in the following months. Looking 
ahead, wage growth is likely to accelerate towards 3 per cent, as next year will 
bring about the negotiation of several wage contracts, both in the public and in 
the manufacturing sector. Moreover, crude oil prices will remain high. On the 
other hand, some improvement in labour productivity growth and the strength 
of the euro should help to keep inflation in check at slightly above 2 per cent.  
 
The public finances appear to be as strong as was expected. Tax revenues and 
the transfer of Tfr to Inps funds reduced the public borrowing requirement in 
the first eight months of 2007 by 11 billion euros relative to the same period of 
2006. According to our estimates, revenue growth will continue to be larger 
than expected in the coming months. However, taking into account the 
spending passed in July and the willingness of the government to take 
advantage of this favourable situation by bringing forward as much as possible 
spending that was due in 2008, we expect  that the budget deficit will not be 
lower than the target of 2.5 per cent of GDP. However, we cannot exclude a 
revision to the target in the coming Update of the Planning Document, due at 
the end of September. The deficit is estimated to be 2.5 per cent of GDP in 
2008 as well, only slightly above the government target (2.2 per cent), and is 
likely to fall only in 2009.  
 
References have been made above to financial uncertainty, its possible 
consequences for the banking system and the reactions of central banks to the 
situation. Given the importance of these issues, it is appropriate to analyse 
them further. In the following three sub-sections, we present such analyses. 
1.4 Additional 
topics 
1.4.1 A BERNANKE PUT? 
Federal Reserve Board chairman Ben Bernanke has made it clear that he will 
stand by the markets and try to ensure that the recent turmoil that has resulted 
from lending to home buyers that was not fully secured will not cause a major 
downturn. The US faces two major problems, in that the banking sector is 
distressed and the housing market appears to be turning down sharply. The 
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former could result in a crisis, whilst the latter will reduce the level of 
economic activity rapidly. It has been made clear that the Federal Reserve will 
both support the markets through the discount window and also that it would 
cut interest rates to support demand. We consider that this is a clear message 
that monetary policy will be looser than it would have been and the markets 
hence must react. The message form other Central Banks has been less clearly 
expansionary in its implications, and hence the dollar has weakened in 
anticipation of the loosening. 
 
We can simulate the effects of a decline in the dollar generated in this way by 
shifting the target for US inflation, and we scale it so that the dollar falls by 
around 2 1/2 per cent in effective terms, much as it did between early August 
and the middle of September 2007. In the simulation, interest rates in the US 
fall by 50 basis points in the fourth quarter of 2007 and by a further 25 basis 
points in the first quarter of 2008. We add on to this a relative appreciation of 
the yen induced by a fall in its relative risk premium. This, we believe, has been 
generated by the belief that the Japanese banking system is not at risk in the 
same way as elsewhere. The combination of these two shocks shift the yen 
from around 123 to the dollar in July to around 114.6, whilst the euro rises 
from 1.355 to 1.400 to the dollar. 
 
Table 1.4.1 plots the effects of these shifts on a baseline where they would 
have been absent. US growth and inflation are noticeably higher than they 
would have been, whilst the increase in US demand largely offsets the output 
effects of appreciations elsewhere. These results would lead us to think that the 
Bernanke put is wise and effective. However, bailing out a banking system that 
is unsound builds up risks for the future that we cannot model. These in turn 
could lead to a more severe banking crisis in future. 
 
Table 1.4.1    Impacts of a loosening of monetary policy in the US 
 
Output (per cent difference from 
base) Inflation (per cent difference from base) 
 Euro Area Japan US Euro Area Japan US 
2007 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2008 -0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.5 
2009 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.2 1.1 
2010 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.2 1.0 
2011 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.7 
2012 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.5 
NiGEM simulation. Forward looking financial and foreign exchange markets 
Forward looking wages, myopic consumers. Lower risk premium in Japan. 
 
1.4.2 HOUSE PRICES IN A BANKING CRISIS 
House prices in Europe have generally risen strongly in the last few years, 
supported by low interest rates and financial deregulation. A rise in credit 
spreads facing consumers could impact rapidly on housing markets in a 
number of countries, and this would affect the level of demand, both through 
its impact on investment and through its effects on consumption. The impact 
of house prices on consumption varies across the European economies, 
depending on the nature of the housing market and the degree of financial 
deregulation. Al Eyd et al (2006) looks at the evidence on the role of house 
prices on consumption in Europe, and concludes that in countries such as 
Spain and the UK a fall in house prices has an immediate effect whereas in 
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countries such as France the effects are delayed. There is little evidence that 
changes in house prices impact on Italy. The impact of house prices on 
investment is not at all clear, but if there has been a lot of speculative 
investment with large inventories, then falling house prices are liable to impact 
strongly on housing investment. Holland (2007) suggests that Spain is the only 
European country where this might be a problem. 
 
Table 1.4.2    The Impact of a 5 per cent fall in House Prices 
 Output (per cent difference from base) 
 Euro Area France Spain UK 
2007 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 
2008 -0.08 -0.07 -0.24 -0.28 
2009 -0.08 -0.13 -0.21 -0.25 
NiGEM simulation. Forward looking financial and foreign exchange markets 
Forward looking wages, myopic consumers 
 
We have undertaken two simulations to evaluate the potential impact of 
financial market turmoil on the European economies. In the first we reduced 
house prices by 5 per cent in all countries from the fourth quarter of 2007. 
Output growth slows as we can see from Table 1.4.2, but the effects on the 
Euro Area are not large, and market interest rates would only fall by 10 basis 
points initially. In the UK the effects are larger, and interest rates would be cut 
by between 25 and 50 basis points.  
 
Because of the high rate of investment in housing in Spain (discussed in 
Section 1.3) we have considered an additional scenario involving that country. 
If banks and other lenders were to become concerned about lending to house 
builders in Spain then the spread between their borrowing rates and market 
rates, the quality spread, could rise. The simulation presented in Table 1.4.3 
overlays the fall in European house prices with a rise in the quality spread in 
Spain that is sufficient to slow output growth to zero in each quarter of 2008. 
Private sector investment growth drops to an annual rate of -15 per cent in 
Spain by the last quarter of 2008. If the ECB follows our policy rule it would 
cut the interest rate by at least 25 basis points by the end of 2008 to help 
absorb the shock to the Euro Area as a whole, but it would not respond to 
events in Spain in any specific way. As a consequence of the slowdown in 
demand in Spain the current account would improve by 2 ½ per cent of GDP 
in 2008. Inflation would take time to respond, but it would be one per cent a 
year lower in Spain for 2 years. Euro Area inflation would not initially fall 
because the deflation in Spain would be offset by the impacts of a weaker 
currency that the policy response would induce. 
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Table 1.4.3  Impacts of an Investment Crisis in Spain after a 5 per cent fall in 
House Prices 
 
Output (per cent difference from base) 
 
Inflation (per cent difference 
from base) 
 Euro Area France Spain UK Euro Area Spain 
2007 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2008 -0.3 -0.1 -2.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 
2009 -0.5 -0.2 -3.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.9 
2010 -0.5 -0.2 -3.6 -0.2 -0.2 -1.1 
2011 -0.3 -0.2 -2.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 
2012 -0.1 -0.1 -0.9 0.2 0.0 0.1 
NiGEM simulation. Forward looking financial and foreign exchange markets 
Forward looking wages, myopic consumers. 
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1.4.3  BANKING CRISES AND THE RISKS OF RECESSION 
Turmoil in the financial markets between June and September 2007 has led to 
the possibility that we may see a wave of banking crises. A full blown banking 
crisis leads to a destruction of financial assets and to a loss of confidence in 
banks, changing people’s behaviour and the equilibrium of the economy. 
There are few ways to deal with them, and a fiscal intervention is almost 
inevitable. The state normally takes the assets and liabilities of the failed banks 
and covers most liabilities and attempts to realize value from the assets. The 
Norwegian and Swedish banking crises involved an initial increase in 
government debt of 8 per cent and 4 per cent of GDP respectively. Finland 
had a larger scale problem and the initial cost of the banking crisis involved an 
11 per cent of GDP increase in government debt, but many of the assets had a 
realized value in excess of their initial book amount, and hence the overall cost 
to the fiscal authorities was probably 3.8 per cent of 2005 GDP. In each of 
these recent European cases the output loss was severe, as can be seen from 
Figure 1.4.1. Banking crises have not been uncommon, as we can see from the 
‘agreed’ list of crises that is commonly used in studies of their causes and 
impacts.4
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The table is abstracted from Barrell, Davis and Pomerantz (2006) which survey studies on the 
impact of crises on GDP and investment and undertakes the fist study of their direct impact on 
consumption. The list does not include obvious problems in the banking system such as those in 
the UK or France in the early 1990s as no bank went bankrupt in either case. In both cases the 
banking sector turmoil constrained consumption and reduced growth for a period. Hence the 
literature probably underemphasises the impact of banking sector problems on the real 
economy. 
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Figure 1.4.1: GDP Growth and the 1991 Banking Crisis 
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Table 1.4.4: List of Crises 
 Start date for banking crises 
US 1984 
UK 1974 
Germany 1977 
Japan 1992 
France 1994 
Sweden 1991 
Italy 1990 
Canada 1983 
Spain 1977 
Finland 1991 
Denmark 1987 
Australia 1989 
S Korea 1998 
Norway 1987 
  
Total 14 
1960s 0 
1970s 3 
1980s 5 
1990s 6 
Source: Barrell, Davis and Pomerantz (2007) based on Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), 
Bordo and Eichengreen (2002); systemic banking crises shown in bold. 
 
Banking crises are very hard to predict, but they have a tendency to follow on 
from periods of financial deregulation and excessive optimism in asset 
markets. Inadequacies in regulation may also raise the possibility of a crisis, and 
concerns have been expressed about the regulatory architecture in Europe5. 
The Commission has generated a European Economic Area wide financial 
system6 with cross border banks and interlocking deposits and loans.7 
However, this multi-country market is regulated by the individual country 
Financial Stability authorities, and it is difficult for any of them to have enough 
                                                 
5 Barrell and Davis (2005) describe financial regulation as the missing pillar in the European 
policy architecture, and they draw attention to the risks of crises. 
6 The Area includes non-EU members such as Norway and Switzerland, as they are covered by 
the banking directives and by most of the Single Market Programme for financial services.  
7 The timely paper by Nicolas Veron (2007) looks at the growth of cross border banking in 
Europe. 
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information to fully understand the balance sheets of international banks. 
Coordination takes place, but it is inevitably clumsy. If deregulated banks lend 
on the strength of bubble backed asset prices, either in the housing or equity 
markets, then a burst in the bubble can leave banks very exposed. Banks can 
also come under pressure when they have mispriced risk, and cut the spread 
between borrowing and lending rates. This can result from unwise competition 
combined with inadequate supervision, much as we have seen in Europe in the 
last decade. A low spread may leave little room for defaults, and spreads have 
been low in the US and the Euro Area over the last three years, as we can see 
from Figure 1.4.2.  
 
Figure 1.4.2: Spreads at the long end, Government-AAA  
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Recent turmoil has involved an increase in the inter bank rates spread over the 
central bank rate because lending banks are uncertain about the solvency of 
borrowing banks. This uncertainty has stemmed, at least initially, from the 
scale of defaults in the US subprime mortgage market. As the assets associated 
with these mortgages have been stripped and split it is not always clear to 
outsiders who is liable to make losses. The rise in inter-bank rates can cause 
short-term liquidity problems, as banks cannot easily borrow to cover the 
fluctuations in their assets and liabilities flows. If the scale of such borrowing 
by a bank becomes large then the availability of funds might dry up as risk 
would be seen to be high. It is at this point that the central bank can step in to 
provide liquidity and ease the situation, and the ECB announced large-scale 
intervention in late August, and the Bank of England intervened in September.  
 
Views differ on how this intervention should take place, but it would appear to 
be unwise for the lending to take place at a subsidized rate, and a penalty rate 
would impose a cost on bank equity holders and reduce the hazard of the 
banks repeating foolish book structures based on central bank bail outs. The 
Bank of England imposed a penal rate on its lending to the Northern Rock, a 
basically sound lender, but unfortunately induced a bank run. The run resulted 
from the public nature in which support was announced, and this made it clear 
that transparency in Central Bank operations is not always best practice. A run 
on the bank induced by the publicity could in turn have led to a liquidity crisis 
turning into a bankruptcy, but this was prevented. Subsequent lending to banks 
by the Bank of England has been less transparent, even though it has been at 
penal rates. ECB lending has also been less transparent than the Northern 
Rock case, but it is not at all clear that it has always been at a penal rate. 
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Liquidity crises can go away in a few months as exposures become clear, and 
our baseline case involves this assumption. We recognize that risk may have 
been underpriced and as a result the spread between risk free and risky assets 
will increase permanently. This increase in the cost of borrowing will slow 
investment and reduce sustainable output, but we would anticipate that the 
effects would be distributed over a number of years. Barrell, Holland, Liadze 
and Pomerantz (2007) suggest that a one per cent increase in the quality 
premium would raise the cost of capital by ½ to 1 percentage points and hence 
reduce equilibrium output in the Euro Area by between 0.4 and 1 per cent in 
the long run. Model simulations suggest that this could mean that growth 
would be reduced on average by 0.1 to 0.2 per cent a year for five years. Such a 
change is not a recession. However, a full scale banking crisis would have a 
much larger impact, and we present the potential impacts of such events as 
alternative scenarios to our main forecast.  
 
The core problem for the world financial system appears to originate in the 
US, although the major fall out appears to have been in Europe to date. The 
housing market has weakened in the US, but if as a result of the credit crisis 
the margin between borrowing and lending rates were to rise further house 
prices could fall by more than we anticipate. In our scenarios we assume that 
house prices drop by 10 per cent over the next year, and stay that low for 3 
more years. The rise in spreads and the increase in risk that we anticipate in 
this scenario could raise the premium in the equity market, reducing the 
current value of future profits, and hence in order to simulate this we reduce 
the equity by 10 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2007, although we assume it 
begins to return to fundamentals after three years. If the ‘credit crunch’ turns 
into a banking crisis then the cost of firms borrowing from banks would rise 
sharply and credit would be rationed in relation to the quality of the borrower. 
We can simulate this by raising the investment premium, which increases the 
user cost of capital (essentially one for one) by 8 percentage points. We can see 
this as an increase in the shadow price of borrowing, as credit would be 
quantitatively rationed as well. Such a large rise would slow investment down 
markedly, and output growth would slow to zero, as we can see in Figure 1.4.3.  
 
We utilize the full forty countries on the NiGEM model, and we assume that 
the banking crisis takes place within the OECD, as the risky lending appears to 
be from Europeans and Americans to each other. We assume that financial 
markets for equities, long rates and the exchange rate are all rational and 
forward looking, and hence prices and exchange rates can jump when there is 
news of a change in belief. We also assume that firms are forward looking in 
their investment decisions and workers in their wage bargaining. If these last 
two assumptions were dropped then the effects on output would be greater. 
We do not assume consumers are forward looking as they may find them 
selves constrained in a banking crisis. If they were, then they would absorb 
almost half of the shock as they would respond to lower market interest rates 
and consume more now. 
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Figure 1.4.3: US Output 
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It is of course possible for the Federal Reserve to react, and we have our 
default policy feedback for the Fed in place. Interest rates would be quickly cut 
by 400 basis points as compared to our baseline, and this would absorb much 
of the shock. However, in the unlikely event that it took the Fed two years to 
react, then the US would be in a full recession for a year, even though long 
rates and exchange rates would fall in the knowledge that the Fed would 
eventually step in.8 Conversely if the reaction were to be more vigorous the 
output effects may be less. 
 
If the US slowed down so markedly, and interest rates fell sharply, the dollar 
would fall, and the Euro Area would lose competitiveness. It would also suffer 
a direct reduction in export demand, and as a result the growth rate might slow 
by up to ½ a percentage point, even if the ECB were to cut rates by 50 basis 
points as our policy rule suggests. Figure A.4 plots the effects of the US crisis 
alone on Euro Area output.  
 
The evidence that we have so far seen suggests that the crisis will not be 
restricted to US financial markets. Equity markets have become much more 
linked in the last three decades, and Barrell and Davis (2007) show that on 
average 60 per cent of a shock to US equities spills over to Europe. In addition 
the existence of international banks and portfolios will have spread the US 
risks to others, especially in Europe. Hence we can expect that the rise in the 
quality premium would be the same in Europe as in the US, and that equity 
markets would also decline. We have undertaken a second scenario where 
contagion takes place, and equity prices fall as much in the rest of the OECD 
world as they do in the US, and the investment premium, that reflects 
constraints on lending as well as higher risk, rises by a similar amount 
elsewhere. However, we do not assume that there is an autonomous collapse in 
the housing market elsewhere. Figure 1.4.4 contains the resulting profile for 
Euro Area growth, which would slow to 1 per cent. Much of this would be 
domestically generated, as we can see, and the increase in spare capacity would 
reduce inflation to around half a per cent in 2009, 2010 and 2011 despite the 
depreciation of the euro against other currencies that would follow from 
monetary policy differences. Of course the ECB could cut rates more than our 
rule suggests, as they fall slowly to around 1.5 per cent at the end of 2010. If it 
                                                 
8 This was what happened after the great crash in 1929 when the Fed did not react in the way we 
would expect today. However, central banks have learned from this experience. 
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were to do so it would absorb some of the shock, and shift some back onto 
other countries. 
 
Figure 1.4.4: Output Growth in the Euro Area 
 
We do not assume contagion to Japan, in part because we have not seen it, and 
in part because Barrell and Davis (2007) find less evidence for it. In addition 
we do not shock the quality premium in emerging markets because the spread 
does not seem to have risen there. The impacts on the Euro Area are less than 
on the US, in part because we do not assume that housing markets will 
collapse in the same way, but also because equities play a smaller role in 
determining consumption in Europe than they do in the US.  
 
Figure 1.4.5: US Output in Crisis 
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The contagion to the Euro Area would feed back into the US and other 
countries, as we can see from Figures 1.4.5 and 1.4.6. Even if the Fed were to 
react the US would enter a full recession, and US interest rates would, 
following our feedback rule at least, be cut to zero for a full year after the crisis 
had had some time to develop. The Federal Reserve would find itself in the 
same position as the Bank of Japan through much of the 1990s. The liquidity 
trap would reduce the efficiency of its actions, and would make it hard to 
stimulate demand. Of course, it could cut rates more quickly than our policy 
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rule suggests, and it could keep them low for longer. Inflation is currently high, 
but in our contagion scenario it falls to around 0.25 in 2009 and 2010.  
 
Figure 1.4.6: OECD Output in Crisis 
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Of course, we would hope and expect that the current crisis we are seeing is a 
short-term blip in the liquidity of the banking sector. This is the assumption 
underlying our forecast. Our simulations suggest that the effects of such a 
“blip” on the potential output of the Euro Area would be quite limited. Hence 
we have not made major changes to our forecast for 2008. However, if a full-
blown banking crisis were to develop, then we could see several years of 
stagnation. There would be the danger that even if such a crisis were to 
originate in the US, contagion would see it spread immediately to Europe. It is 
the task of the Fed, the ECB and the other European central banks to ensure 
that such a crisis does not happen. 
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FORECAST TABLES 
 
 
 
  Annex Table 1: Su ary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Areamm        a 
 
 
 
a GDP data shown 
in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Output Growth Rate 0.8 1.8 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.1 
Inflation Rate 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.0 
Unemployment Rate 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.0 6.5 6.2 
Gov. Balance as % GDP -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -1.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 
 
Annex Table 2: Real GDP in Major Economies 
 World OECD NAFTA China 
EU-
27 
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1997-
2003 3.6 2.6 3.2 8.6 2.4 2.3 3.1 0.6 1.5 2.4 1.6 2.9 
2004 5.3 3.3 3.6 10.1 2.3 1.8 3.6 2.7 0.6 2.3 1.0 3.3 
2005 4.9 2.7 3.0 10.4 1.9 1.6 3.1 1.9 1.0 1.7 0.2 1.8 
2006 5.4 3.2 3.0 10.7 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.2 3.1 2.2 1.9 2.8 
2007 5.1 2.7 2.1 10.9 2.9 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.7 1.9 1.8 2.9 
2008 4.8 2.5 2.3 9.8 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.7 2.2 2.3 1.5 2.2 
2009 4.7 2.6 2.6 9.3 2.4 2.1 2.4 1.7 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 3: Private Consumption Deflator in Major Economies 
 OECD NAFTA China EU 
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1997-
2003 1.9 2.3 0.6 1.9 1.9 1.7 -0.5 1.1 1.1 2.5 2.0 
2004 2.1 2.7 3.0 1.9 2.1 2.6 -0.6 1.6 1.5 2.6 1.7 
2005 2.1 2.9 2.8 2.1 2.0 2.9 -0.8 1.5 1.4 2.4 2.5 
2006 2.1 2.7 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.8 -0.3 1.4 1.4 2.7 2.4 
2007 2.0 2.5 4.1 2.0 1.9 2.5 -0.3 1.8 1.1 2.1 2.6 
2008 2.4 2.7 3.2 2.2 2.2 2.5 0.8 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.3 
2009 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 1.4 1.9 1.6 2.0 2.1 
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Annex Table 4:  World Trade Volume and Prices 
 World trade volume 
World export prices 
in $ 
Oil price ($ 
per barrel)a
 Annual percentage changes 
1997-2003 6.2 -1.0 21.6 
2004 10.3 8.6 35.9 
2005 7.2 3.4 51.8 
2006 8.4 2.4 63.4 
2007 7.0 7.3 66.6 
2008 7.3 5.1 70.9 
2009 6.4 3.0 70.0 
a Based on the unweighted average of the Brent, WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and Dubai oil 
prices. 
 
 
Annex Table 5: Interest Rates 
 
 Short-term interest rates  Long-term interest rates  
 USA Japan 
Euro 
Area UK USA Japan Euro Area UK 
2004 1.6 0.0 2.1 4.6 4.3 1.5 4.1 4.9 
2005 3.5 0.0 2.2 4.7 4.3 1.3 3.4 4.4 
2006 5.2 0.2 3.1 4.8 4.8 1.8 3.9 4.5 
2007 5.3 0.6 4.2 6.0 4.7 1.7 4.4 5.1 
2008 4.4 0.8 4.3 6.0 4.7 1.8 4.5 5.3 
2009 4.3 1.0 4.2 5.5 4.7 2.0 4.5 5.3 
        
2007Q1 5.3 0.5 3.8 5.5 4.7 1.7 4.0 4.9 
2007Q2 5.3 0.6 4.1 5.7 4.8 1.9 4.7 5.2 
2007Q3 5.5 0.6 4.5 6.4 4.7 1.7 4.4 5.3 
2007Q4 5.0 0.7 4.3 6.3 4.7 1.7 4.4 5.3 
         
2008Q1 4.7 0.7 4.3 6.2 4.7 1.8 4.4 5.3 
2008Q2 4.3 0.8 4.3 6.2 4.8 1.8 4.4 5.3 
2008Q3 4.3 0.8 4.3 6.0 4.7 1.9 4.5 5.3 
2008Q4 4.3 0.8 4.3 5.7 4.7 1.9 4.5 5.3 
         
2009Q1 4.3 0.9 4.2 5.5 4.7 2.0 4.5 5.3 
2009Q2 4.3 1.0 4.2 5.5 4.7 2.0 4.5 5.3 
2009Q3 4.3 1.1 4.2 5.5 4.7 2.0 4.5 5.3 
2009Q4 4.3 1.1 4.2 5.5 4.7 2.1 4.6 5.3 
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Annex Table 6: Effective Exchange Rates 
 USA Japan Euro Area Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2004 -4.3 3.7 5.2 2.3 2.2 2.5 5.2 
2005 -2.6 -3.6 -1.0 -0.8 -0.3 -0.7 -1.4 
2006 -1.3 -6.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
2007 -3.6 -4.3 3.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 3.1 
2008 -1.3 2.9 2.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 -0.6 
2009 0.1 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 -1.5 
        
2007Q1 -0.4 -0.9 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 
2007Q2 -2.6 -5.5 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 -0.4 
2007Q3 -1.0 2.9 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 
2007Q4 -0.1 3.0 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.5 -0.2 
        
2008Q1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.3 
2008Q2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
2008Q3 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.6 
2008Q4 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.5 
        
2009Q1 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.5 
2009Q2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 
2009Q3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 
2009Q4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 7: Euro Area, Main Features of Forecasta
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Annual percentage changes 
Volumes  
Consumption 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.7 2.4 2.2 
Private investment 1.8 3.1 2.8 6.0 4.8 3.3 2.5 
Government expenditure 1.8 1.0 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 
Stockbuildingb 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Total domestic demand 1.7 2.1 1.9 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.2 
Export volumes 1.1 6.5 4.6 8.2 5.8 4.2 3.7 
Import volumes 3.2 6.3 5.3 7.8 5.1 4.7 4.0 
GDP 0.8 1.8 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.1 
Average earnings 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.4 3.4 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.0 
Private consumption deflator 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.0 
Real personal disposable income 0.8 1.6 1.1 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.3 
 Levels 
Standardised unemployment %  8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.0 6.5 6.2 
Government financial balancec -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -1.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 
Government debtc 69.3 69.8 70.8 68.9 66.6 64.4 62.7 
Current accountc 0.4 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 
a See footnote a of Annex table 1. 
b Change as percentage of GDP.  
 
c As a percentage of GDP.  
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Annex Table 8: Real GDP in the European Union a
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 2.2 2.4 3.1 3.5 2.4 2.0 
Belgium 2.8 1.4 3.0 2.6 2.1 2.1 
Denmark 2.1 3.1 3.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Finland 3.7 2.9 4.9 4.8 3.2 2.9 
France 2.3 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.1 
Germany 0.6 1.0 3.1 2.7 2.2 2.0 
Greece 4.7 3.7 4.3 4.0 3.1 2.9 
Ireland 4.3 5.9 5.7 4.5 2.8 3.4 
Italy 1.0 0.2 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.7 
Netherlands 2.2 1.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.3 
Portugal 1.3 0.5 1.3 2.3 2.2 1.8 
Spain 3.3 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.2 2.7 
Sweden 3.7 2.9 4.5 3.3 3.0 3.0 
United Kingdom 3.3 1.8 2.8 2.9 2.2 2.5 
Poland 5.2 3.6 6.1 6.4 5.5 5.3 
Hungary 4.8 4.1 3.9 2.2 3.5 3.5 
Czech Republic 4.6 6.5 6.4 5.6 4.5 4.1 
Estonia 8.1 10.5 11.4 8.8 6.9 5.0 
Latvia 8.2 11.2 12.0 9.8 7.5 6.7 
Lithuania 7.3 7.6 7.5 8.0 7.1 6.0 
Slovak Republic 5.4 6.0 8.3 9.1 7.3 6.1 
Slovenia 4.0 4.3 5.5 5.0 4.3 3.9 
Romania 8.5 4.2 7.7 5.7 5.4 4.9 
Bulgaria 6.6 6.2 6.1 5.9 6.1 4.6 
       
Euro Area 1.8 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.1 
EU-15 2.1 1.7 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 
NMS-12 5.4 4.9 6.3 6.0 5.3 4.9 
EU-27 2.3 1.9 3.1 2.9 2.4 2.4 
a GDP data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. 
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Annex Table 9: Harmonised Inflation in the European Union 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.5 
Belgium 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.6 1.5 
Denmark 0.9 1.7 1.8 1.5 2.0 2.0 
Finland 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.5 2.3 2.3 
France 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.8 1.6 
Germany 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.9 
Greece 3.0 3.5 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.5 
Ireland 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.8 
Italy 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.0 
Netherlands 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.4 2.2 
Portugal 2.5 2.1 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.1 
Spain 3.1 3.4 3.6 2.4 2.6 2.6 
Sweden 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.7 2.3 2.1 
United Kingdom 1.3 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 
Poland 3.6 2.2 1.3 2.1 2.7 3.0 
Hungary 6.8 3.5 4.0 7.7 4.4 3.6 
Czech Republic 2.6 1.6 2.1 2.5 3.4 3.7 
Estonia 3.0 4.1 4.4 5.8 5.8 6.3 
Latvia 6.2 6.9 6.6 8.2 7.0 7.0 
Lithuania 1.2 2.7 3.8 4.8 5.0 4.9 
Slovakia 7.4 2.8 4.3 1.9 2.3 2.6 
Slovenia 3.7 2.5 2.5 3.1 2.7 2.6 
Romania 11.9 9.1 6.6 4.0 4.3 3.4 
Bulgaria 6.1 6.0 7.4 5.6 5.4 5.5 
       
Euro Area 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.0 
EU-15 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.0 
NMS-12 5.0 3.5 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 
EU-27 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 
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Annex Table 10: Fiscal Balances in the EU-15 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 % GDP 
Austria -1.3 -1.7 -1.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 
Belgium -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -0.8 
Denmark 2.0 4.7 4.2 3.9 2.5 2.5 
Finland 2.3 2.7 3.9 4.2 3.8 3.6 
France -3.6 -3.0 -2.5 -2.7 -3.1 -3.0 
Germany -3.7 -3.4 -1.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Greece -6.2 -4.5 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 
Ireland 1.5 1.0 2.9 0.8 0.2 0.6 
Italy -3.5 -4.2 -4.4 -2.5 -2.5 -2.3 
Netherlands -1.8 -0.3 0.5 -0.3 0.5 1.1 
Portugal -3.3 -5.9 -3.9 -3.6 -3.1 -3.1 
Spain -0.2 1.1 1.8 1.2 0.6 0.5 
Sweden 0.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.1 1.8 
United Kingdom -3.4 -3.4 -2.8 -2.8 -2.4 -2.1 
 
Euro Area -2.8 -2.4 -1.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 
Eu-15 -2.6 -2.3 -1.5 -1.0 -1.1 -0.9 
 
Fiscal deficits of NMS are not included due to incomparability of available 
data. Some countries have taken the opportunity to temporarily present the 
surplus in the second pillar pension funds as part of general government sector 
balance. In spite of the fact that the transitional period has passed in March 
2007, the most recent convergence reports available for NMS are dated prior 
to the deadline so do not yet include the harmonized fiscal statistics. 
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Annex Table 11: Standardised Unemployment Rate in the European Union 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 % Total labour force 
Austria 4.8 5.2 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.0 
Belgium 8.4 8.5 8.3 7.5 7.1 7.0 
Denmark 5.5 4.9 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.9 
Finland 8.9 8.3 7.7 6.8 6.2 6.2 
France 9.6 9.7 9.0 8.1 7.9 7.7 
Germany 9.5 9.4 8.4 6.7 6.1 6.0 
Greece 10.5 9.9 8.9 8.3 8.2 8.5 
Ireland 4.5 4.3 4.4 4.6 5.3 5.2 
Italy 8.0 7.7 6.8 6.1 6.0 5.6 
Netherlands 4.5 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.0 3.1 
Portugal 6.6 7.6 7.6 8.2 7.6 7.6 
Spain 10.6 9.1 8.5 8.0 7.2 6.4 
Sweden 6.3 7.3 7.0 5.7 5.2 4.8 
United Kingdom 4.8 4.9 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.9 
Poland 18.9 17.7 13.8 10.0 9.0 8.5 
Hungary 6.1 7.2 7.5 7.6 7.2 7.1 
Czech Republic 8.3 7.9 7.1 5.7 5.7 5.8 
Estonia 9.7 7.8 5.9 5.1 4.2 3.7 
Latvia 10.4 8.9 6.8 5.8 5.3 5.0 
Lithuania 11.4 8.2 5.6 4.8 4.5 4.6 
Slovakia 18.2 16.2 13.4 10.8 10.2 10.1 
Slovenia 6.3 6.5 6.0 5.2 4.9 5.1 
Romania 8.1 7.1 7.3 6.8 6.2 5.2 
Bulgaria 12.0 10.1 8.9 7.0 6.3 6.5 
Euro Area 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.0 6.5 6.2 
EU-15 8.0 7.9 7.4 6.6 6.3 6.2 
NMS-12 13.5 12.5 10.3 8.1 7.5 7.1 
EU-27 9.0 8.7 7.9 6.9 6.5 6.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2. EUROPEAN POLICY 
MONITORING 
Recent turbulences on financial markets, have – just like in other countries –
significantly affected the level of interest rates also in the Euro Area. Money 
market rates that had continued to increase at moderate pace until the 
beginning of August, reflecting the gradual tightening campaign of the ECB, 
jumped to substantially higher levels in the following weeks. By mid September 
2007, the 3-month EURIBOR has gone up to almost 4.8 per cent. While the 
level of 4.2 per cent that prevailed in July has been in line with expectations of 
market participants that the ECB would raise key interest rates in early 
September by another 25 basis points, the strong increase in the recent past 
cannot be explained by movements in the expected refi-rate. It rather reflects 
the shortfall of the credit supply as a reaction to uncertainties about credit risks 
linked to the US sub-prime mortgage market that have spread out through 
highly leveraged derivatives and structured instruments. Facing an 
immeasurable uncertainty about underlying credit quality and counterparty 
risks, a general lack of confidence against other market participants developed 
and investors started to reduce risk in an indiscriminate fashion, almost 
stopping to lend to each other. In response, the ECB provided ample liquidity 
so that the market for overnight money soon calmed down and rates returned 
to their normal level. However, rates for longer maturities, e.g. 3-month 
money, remained at elevated levels and even continued to increase, although at 
a slower pace, even though the ECB provided liquidity for this part of the 
money market, too.  
2.1 
Monetary Policy 
in the Euro Area 
 
With investors shying away from the money market, government securities 
rallied substantially in recent weeks as they were obviously seen as a safe 
haven. The yield for 10-year government bonds fell to 4.2 per cent in mid-
September, after having gradually increased to almost 4.5 per cent in the first 
half of the 2007. 
 
All in all, monetary conditions have deteriorated considerably as a consequence 
of the turbulences. The real short-term interest rate, calculated as the 
difference between the nominal rate and core inflation, rose to approximately 2 
¾ per cent which is considerably higher than a few months ago when it was 
about 2 per cent and close to what generally is regarded as a “neutral” level. 
The conditions of refinancing for the corporate sector also deteriorated as a 
consequence of lower stock prices and higher risk premia on corporate bonds. 
The impact of the recent turmoil in the money markets on credit availability is 
currently still unclear. While there is some indication that banks have tightened 
credit standards somewhat there is still no evidence of an outright credit 
crunch developing. During the drastic changes of interest rate sand asset 
prices, the US-dollar initially gained some strength against major currencies, 
but lost ground in recent weeks with the euro marking a new all-time high 
against the dollar. As far as the international competitiveness is concerned, the 
effects are, however limited so far. The euro has appreciated only very little in 
real effective exchange terms since the beginning of this year. 
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The deterioration of monetary conditions is also confirmed by our monetary 
conditions index (MCI) The MCI is a combination of real interest rates 
adjusted for trend growth of real GDP and the detrended real effective 
exchange rate (Figure 2.1.1). As far as the Euro Area is concerned, the real 
interest rate moved up as a result of higher nominal rates and lower inflation, 
and the exchange rate also contributed to the deterioration as the euro 
appreciated slightly in real terms. By comparison, the index for the US shows a 
slight improvement because inflation went up at roughly constant nominal 
interest rates and the real effective exchange rate came down slightly. 
 
Figure 2.1.1: Monetary Conditions for the Euro Area and the US 
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Notes: The index is calculated as: 1*Interest rate component+ 0.2*Exchange rate component.  
*1991–2006 average; component weighted according to its weight in the index (0.2); 
**Average of long-term and short-term interest rates less annual consumer price inflation 
less smoothed GDP growth. The MCI’s methodology is based on “Disparités de croissance 
et de politiques économiques en Europe”, Catherine Mathieu and Olivier Passet, Revue de 
l’OFCE no. 64, janvier 1998. 
Sources: OECD, national sources, own estimates. 
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The outlook for interest rates crucially depends on how the problems in the 
financial market play out. The EUROFRAME-Institutes assume that the 
uncertainty in financial markets about the level of potential losses from 
investments in US mortgage backed securities and where they will finally 
accrue will fade relatively soon. As a large part of these paper is financed short-
term and has to be refinanced in the coming weeks, potential problems should 
become more and more disclosed, and this should facilitate a return to 
normality in the money market. We expect that 3-month money market rates 
will decline gradually over the coming months, again reflecting mainly the 
expected interest rate policy by the ECB by year end; the 3-month EURIBOR 
is assumed to be back to 4.3 per cent in December. In this scenario the effects 
of temporarily higher interest rates on the real economy should be quite 
limited. 
 
On September 6, the ECB kept its key interest rate (the minimum bid rate in 
the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations) constant at 4 per cent. This was 
a deviation from the previous course of gradual raising interest rates that the 
ECB had indicated it would continue for the time being in previous 
announcements. It was however, already widely expected after more recent 
comments on the developments in the financial markets. Apparently, the ECB 
wants to accumulate further evidence on the impact of the freeze in the money 
markets on the outlook for the real economy and finally prices.  
 
In the comments on the interest rate decision, the ECB stressed that it has two 
prime responsibilities. The first is to ensure price stability over the medium 
term, the second is to ensure a smooth functioning of the money market. In 
meeting the latter responsibility, the ECB will be quick to address any signs of 
a significant and undesired tightening in credit conditions by supplying 
additional liquidity. In line with this assessment, the ECB council decided to 
launch another additional longer-term refinancing operation in its most recent 
meeting. On the other hand, we would not expect central bank interest rates to 
be lowered to counter stress in the financial markets unless the outlook for 
inflation was significantly affected. Such a stance is consistent with the century-
old conventional wisdom that central banks in periods of financial market 
turmoil should lend freely in order to ensure liquidity, but at high interest rates 
in order to reduce the problem of moral hazard.  
 
Concerning first responsibility, maintaining price stability, the ECB still sees 
risks for inflation tilted to the upside, a judgement that is based on both the 
monetary and the economic analysis. One reason for this assessment is the 
rapid growth of monetary and credit aggregates. In fact, M3 growth even 
accelerated in recent months reaching more than 11 per cent y-o-y. Loans to 
the private sector have continued to increase at double-digit rates although 
there has been some moderation mainly as a result of less dynamic lending for 
consumer credit and lending for households. In the economic analysis the 
outlook has not changed materially since June. The staff projections for real 
GDP growth have been reduced only slightly to 2.5 per cent this year and were 
kept unchanged at 2.3 per cent for next year (see Table). With growth at such a 
level, capacity utilization in the Euro Area should remain high or rise even 
further. The outlook for inflation was unchanged at 2.0 per cent in both years. 
In the baseline scenario adopted for this EUROFRAME report, with money 
markets calming relatively soon and the fallout in the real economy limited, 
these projections should not be revised substantially soon, and the ECB is 
expected to perform in December the rise in interest rates by 25 basis points 
that was originally scheduled for September.  That said, the ECB will certainly 
closely watch developments in the economy, also taking account of moves in 
the exchange rate. There is a relatively large chance that the ECB drops 
another rate hike from the agenda in the event that the economic environment 
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should look less reassuring than projected here, especially in the event that the 
Fed cuts interest rates aggressively. Even rate cuts would be a likely response 
should one of the larger risks discussed in the report materialize.  
 
In any case, the ECB is not expected to raise key rates any further than to 4.25 
per cent over the forecast horizon. This projection is supported by our 
estimate of a forward looking Taylor rule.1 According to our forecast, overall 
capacity utilization in the Euro Area will increase only slightly, and according 
to the Professional Forecasters, the inflation rate will be near 2 per cent. 
Assuming that the ECB will behave in the same fashion as in the past, the key 
interest rate will most likely remain at 4.25 per cent. 
 
Table 2.1 Eurosystem Staff Macroeconomic Projections for the Euro Areaa 
Date 
Real GDP 
growth 2007
Real GDP 
growth 
2008 
HICP inflation 
2007 
HICP 
inflation 
2008 
September 2006 2.1 .. 2.4 .. 
December 2006 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.9 
March 2007 2.5 2.4 1.8 2.0 
June 2007 2.6 2.3 2.0 2.0 
September 2007 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 
aMiddle of the respective confidence bands (percentage change over previous year). 
Source: ECB, Monthly Bulletin, various issues. 
 
In 2006, budgetary positions have improved much more rapidly than expected 
in the Euro Area, especially in Germany. This was also the case for Italy 
although it does not show in terms of the global deficit because of the impact 
of exceptional measures. This year again, budgetary positions are likely to 
improve more rapidly than expected in the Euro Area. A major surprise will be 
again on the German side, with government deficit now forecast to turn into a 
slight surplus instead of 0.5 percentage point deficit in our Spring forecast at 
unchanged GDP prospects. Budgetary positions have also improved more 
rapidly than expected in several other countries, among them the Netherlands 
and Ireland, which we will address below. In general, the larger than expected 
improvement in budgetary positions this year does not result from higher 
growth and results only partly from discretionary measures. Other elements 
have play a role, first of all higher than usual revenues to GDP elasticity.  
2.2 Fiscal Policy 
in the Euro Area 
 
The fiscal stance has been contractionary at the Euro Area level over the last 
years, mainly in countries running deficits. We expect the fiscal stance to 
remain slightly contractionary in 2007 and come close to neutral in the two 
coming years at the Euro Area level. In two of the four remaining countries 
currently running close to 3 per cent of GDP deficits - Greece and Portugal - 
the fiscal stance will remain contractionary. However, the fiscal effort is 
forecast to be less restrictive than announced in the updates of the Stability 
Programmes (SPs) at the turn of 2005-2006 and below the 0.5 percentage 
point of GDP requested by the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
France will probably be major exception, at least in view of government 
                                                 
1 See Box 2.1 in the Autumn 2006 Report. 
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measures announced at the time of our forecast, with a positive fiscal impulse 
possibly bringing the deficit slightly above 3 per cent of GDP in 2008.2 In 
most countries running close to balance positions or surpluses, fiscal policies 
are expected to be close to neutral, at the noticeable exception of the 
Netherlands where the fiscal stance will be contractionary both in 2008 and 
2009.  
 
With GDP growth decelerating from 2.7 per cent in 2007 at 2.1 per cent in 
2009 and a close to neutral fiscal stance, the Euro Area deficit would remain at 
around -1 per cent of GDP. This would mean that the objective of 0 per cent 
of GDP deficits in 2010 would be difficult to reach at the Euro Area level.  
However a 1 per cent of GDP Euro Area government deficit is low from a 
historical perspective and as compared to deficits elsewhere in the industrial 
world.  
 
2.2.1 GROWTH PROSPECTS 
We expect Euro Area GDP to grow by 2.7 per cent this year before 
decelerating to 2.3 per cent next year and 2.1 in 2009. We have hardly revised 
our GDP growth prospects for 2007 since our Spring forecasts, both at the 
area and country level. The main revision has been for France, where the 
figures of national accounts up to the second quarter of 2007 lead us to revise 
our forecast downwards from 2.2 per cent to 1.9 per cent. 
 
In 2006, Euro Area GDP grew more rapidly than announced in the SP’s (2.9 
per cent instead of 2.5 per cent, see Table 2.2). This now seems to have been 
also the case in 2005, accounting for GDP data revisions GDP growth had 
already been underestimated in the course of the recovery of the early 1990’s, 
although the recovery was then stronger than now. We forecast the peak of 
growth to be already behind us and GDP to grow up to 2009 at around 2.2 per 
cent per annum, i.e. very close the SPs assumptions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Exhaustive information on the forthcoming budget was however not available for France at 
the time we were producing our forecast. The French government will announce its budget 
plans for 2008 and 2009 on September 26th. The situation is similar for Italy, where budget plans 
will be announced at the end of September. 
  
 
46 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
Table 2.2: Euro Area GDP growth and general government balances according to the 
stability programmes 
 
 GDP growth assumptions (per cent) General government balance (per cent of GDP)
 Stability Programmes Actua Stability Programmes Actual
 J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 J06 J07  J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 J06 J07
98 2.8      2.7 -2.1 -1.9       -2.3
99 2.5 2.2    2.9 -1.7 -1.4 -1.2      -1.4
00 2.6 2.8 3.3   4.0 -1.5 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8     -1.0
01 2.6 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.5 1.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -1.2 -1.6    -1.8
02  2.5 2.9 1.9 1.0 0.9  -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -2.2    -2.5
03  2.5 2.8 2.6 2.1 0.6 0.8  -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 -2.7   -3.1
04   2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.8   0.4 0.1 -1.1 -2.4 -2.7  -2.8
05    2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.4 1.3 1.6    0.3 -0.6 -1.8 -2.3 -2.6 -2.4 -2.4
06     2.6 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.5 2.91     -0.2 -1.3 -1.8 -2.4 -2.0 -1.51
07      2.5 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.71      -0.9 -1.3 -1.9 -1.4 -0.91
08      2.4 2.2 2.2 2.31       -1.0 -1.4 -1.1 -1.01
09      2.2 2.2   2.11        -0.9 -0.6 -0.91
10      2.2 –         -0.1 – 
1. EUROFRAME-EFN, Autumn 2007 Forecast. 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN, Stability programmes, Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
2.2.2 GOVERNMENT BALANCES 
GDP grew by 2.9 per cent in 2006, instead of 2.5 expected in the SP’s, while 
deficits decreased from 2.4 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 1.5 in 2006, instead of 
2 per cent in the SPs. The reduction in the Euro Area government deficit can 
be explained partly by stronger than expected growth: 0.2 percentage point 
under usual unitary elasticity of revenues to GDP. Another 0.2 percentage 
point would thus be explained by non cyclical factors. However, the 
improvement in government balances has been more rapid than usually, not 
only because of more tightening discretionary measures but also of higher than 
usual revenues to GDP elasticity. On the latter element, we will focus below 
on recent developments in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Ireland. 
UNEXPECTED REVENUES GROWTH IN RECENT PAST: THE 
EXPERIENCE FROM FOUR COUNTRIES 
GERMANY 
Tax revenues will rise much stronger than nominal GDP in 2007 as was 
already the case in 2006. The increase of tax revenues will amount to 10.7 per 
cent (cash basis, not in terms of NIPA) (Graph 2.2.1), while GDP will 
probably increase by 4.2 per cent. The tax ratio which had declined in the early 
2000’s rose by 1.3 percentage points (2006: 21 per cent; cash basis). It reached 
the level which had been “normal” in the 1990’s. 
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The increase in taxes on capital income (corporate income tax, assessed 
income tax, withholding tax on dividends and interest income) will be very 
high in 2007 (Graph 2.2.2), at an expected 14.5 per cent. Besides, the revenues 
of the Gewerbesteuer (tax on profits and on parts of interest paid by firms) 
will increase by 20 per cent in 2007. VAT revenues have continued to rise 
more rapidly than private consumption, their most important determinant 
(Graph 2.2.3). 
  
It is not yet clear why tax revenues surged in 2006 and 2007. There are only 
some elements of an explanation: 
 
1. Taxable incomes and taxable profits were higher than expected due to an 
underestimation of the effects of tax base broadening measures (e.g. 
restrictions to carrying losses forward) which had been decided upon in recent 
years. 
2. Due to the lag structure of assessed taxes, there was a reaction on the poor 
development of assessed tax revenues in the period 2002–2004. 
3. As a result of the upswing, the number of insolvent firms went down. In 
addition, the fight against tax fraud seems to be successful to some extent. 
Thus, losses of VAT revenues probably were much smaller than in the 
previous years. 
 
Overall, tax revenues developments in 2006 and 2007 may have been a kind of 
reaction on the poor development in the period 2002–2005. We do not expect 
a further strong increase of tax revenues in 2008 and 2009. In addition, the 
reform of business taxation will lead to a loss of revenues in the range of 6.5 
billion euros in 2008 and somewhat less in 2009. 
 
Figure 2.2.1: Tax Revenues in Germany 2000-2007 
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Figure 2.2.2 Capital Income Tax Revenues in Germany 2000–2007 
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Figure 2.2.3 Private Consumptiona and VAT Revenuesa in Germany 2000–2007 
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 ITALY 
The improvement in general government net borrowing in 2006 was 
unexpectedly large, from 4.1 to 2.4 pp of GDP (excluding the extraordinary 
burden related to the judgment of ECG concerning VAT, 1.2 pp, and the 
decision to cancel the State’s claims on TAV Spa, 0.8 pp), while the 
government estimate published in the Stability Programme update in 
December 2006 was by 3.6 per cent. The decrease of deficit reflected the 
increase of fiscal burden by 1.7 pp of GDP, from 40.6 to 42.3 per cent, with a 
contribution of the tax components near to 1.6 points.  
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The divergence with respect to the forecasts in SP updates is only partly due to 
a more favourable economic growth (1.9 versus 1.6). The increase in tax 
revenues was larger than forecasted and larger than would have been 
consistent with the changes in the corresponding bases. The infra annual 
information on tax receipts has determinate several upward revisions in the 
forecasts of tax revenues growth, as the table below shows: 
    
  Table 2.3: General government – taxes (rate of growth) 
Forecasting and Planning Report - October 2005 2.6 
Quarterly report on the Borrowing Requirement - April 2006 4.2 
Economic and Financial Planning Document - July 2006 5.9 
Forecasting and Planning Report - October 2006 6.8 
Outturn, ISTAT March 2007 10.0 
 
In general, the growth of tax receipts in 2006 is evidence for the sharp increase 
of elasticity of revenues with respect to GDP. Taxes increased by 9.5 per cent, 
8.9 per cent net of one-off, while nominal GDP increased by 3.7 per cent.  
 
Figure 2.2.4: Elasticity of Revenue with respect to GDP 
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The elasticity in 2006 is close to the values of 1992-1993 and 1997-1998, when 
budgetary consolidation was intensified and structural changes in taxes were 
enacted primarily with the aim of increasing revenues (the revisions of VAT 
and personal income rates and the curbs on the correction of fiscal drag in 
1992-93; the tax system reform in 1998). On the contrary, in 2006 the 
measures enacted did not involve changes in tax rates. 
 
More in detail, according to our estimation the growth of tax revenues in 2006 
can be attributed to several factors, which we can group in four categories:  
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  Table 2.4 Composition of additional tax revenues, in % of GDP 
Macroeconomic growth 0.9%  
Discretionary measures  0.6% 
One-off and extraordinary items 0.6% 
Other items 0.5% 
Total 2.6% 
 
At first, we take into account the effects of macroeconomic recovery, which 
explains a 30 per cent of the total growth in fiscal receipts. A 23 per cent of the 
growth can be attributed to the measures of Budget Law and other 
discretionary fiscal measures implemented by government in 2006. A further 
class includes extraordinary and temporary factors. In this group we can set 
direct tax receipts paid by public employees on back payment in the first part 
of the year, tax on insurance companies’ mathematical provisions, increase of 
the taxes on capital income due to the large increase in redemptions of post 
office savings and the effects of the increase in the prices of oil and other 
energy products on VAT.  
 
The latter group corresponds to the un-explicated fraction of major receipts. 
Trying to give reasons for this residual increase of revenues, we made some 
exercises with Prometeia’s macroeconomic model. If we run the budgetary 
equations of the model with the tax basis and other economic variables at their 
historical values, we can test for the presence of a structural break of the 
budgetary equations. All in all, this analysis seems coherent to an increase of 
taxpayers’ compliance due to the intensifications of the measures to fight tax 
evasion and avoidance. This is particularly noticeable in the growth of VAT 
and personal income taxes. 
 
More in detail, for direct taxes the total error which came from the model was 
about 70 per cent larger in 2006 estimation than in the previous five years. If 
we do not include the one off revenues, the error decreases, but it remains 35 
per cent larger than in the previous years anyway.  
 
Among direct taxes, personal income taxes grew by 6.3 per cent, while salaries 
and pensions grew by 3.7 per cent. The observed elasticity from 1 per cent 
calculated in the last two years is by 1.9 per cent in 2006. This effect seems to 
confirm an increase in the reactivity of tax receipt to personal income (fiscal 
drag was estimated about 2 billion of euros) caused by previous reforms and 
measures aimed to broaden the taxable base of self-employed. 
 
Also receipts of the taxes on capital income grew sharply, by 36.4 per cento, 
28.3 per cent net of one-off factors (redemptions of post office savings), but in 
this case the rise is consistent with the growth in the tax base. 
 
For indirect taxes we have a similar outcome. In 2006 estimation, the equations 
error is by 50 per cent larger than in the previous five years, 32 per cent if we 
do not consider one-off revenues.  
 
The increase of VAT was particularly large, 9.2 per cent, while the related 
consumptions in national account data increased by 3.2 per cent. The observed 
elasticity of VAT revenues with respect to the tax base grew from the average 
of 1.5 of the previous two years to 3. This increase could reflect in part the 
shift in the composition of household spending towards durable goods, which 
are subject to higher VAT rate, and the role of large-scale retailing, which 
reduces the possibility of evading VAT. In the model equations, the observed 
increase of elasticity of VAT can explain about of 80 per cent of the increase in 
error on indirect taxes estimation. 
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NETHERLANDS: CORPORATE TAXES IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Forecasting corporate tax returns proves to be a wearisome exercise and errors 
in forecasting government revenues often relate to corporate taxes. The 
windfall in profit taxes in the Netherlands in 2005 and 2006, which helped to 
reduce the government deficit beyond the budget proposals, is a clear example. 
  
Figure 2.2.5 shows the statutory corporate tax rate and actual corporate tax 
returns on a cash basis as a per cent of private capital income in the 
Netherlands over the period 1975-2006. Two striking features emerge. Firstly, 
in spite of the decline of the statutory rate actual tax return are on a slightly 
upward sloping trend, implying a broadening of the tax base. Secondly, actual 
tax returns as a percentage of private capital income show extreme annual 
fluctuations, from 16 per cent to 39 per cent. 
 
Numerous changes in the laws affecting the tax base were carried through over 
the reference period. The impact of these measures on actual returns is often 
difficult to gauge, reducing the reliability of revenue projections. However, the 
single most important factor explaining the large fluctuations of actual tax 
returns is the asymmetric treatment of profits and losses. Profits are followed 
by a positive assessment, but losses do not result in a negative assessment, but 
opens up the possibility of clearing with profits in other years. Macro-
economic profits, which are hard to forecast anyway, are the balance of profits 
and losses and can result from high profits and high losses or of low profits 
and low losses, with completely different implications for tax returns. The 
timing of the clearing of losses constitutes also a considerable element of 
uncertainty. Moreover, we often lack reliable data on recent corporate tax 
returns, negatively affecting the projection base. 
 
Figure 2.2.5: Corporate Tax Rate and Returns as a % of Private Capital Income 
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IRELAND: THE EFFECT OF THE HOUSING MARKET 
Figure 2.2.6 illustrates the extent to which tax revenue in Ireland has diverged 
from the targets outlined in the Budget. In the earlier part of this decade there 
was substantial undershooting of tax revenue, while in more recent years tax 
revenue has overshoot forecasts. In 2006 the overshoot in revenue was 
particularly strong at 9.3 per cent.  
 
Figure 2.2.6: Tax Revenue in Ireland: Difference Between Outturn and Budget 
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Table 1 shows the overshoot by individual tax heads for 2006. The table shows 
that the largest tax heads experienced the smallest forecast error, while the 
overshoot on stamp duty and capital gains tax was considerable. Much of this 
error can be attributed to the exceptional growth in the Irish housing market3 
which has made the forecasting of housing related tax revenue very difficult.  
 
Table 2.5: Overshoot in Revenues in 2006 by Tax Head  
 Share of Total Outturn Overshoot (as a % of 
Budget Estimate) 
Income Tax 27% 4.9% 
VAT 30% 2.7% 
Corporation Tax 15% 10.8% 
Excise Duties 12% 1.8% 
Stamp Duty 8% 38.4% 
Capital Gains Tax 7% 52.3% 
Capital Acquisitions Tax 1% 35.8% 
Customs 1% 7.1% 
 
Figure 2.2.7 plots the annual aggregate tax revenue to GDP elasticity from 
1990 to 2006. Over the period the average elasticity is 1.04, however it is clear 
from the graph that it can deviate significantly from this average in individual 
years, and indeed for periods of years. From the graph, we can see that 
between 1996 and 2003 the actual elasticity was below the average, while in 
                                                 
3 Between 2000 and 2005 house prices have increased by around 63 per cent, while housing 
completions were 93.4 thousand in 2006 (around half of the UK level). 
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more recent years it has been above the average, with an elasticity close to 2 in 
2006. 
 
Figure 2.2.7: Aggregate Tax to GDP Elasticity 
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2.2.3 BUDGETARY POSITIONS AND EXPECTED FISCAL STANCE 
Euro Area countries can be split into four groups in terms of recent budgetary 
positions and developments:  
 
- Countries having improved their budgetary positions and now expected to 
run close-to-balance budgetary positions or even surpluses in 2007: Germany, 
Austria.  
- Countries keeping a close to balance position: Belgium, the Netherlands.  
- Countries keeping fiscal surpluses: Finland, Ireland, Spain 
- Countries keeping deficits: France, Italy, Portugal, Greece 
 
The fiscal stance has been contractionary at the Euro Area level in recent years, 
mainly in countries running deficits. The estimate of the fiscal stance is based 
among other things on unitary revenues to GDP elasticity, and we have seen 
above that these have been higher than expected in recent years in some 
countries and for some revenues. The estimate also depends on potential 
output growth. Table 2.6 shows two estimates of the expected fiscal stance in 
the Euro Area, based on our forecasts for GDP and government deficits. The 
first measure uses potential output growth taken from the SP’s, leading to a 
potential growth close to 2 per cent for the Euro Area as whole. The second 
measure uses NiGEM estimates that suggest Euro Area trend output has been 
accelerating in recent years from 1.7 to 2.2 per cent, mainly under the effect of 
a more rapid German trend output. At the country level, Germany has been in 
recent year a major case for uncertainty in terms of potential output growth. 
The recent German economic acceleration of growth has led to upwards 
revisions of German potential output growth, now often assumed to be closer 
to 2 per cent than 1.5 per cent a few years ago and in the latest update of the 
SP.  
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Table 2. 6: GDP growth, fiscal balances and fiscal impulses according to two 
estimates 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany (1) 0,9 2,9 2,6 2,5 2,0 
France 1,7 2,2 1,9 2,3 2,1 
Italy 0,2 1,9 1,8 1,5 1,7 
Spain 3,6 3,9 3,9 3,2 2,7 
The Netherlands 1,5 3,0 2,6 2,3 2,3 
Belgium 1,4 3,0 2,6 2,1 2,1 
Austria 2,4 3,1 3,5 2,4 2,0 
Finland 2,9 4,9 4,8 3,2 2,9 
Portugal 0,5 1,3 2,3 2,2 1,8 
Greece 3,7 4,3 4,0 3,1 2,9 
Ireland 5,9 5,7 4,5 2,8 3,4 
Euro Area-11 (2) 1,5 2,8 2,6 2,3 2,1 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -3,4 -1,6 0,2 0,2 0,3 
France -3,0 -2,5 -2,7 -3,1 -3,0 
Italy -4,2 -4,4 -2,5 -2,5 -2,3 
Spain 1,1 1,8 1,2 0,6 0,5 
The Netherlands -0,3 0,5 -0,3 0,5 1,1 
Belgium 0,0 0,1 -0,4 -0,8 -0,8 
Austria -1,7 -1,2 -0,5 -0,6 -0,5 
Finland 2,7 3,9 4,2 3,8 3,6 
Portugal -5,9 -3,9 -3,6 -3,1 -3,1 
Greece -4,5 -2,3 -2,4 -2,4 -2,4 
Ireland 1,0 2,9 0,8 0,2 0,6 
Euro Area-11 -2,5 -1,6 -0,9 -1,0 -0,9 
One-off measures, per cent of GDP 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 
France 0.5 0.0 0 0 0 
Italy 0.5 -1.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 
The Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0.4 0.6 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0.4 0.3 0 0 0 
Portugal 0.2 0 0 0 0 
Greece 0.0 0.6 0 0 0 
Ireland -0.4 -0.2 0 0 0 
Euro Area-11  0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Fiscal impulse, under SP potential output growth assumptions, per cent of GDP (3)
Germany  -0,5 -1,1 -1,3 0,5 0,2 
France -0,4 -0,9 0,0 0,5 -0,2 
Italy -0,4 -1,2 -0,6 0,0 -0,1 
Spain -0,4 -0,3 0,9 0,5 -0,3 
The Netherlands -1,6 -0,2 1,1 -0,7 -0,4 
Belgium -0,1 1,2 0,3 0,4 0,1 
Austria 0,6 0,2 0,2 0,3 -0,2 
Finland -0,5 -0,1 0,5 0,3 0,4 
Portugal -0,2 -2,7 -0,2 -0,3 -0,1 
Greece -1,7 -1,4 -0,3 -0,2 -0,6 
Ireland -0,5 -1,9 1,7 -0,5 -1,0 
Euro Area-11 -0,5 -0,8 -0,3 0,3 -0,1 
Fiscal impulse, under NiGEM trend output growth assumptions, per cent 
of GDP (4)
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Germany  -0,5 -1,2 -1,5 0,2 -0,2 
France -0,2 -0,8 0,2 0,6 -0,1 
Italy -0,1 -1,1 -0,7 -0,2 -0,3 
Spain -0,4 -0,4 0,9 0,6 0,0 
The Netherlands -1,5 -0,1 1,0 -0,8 -0,8 
Belgium 0,0 1,2 0,3 0,4 0,0 
Austria 0,5 -0,1 -0,1 0,1 -0,3 
Finland -0,5 -0,5 0,1 -0,2 -0,1 
Portugal 0,3 -2,3 0,0 -0,3 -0,1 
Greece -1,6 -1,3 -0,2 0,3 0,0 
Ireland 0,0 -1,0 2,3 0,4 -0,3 
Euro Area-11 -0,3 -0,8 -0,3 0,2 -0,2 
 (1) Not working day adjusted.  (2) Excluding Luxembourg. (3) Excluding one-off measures. 
Fiscal impulse is the opposite of the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, 
derived from EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-off 
measures, with potential output growth as in the stability programmes. (4) Excluding one-off 
measures. Fiscal impulse here is the opposite of the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance, derived from EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and 
one-off measures, with trend output growth as in NiGEM 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN Autumn 2007 forecast, Stability programmes, seventh 
updates, end 2006, Eurostat, own assumptions. 
 
The fiscal impulses associated with the two measures give some bounds for the 
fiscal stance. Both measures suggest that countries will reduce their budgetary 
efforts in 2008 and 2009, and be below the 0.5 percentage point effort 
announced in the SPs at the area level. Both measures are in general very 
similar at country level, with the exception of Germany and Ireland due to 
differences in potential output estimates. 
 
We expect the fiscal stance to remain slightly contractionary in 2007, become 
slightly expansionary in 2008 and slightly contractionary in 2009 at the Euro 
Area level. In most countries running close to balance positions or surpluses, 
fiscal policies are expected to be close to neutral, at the noticeable exception of 
the Netherlands where the fiscal stance will be contractionary both in 2008 and 
2009.  
 
In Germany, we expect the government balance to remain close to 0 per cent 
of GDP, possibly with a slight positive fiscal impulse in 2008, reflecting the 
introduction of the corporate tax reform. German fiscal policy would become 
close to neutral after years of budgetary efforts 
 
In two of the four remaining countries currently running close to 3 per cent of 
GDP deficits - Portugal and Greece - the fiscal stance will remain 
contractionary. However, the fiscal effort is forecast to be less restrictive than 
announced in the SPs and below the 0.5 percentage point of GDP requested 
by the requirements of the SGP. In Italy, although there is a possibility that 
revenues growth remains in the short future stronger than expected, we expect 
a deficit at 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2008, above the 2.2 per cent target of the 
SPs, and at 2.5 per cent too in 2009 (versus 1.5 per cent in the SPs). In other 
words, we expect the fiscal stance to be close to neutral rather than strongly 
contractionary.  
 
France seems likely to be at odds with neighbouring countries in terms of fiscal 
developments. The government in office since the Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections of last Spring has announced a number of fiscal 
measures, mainly tax cuts benefiting households and amounting to 0.7 per cent 
of GDP in 2008 (see Table 2.7). At the time of preparing the forecast, detailed 
budget plans were not available. Our forecast embeds the new measures 
announced in terms of revenues. On the expenditure side, we have more 
limited information. Some measures reducing spending growth have been 
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announced but they are small (see Table 2.8). We have assumed that 
government spending will rise at rates close to the recent trend. Under these 
assumptions, fiscal policy will be expansionary in 2008, with a fiscal impulse 
amounting to 0.5 percentage point of GDP, whereas the objectives announced 
in the latest update of the Stability Programme at the end of 2006 where a 0.7 
percentage point of GDP fiscal tightening. Under our GDP growth forecast 
and fiscal assumptions, the government deficit is at risk of breaching the 3 per 
cent of GDP limit of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2008.  
 
Table 2.7. France: Impact of measures decided in August 2007 
 
 2007 2008 2009 Full year 
Income tax exemption on students earnings - 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Income tax cuts on interest payments - 0.7 1.4 2.8 
Inheritance taxes 1.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 
‘Bouclier fiscal’ and ISF  2.0 2.4 2.4 
Extra-hours worked 1.1 4.9 6.0 6.0 
Research tax credit  2.0 2.4 2.4 
Total (billion euros) 2.3 12.4 15.6 17.0 
% of GDP   0.7 1.0 1.1 
Table 2.8. Impact of lower expenditure announced 
 2007 2008 2009 
Civil service employees  0.3 0.7 
Health expenditure 0.2 1.2 2.0 
Special pensions regimes  0.1 0.3 
Total (billion euros) 0.2 1.6 3.0 
 
Table 2.9 shows French fiscal prospects under our central assumption. The 
government will perhaps announce in its forthcoming budget substantial 
expenditure cuts in order to offset the tax cuts impacts on the deficit from 
2008. Accounting for the fiscal package announced, the stabilisation of the 
government deficit at the 2007 level would require that expenditure growth 
decelerates significantly down from its recent trend.   
 
Table 2.9 France: Government balance prospects under a central assumption 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP growth, % 2.2 1.8 2.3 2.1 
Tax to GDP ratio, before fiscal package, % of GDP 44.0 44.0 43.8 43.8 
Fiscal package, % of GDP  -0.1 -0.7 -0.9 
     
Expenditure, % of GDP 53.5 53.5 53.1 52.8 
Expenditure growth, % 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 
     
Government deficit, % of GDP 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.0 
 
CONCLUSION 
With GDP growth decelerating from 2.7 per cent in 2006 at 2.1 per cent in 
2009 and a close to neutral fiscal stance, the Euro Area deficit would remain at 
around -1 per cent of GDP. This would mean that the objective of 0 per cent 
of GDP deficits in 2010 would be difficult to reach at the Euro Area level, 
albeit with different situations within the area, countries running close to -3 per 
cent of GDP deficits and other more than 3 per cent of GDP surpluses. A 1 
per cent of GDP Euro Area government deficit is low from a historical 
perspective and as compared to deficits elsewhere in the industrial world. 
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Inside the Euro Area, the most striking development as compared to recent 
history would perhaps be the decoupling of government balances 
developments between Germany, running small government surpluses at the 
forecasting horizon and France at risk of breaching the 3 per cent of GDP 
limit for deficits.  
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  The Report aims at providing an analysis of the European Social Model – or 
European Social Models(s) – and to draw future prospects for Social Europe. 
European societies are based on a compromise between on the one hand 
capitalism, private ownership and market strengths, and on the other hand, 
socialism, redistribution and public production. A substantial part of 
households’ consumption is public (education, health); some risks are 
collectively insured (unemployment, healthcare, old-age, family, poverty); 
income redistribution is substantial through taxation and social protection. 
Labour legislation sets the framework of employment relations in the 
workplace, wage settings and dismissal procedures. There seems to be a broad 
consensus among EU (political or social) leaders that there is a European 
Social Model (ESM), typical of European societies and that this model should 
be protected and developed. But the ESM is an ambiguous notion (see Jepsen, 
2005): is it a simple description of the actual state of European societies (which 
are diverse and evolving) or a political objective (but what is its precise 
content)?  
Introduction 
‘Social Europe’ is also an ambiguous expression. It may refer to the current 
actions of European Institutions in social areas, which are limited by the 
subsidiarity principle and by European Treaties, where social issues remain 
mainly at the National level. It may also refer to a political project: increasing 
gradually the level of Europe’s intervention, so that there will be a social 
Europe tomorrow like there is a monetary Europe today. But this project may 
try to ‘modernise social protection’, i.e. to reduce its field and costs to bring it 
more in line with the norms of a global world economy, or on the contrary to 
progressively implement common social norms in all Member States in order 
to  reach a high and similar social protection level.  
In its “Golden Age” after World War II, Europe was an economic and 
social success story: Europe had substantially narrowed the gap in living 
standards vis-à-vis the United States; European welfare states combined strong 
growth, low unemployment and a solid social safety net in these years. Since 
the mid-1990s, Europe has performed rather poorly: Economic growth and 
productivity growth were lower than in the past and lower than in the US. 
Unemployment has been persistently high. In fact, economic performance was 
diverse:  while both liberal market economies with a low level of state 
interference and the Scandinavian countries with high taxation and large 
welfare states performed well, large continental European economies fell 
behind in the last decade.  
Some economists claim that the inferior performance is the consequence of 
restrictive macroeconomic policies, blaming both monetary policy (first the 
Bundesbank and later the ECB) and fiscal policy due to the Maastricht criteria 
and the Stability and Growth Pact as well as insufficient wage increases. Most 
blame high welfare costs and low market flexibility for the disappointing 
growth. The European model with its emphasis on social protection is 
perceived as barrier to competitiveness in a global world.  
In a complex reality, no straightforward explanation is apt to shed light on 
the question of Europe’s lacklustre economic performance. The world has 
changed since the “Golden Age”: On the one hand, international competition 
has intensified through globalisation, a development that in Europe was 
reinforced by European integration and the fall of the iron curtain. These 
factors have strengthened the potential for growth, but at the same time more 
adjustments were required in goods and labour markets. On the other hand, 
welfare state institutions have come under pressure by demographic ageing, 
rising unemployment, flexibility requirements and individualisation. In each 
country, globalisation gives rise to winners and losers and reduces national 
solidarity.  
The objectives of social protection systems should be precisely redefined. 
In the Golden years, the target was to socialise (i.e. to leave out of the Market) 
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a substantial part of households spending and incomes. Unemployment, old-
age, incapacity benefits ensured a satisfactory living standard for the individuals 
who cannot work. This automatically reduces the financial incentive to work 
for some categories of the population and reduces labour supply. Over the last 
decade, national and European authorities have stressed that social protection 
should not be a disincentive to work: “work must pay”. But can the system 
provide a greater incentive to work without questioning the basis of the social 
protection system and without reducing the incomes of unemployed, retired 
people, or of poor families? The concept of ‘ESM modernisation’ is 
particularly ambiguous. One cannot avoid a trade-off between work incentives 
in one hand and social equality and income guarantees in the other. But is this 
choice the same everywhere and for every social category in Europe?  
The notion of the ESM may hide diverging interests between social 
categories. In many Member States, the social protection system is linked to 
trade unions, either through a joint management by employers and employees’ 
trade unions (Bismarkian model), or because trade unions have imposed it at 
the political level (Scandinavian model). Can the management of social 
protection be handled at the European level, without threatning to break this 
link?  
Can the ESM survive in a global world? The answer will be positive only if 
social protection is not a handicap but also a factor of higher productivity and 
competitiveness. Social cohesion arising from the reduction of incomes 
inequalities, from public education and health should raise productivity, by 
avoiding the alienation of a large part of the population, thereby ensuring that 
they do not become a financial weight for society. Job stability must be an 
incentive for companies to invest in workers and for workers to invest in their 
company. However social protection, basically implemented in a national 
framework is necessarily questioned by globalisation and by European 
construction. The wealthiest, the managers and companies can find a way to 
escape the cost of social protection. How can MS and EU institutions prevent 
this?  
This report investigates what kind of welfare state architecture is required in 
Europe in the face of intensified competition due to globalisation and 
European integration, higher flexibility requirements and demographic ageing 
to fulfil the ambitious Lisbon agenda; i.e. to achieve a virtuous triangle : social 
cohesion, full employment and dynamic economic growth. It discusses 
features of a reformed European social model, which would not be a barrier to 
growth but a comparative advantage for international competitiveness.  
Section 1 provides an assessment of ‘the European Social Model’. This 
model has different patterns among EU-15 countries1. The generally adopted 
classification (Esping-Andersen, 1990) sets out four social models in Europe: 
liberal, continental, Scandinavian and Mediterranean. However, each country 
has its own specificities, each risk is specific. National systems have changed 
quite substantially over the last 25 years. There has been, however, no 
convergence, each country keeping their specificities. This raises two types of 
questions:  
- Are the four models variants of a single ESM, or does each model have 
its own specificities that cannot be abolished? For instance, is the liberal 
model an ESM?  
- What are the assessments of these models in terms of economic 
performances and social cohesion? What features of these models 
should be generalised in Europe or, on the contrary, abolished? Can we 
invent a European model that would pick out the best elements in all 
 
1 The report discusses mainly Social protection issues in the old member states. NMS issues are 
discussed in the two annexes: Ruzik (2007) and Sowa (2007).  
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models or is it a utopia? Should European Institutions protect the 
national specificities or should they try to make the existing models 
converge? 
Section 2 compares the economic and social performances of the different 
groups of EU countries, using economic (output growth, unemployment) and 
social indicators (poverty rates, income inequality). According to a widespread 
view, the continental model can be held responsible for the poor performances 
of the Euro area and needs to evolve towards the liberal or the Scandinavian 
model (see Sapir, 2005).  When social indicators are taken into account, the 
position of continental countries looks more positive, although remaining 
clearly below the performance of Scandinavian countries. What specificities of 
the continental model need to be corrected? Can the Scandinavian model be 
implemented in all larger, open, heterogeneous countries and those with high 
unemployment?  
Section 3 discusses the need to adapt to new economic and social 
challenges: the ageing of populations, the rising trend in health spending, the 
change in family structures, the rising trend in social exclusion, the persistence 
of mass unemployment in some countries, of low fertility rates in some others. 
In the face of rising trends in spending, should European models become 
more liberal, target social protection on the poor or should they remain 
universal, even if this would require some rise in contribution rates?How to 
combine social cohesion (hence low inequalities) and work incentives? How to 
raise female, older workers and socially excluded employment rates without 
increasing poverty among the unemployed? Should the financing of social 
protection be reformed in a way that it weighs less on labour? And if so how? 
The section provides a discussion, risk by risk, of the economic and social 
reforms needed.  
What could be the respective roles of national and European institutions in 
the evolution of the ESM (or ESMs). The single market makes it more and 
more difficult for national protection systems to coexist: the EU has until now 
only organised the coexistence through systems coordination. There are three 
incentives for moving beyond this: the functioning of the single market would 
be facilitated, European citizenship would be strengthened, the risk of social 
competition would be reduced. But how can the move from systems based on 
domestic foundations to a European system be achieved? Are European 
citizens ready for a European solidarity? The current European strategy to 
influence the evolution of the national socials systems - the social Agenda and 
the Open method of coordination (OMC) – is based on two non-binding 
pillars: the definition of common objectives and the exchange of good 
practices.  But these procedures remain disconnected from national debates 
and reforms. Can they become more democratic and more powerful?  
In conclusion, three different views are presented on the future of the 
ESM: the first stresses the importance of guaranteeing social cohesion in the 
Member States, by reducing income inequalities and ensuring a high level of 
social protection, in particular for people who cannot work, because of their 
age, their handicap, their family situation or the economic situation. The 
disincentive effect of social protection is judged of second order and it is 
considered that rich countries can accept it. The second expresses the 
importance of restoring work incentives, by accepting initially some increase in 
income inequalities. Making work pay will increase production and will give 
more resources to the Social security system, ensuring its financial 
sustainability. The third suggests a new architecture of welfare states in 
Europe, inspired by the Scandinavian model, so that the impact of social 
protection as a productive factor increases.  
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The basic principle of the ESM is that society has to provide each individual 
with some basic goods and services (education, health) and that it should 
ensure everyone has a minimum vital income, that everyone is protected 
against some risks (sickness, unemployment, old-age), that some redistribution 
must be done in favour of some categories of the population (families, disabled 
people), that everyone can earn their living through a paid job, with decent 
working conditions and some degree of job protection. Labour Law and social 
dialogues regulate wage setting, relations in the workplace and lay-off 
procedures. By supporting social cohesion, by ensuring that important parts of 
the population are not durably excluded from the productive life, by ensuring a 
minimal level of education and health, by supporting compatibility between 
work and childcare, social protection is a productive factor. But, it necessarily 
weakens incentives to work and thus the size of the system is a delicate trade-
off between fairness, social efficiency and individual incentives.   
1.  
From One to 
Four Models   
Should this trade-off change over time? According to a first view point, 
rising living standards should translate into lower work dependence; social 
protection should rise over time; productivity gains should pave the way for 
more leisure time and therefore economic inactivity. A rising share of 
economic inactivity should be financed through social protection: disabled 
people, old-age pensioners, child care. This trend took place until the early 
1980’s and has since then been reversed. Today’s mainstream view is that work 
should pay and that people have both rights and responsibilities, that benefit 
entitlement needs to be conditional on duties towards the Society. Liberal ideas 
and globalisation constraints plead for reducing the weight of taxation. A 
major objective of the reform of social systems is to give people incentives to 
work and to work longer. This raises the question of the link between labour 
and social protection. Should social protection aim at ensuring that everyone 
has decent incomes or make sure that everyone is able to get decent earnings 
form their work? The issue is all the more delicate since most continental 
European countries still have a high level of unemployment.  
Social protection was originally highly connected with trade unions, and 
more progressively toward a universal coverage, more satisfactory in terms of 
social cohesion. Workers financially support the economically inactive, while at 
the same time the system provides insurance for active people (sickness, 
family, unemployment, pensions). The solidarity function was included in the 
social insurance system. But this system is fragile: workers may refuse to pay 
for the inactive and may prefer occupational systems.  
Until the early 1980’s, the ESM had also the objective of supporting 
economic growth and maintaining full-employment through fiscal and 
monetary policies. This ambition weakened in the 1980’s when the reduction 
of inflation and macroeconomic stability became priority objectives in Europe, 
rather than full-employment that seemed impossible to maintain.  
Social protection systems are extremely heterogeneous in the EU, which 
reflect different histories and different organisations of social relations. Each 
country manages risks in its own way. In the tradition of Esping-Andersen 
(1990), four models are generally considered:  
1. The Scandinavian (or social-democratic) model is the most 
comprehensive one, with a high degree of emphasis on redistribution, 
social inclusion and universality. A uniform and relatively high level of 
social protection is afforded to all citizens, meaning that dependence 
of the individual on the market and on his work is lowest. They are 
complemented by occupational benefits agreed by social partners and 
covering almost all the labour force. A generous infrastructure of 
social services is designed to be both affordable and of high quality. 
High replacement rates of unemployment benefits and the health 
system are financed through the tax system. Taxation is very 
progressive while business taxes are rather low. Job protection is 
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rather low but unemployment allowances are high with an active 
policy of reintegration in employment. Trade unions are strongly 
involved in the administration of unemployment insurance and 
training. The Scandinavian countries have been successful in 
generating high employment rates, especially for female and older 
workers and at reducing gender inequalities in the labour market 
especially for female and older workers. A strong social dialogue and 
close cooperation of the social partners with the government 
characterise the countries that can be subsumed under this ideal-type 
(Denmark, Finland and Sweden).  
- The liberal (or Anglo-Saxon) model emphasises the responsibility of 
individuals for themselves. A minimal social protection is afforded to 
the poor and is complemented by company or private insurance.  
Social transfers are smaller than in the other models, more targeted 
and “means tested”. Accordingly, social policies usually cater to a 
clientele consisting of low-income groups. The state encourages 
market actors to co-provide services, and leaves recipients with the 
choice to opt between public and private providers. Private insurance 
and savings schemes are frequently supported by complementary state 
policies (e.g., tax credits, tax shelters). The labour market is not 
regulated; labour relations are decentralised and bargaining takes place 
primarily at the firm level. Unemployment allowances are low and only 
slightly over the subsistence minimum. Employment rates are high. 
Taxation is relatively low. The Anglo-Saxon model is typified in 
Europe by the United Kingdom and Ireland.   
- The Continental European model of social insurance: social 
protection is organised on an occupational basis and aims at 
guaranteeing wage incomes.  Accordingly, transfers are financed 
through employers’ and employees’ contributions. The redistributive 
efforts of the fiscal system are less pronounced than in Scandinavian 
countries. Social partners play an important role in industrial relations 
and wage bargaining is centralised. The model includes strong job 
protection and generous unemployment allowances. The employment 
rate is relatively low. The tax-to-GDP ratio is high. This is the model 
in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria.  
- In the Mediterranean model, the low level of social transfers is partly 
counterbalanced by the strong supportive role of family networks. 
Families still play a significant role in the provision of security and 
shelter; these countries maintain some aspects of a paternalistic 
society, especially pronounced gender inequalities. If old-age benefits 
are high, family and anti-poverty benefits are low. Female employment 
rates are very low and the total employment rate is low. Job protection 
is very high but unemployment allowances are low. The Mediterranean 
group of countries includes Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. 
This breakdown into four models is not so clear-cut when one looks in 
more detail at country level. Some countries have characteristics of both 
continental and Scandinavian countries (the Netherlands, Austria). Domestic 
specificities are very strong: for instance the Finnish pension system is very 
different from the Swedish one, although the two countries are generally 
considered as Scandinavian ones. France and Germany are continental 
countries, but they run different policies in many fields like family benefits or 
industrial policy. The UK health system is not typical of a liberal model.  
The distinction needs to be refined according to the risk: relatively relevant 
for old age, much less relevant for family and health benefits. Systems have 
changed over time: health and family allowances have become universal in 
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almost all countries; minimum incomes have been introduced in most 
continental countries.  
Globally the differences between the four models remain (see Table 1.1). 
Social protection public spending amounts to 33% of GDP in Scandinavian 
countries, 30% in continental countries, 26% in Mediterranean countries and 
23% in liberal countries. Some countries can be singled out: the Netherlands is 
the only country where the share of social protection spending has been 
significantly reduced. On the contrary, Portugal has converged towards 
continental countries and the share of social protection spending has risen in 
the UK.  
Table 1.1: Social Protection Public Expenditures 
As a Percentage of GDP 
      1980     1990     1998     2006 
Austria 26.9 28.2 30.0 29.5 
Belgium 30.0 28.0 28.9 29.6 
France 27.3 29.3 32.0 33.2 
Germany 25.6 23.5 29.7 29.7 
Netherlands 30.6 29.7 23.6 26.2 
Average(1) 27.0 26.2 29.8 30.5 
Greece .. 19.4 23.7 23.9 
Spain                ..    23.8 (2) 22.4 23.0 
Italy .. 27.0 27.3 29.0 
Portugal 13.4 17.3 21.8 27.5 
Average(1) .. .. 24.9 26.3 
Denmark 33.9 33.5 34.8 33.2 
Finland 22.5 28.6 31.6 30.1 
Sweden     42.5 (3)  37.6 35.9 
Average(1)   35.2 33.6 
Ireland .. 21.1 18.2 18.6 
UK 22.6 21.7 24.3 26.4 
Average(1)  21.7 23.9 25.8 
(1) Weighted averages. (2) In 1995. (3) In 1993.  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
An analysis of expenditure per function reveals divergences both between 
models and within models (see Table 1.2): 
- Anglo-Saxon countries spend little on old-age pensions, continental countries 
quite a lot. The picture is more contrasted for other models. Italy spends quite 
a lot on pensions, Spain very little. Swedish spending on pensions differs 
widely from the Finnish one.  
- Health spending is low in Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries; high in 
continental countries. 
- Incapacity benefits are high in the Scandinavian model, also in the 
Netherlands and to a lesser extent in Portugal and the UK. On the contrary, 
this category of expenditure is low in Mediterranean countries, in Ireland and 
in France.. 
- Family allowances are high in Scandinavian countries; this is also the case for 
continental countries (except for the Netherlands). By contrast, spending is 
low in Mediterranean countries.  
- Unemployment allowances are high in the Scandinavian countries (despite 
low unemployment rates). This is the opposite in Mediterranean countries.  
-  Poverty benefits vary quite substantially within the models. 
From 1992 to 2003 the rise in social protection expenditure (by 1.7 percentage 
point of GDP) was due mainly to higher old-age spending (1.1 percentage 
point), health (0.5) and family (0.3) while the weight of unemployment 
spending, was diminishing (0.5) (see Table 1.3).  
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- Old-age spending rose in almost all countries and especially rapidly in 
Portugal, in a catching-up process. It remained stable in the Netherlands while 
it hardly rose in Spain and decreased in Ireland, two high growth countries. 
- Health spending rose rapidly in France, despite a rather high initial level, to a 
smaller extent in the UK and in catching-up countries (Greece, Portugal). 
- Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands have reduced significantly the 
level of incapacity spending.  
- Family spending rose in Germany and Italy whereas it was being reduced in 
Scandinavian countries. 
- Unemployment spending declined in line with unemployment in 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. 
- Spending targeted at reducing poverty and social exclusion fell in Sweden but 
rose in France, the Netherlands, Greece. 
All in all, some elements of convergence emerged at the level of the risks, 
although domestic specificities remain. 
Table 1.2:  Social Protection Expenditures in 2003 
As a Percentage of GDP 
     Total  Old-age   Health Incapacity    Family  Unempl. Exclusion
Austria 29.5 14.2 7.3 2.5 3.2 1.8 0.5 
Belgium 29.7 13.2 8.0 2.0 2.3 3.7 0.5 
France 30.9 13.4 9.4 1.5 2.8 2.4 1.4 
Germany 30.2 13.0 8.4 2.4 3.2 2.6 0.8 
Netherlands 28.1 11.3 8.8 3.1 1.4 1.7 1.7 
Average(1) 30.2 13.0 8.7 2.4 2.9 2.5 0.9 
Greece 26.3 13.4 7.0 1.3 2.0 1.5 1.2 
Spain 19.7 8.5 6.0 1.5 0.6 2.6 0.3 
Italy 26.4 16.3 6.8 1.7 1.1 0.5 0.1 
Portugal 24.3 11.2 7.0 2.8 1.6 1.3 0.4 
Average(1) 23.8 12.9 6.5 1.7 1.0 1.4 0.3 
Denmark 30.9 11.5 6.3 4.2 4.1 3.0 1.8 
Finland 26.9 10.0 6.8 3.6 3.1 2.7 0.9 
Sweden 33.5 13.4 8.8 4.8 3.2 2.0 1.1 
Average(1) 31.1 12.0 7.6 4.3 3.4 2.5 1.2 
Ireland 16.5 3.8 4.2 0.8 2.6 1.4 0.9 
UK 26.7 12.0 7.9 2.5 1.8 0.4 1.7 
Average(1) 25.9 11.3 7.6 2.4 1.9 0.5 1.6 
EU-15 28.3 12.9 8.0 2.2 2.3 1.9 1.0 
(1) Weighted averages  
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 1.3: Social Protection Expenditures in 1992 
As a Percentage of GDP 
     Total Old-age   Health Incapacity    Family   Unempl. Exclusion
Austria 27.0 12.9 7,5 1.8 2.9 1,4 0.5 
Belgium 26.5 11.0 7.4 1.8 2.3 3.4 0.6 
France 27.8 12.0 7.9 1.7 2.7 2.5 1.1 
Germany 26.6 11.0 8.5 1.7 2.2 2.6 0.7 
Netherlands 30.3 11.3 8.9 4.9 1.5 2.6 1.1 
Average(1) 27.4 11.5 8.2 2.1 2.3 2.6 0.9 
Greece 20.3 10.8 5.3 1.2 1.7 0.9 0.7 
Spain 21.8 8.9 6.4 1.6 0.4 4.3 0.2 
Italy 25.1 15.1 6.6 1.7 0.8 0.7 0.0 
Portugal 16.5 6.7 5.6 2.4 1.0 0.7 0.1 
Average(1) 23.0 12.0 6.4 1.7 0.7 2.0 0.1 
Denmark 29.5 10.4 5.8 2.9 3.5 4.9 2.0 
Finland 32.6 10.5 7.6 4.9 4.2 4.3 1.1 
Sweden 37.7 13.8 8.6 4.0 4.5 4.3 2.4 
Average(1) 34.3 12.0 7.3 3.9 4.1 4.5 1.9 
Ireland 19.4 5.5 6.6 0.9 2.2 3.2 1.0 
UK 26.7 11.5 6.6 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.8 
Average(1) 26.1 11.0 6.6 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.7 
EU-15 26.6 11.8 7.5 2.1 2.0 2.4 0.9 
(1) Weighted averages  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
Box 1: The Difficulties of International Comparisons 
The differences in social protection systems make international 
comparisons difficult:  
- Incapacity benefits are very widespread in some countries where they 
play the role of unemployment or early retirement allowances. 
- Families can be supported through social benefits or tax allowances 
- Childcare can be facilitated though social benefits or collective services 
(nurseries, pre-primary schools). 
- In some countries (like in the UK) employees can chose to opt out of 
public insurance if their employers provide a higher benefit 
 
Models also differ in terms of degree of market regulation. From 1998 to 
2003, product markets’ regulation decreased in all countries, so that the 
ranking of countries in terms of regulation remained unchanged from liberal, 
Scandinavian, continental to Mediterranean countries (Table 1.4). The same 
ranking can be found in terms of labour regulation, with a less clear 
convergence. Unemployment allowances are more generous in continental and 
Scandinavian countries than in liberal countries and less generous in 
Mediterranean countries.  
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Table 1.4:  Product and Labour Market Regulation 
 Product Market Regulation 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
Unemployment
Net 
Replacement 
Rate 
       1998       2003       1990       1998       2003         2004 
Austria 1.8 1.3 2.2 2.4 2.2 73 
Belgium 1.9 1.4 3.2 2.5 2.5 66 
France 2.4 1.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 71 
Germany 1.8 1.3 3.2 2.6 2.5 75 
Netherlands 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.3 2.3 79 
Average(1) 2.0 1.4 2.9 2.6 2.6 73 
Italy 2.7 1.8 3.6 3.1 2.4 6 
Greece 2.7 1.7 3.6 3.5 2.9 33 
Portugal 2.2 1.7 4.1 3.7 3.5 72 
Spain 2.1 1.5 3.8 3.0 3.1 52 
Average(1) 2.4 1.7 3.7 3.1 2.8 29 
Denmark 1.4 1.1 2.3 1.8 1.8 77 
Finland 2.1 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 75 
Sweden 1.8 1.1 3.5 2.6 2.6 77 
Average(1) 1.8 1.2 2.9 2.3 2.2 76 
Ireland 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.3 71 
UK 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.1 66 
Average(1) 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.1 66 
US 1.3 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.7 29 
(1) Weighted averages  
Source: OECD. 
 
Social models differ also in terms of tax structure (see Table 1.5). Direct 
taxation is low in liberal countries, high in continental countries, slightly less 
high in Mediterranean countries, where indirect taxation is more substantial; 
households’ taxation is higher in Scandinavian countries, while company 
taxation is relatively low.  
Table 1.5: Maximal Tax Rates in 2006 
 Income Tax Corporate Tax 
Austria 50 25 
Belgium 50 35.5 
France 48.1 34.4 
Germany 44.3 39,3 
Netherlands 52 31.5 
Average(1) 47.0 36.3 
Italy 43 37.25 
Greece 40 32 
Portugal 42 22.5 
Spain 45 35 
Average(1) 43.4 35.1 
Denmark 59.8 28 
Finland 56.75 26 
Sweden 56.5 28 
Average(1) 57.3 27.5 
Ireland 42 12.5 
UK 40 30 
Average(1) 40.2 28.6 
(1) Weighted averages  
Source: European Commission. 
 
Table 1.6 shows another typology, where social protection systems are 
broken down into: social insurance systems (benefits depend on contributions 
paid although there is also some redistribution), universal systems (entitlement 
to all citizens) and assistance systems (targeting the poor, income-tested). 
Besides public systems are complemented with more or less compulsory 
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occupational systems, benefiting from tax incentives and relying more or less 
on public decisions and on private individual insurance systems (that benefit 
often from tax incentives). Each country is characterised by specific choices on 
each insured risk.  
Table 1.6: Social Benefits: A Typology 
 Assistance Universal  
System 
Social 
Insurance 
Occupational 
Insurances 
Private 
Insurance 
      
Pensions,  
long-term care, 
incapacity 
Minimum pension Flat pension 
Incapacity 
benefits 
Pays-as-you-go 
systems Company funds 
Individual 
insurance 
      
Family, 
Housing 
Housing benefits, 
Minimum income 
Universal  
benefits 
Family tax credit  
or allowance  
 
      
Health Free health care  
for the poor 
Universal public 
system 
Health insurance Mutual insurance 
funds 
Private  
insurance 
      
Unemployment, 
Exclusion 
Minimum income  Unemployment 
benefit 
  
 
By nature, the liberal model favours assistance systems complemented by 
private insurance systems. This raises the question of the level of assistance 
benefits and does not ensure social cohesion. The lower middle-class may turn 
out to be the looser, because it is not covered by social protection and pays 
relatively high tax and premiums. The continental model favours social 
insurance systems for pensions and unemployment, but these systems are 
complemented with assistance systems and universal systems (family, sickness, 
poverty).  The Scandinavian model is based on universal systems 
complemented in practice by more or less universal occupational systems (for 
pensions). Disincentives to work are corrected by social control and activation 
policies in Scandinavian countries. The two models require the acceptance of a 
high level of taxation (which is easier in a homogeneous society, like in 
Scandinavian countries). The disparities between models make it difficult to 
define ‘the’ ESM.  
 
 
2.  
Economic and 
Social 
Performance of 
Social Models in 
Europe  
2.1 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCES 
European economic performance has deteriorated since the beginning of the 
nineties, compared with the past as well with the United States. Growth has 
been disappointingly low compared with the expectations raised by the 
European integration and the enlargement project. Many authors blame the 
high level of taxes and government expenditures, the degree of regulation, and 
the costs of welfare in Europe as main reasons for Europe’s economic 
underperformance. Other authors emphasise the role of "growth drivers", 
macroeconomic policies and the housing cycle.  
In the long run (1970-2006) there are rather small differences between 
social models in Europe: the best performers were countries with initial low 
level of GDP par capita (Greece, Portugal; Spain, Ireland) rather than 
countries which belong to a particular model. During the 1986-1996 period, 
Continental model countries obtained the best results and Scandinavian ones 
the worst. The situation had changed since 1996 (see Table 2.1). In the last 
decade, GDP per capita and real GDP growth was high in liberal and 
Scandinavian countries and rather low in Continental and Mediterranean 
countries. Is it an effect of the inadequacy of these models with globalization 
or a temporary failure?  
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Table 2.1: Economic Performance 
 Real GDP Growth (Per Cent p.a.)  
 1970/2006 1970/1986 1986/1996 1996/2006 
     
Continental Model  +2.3 +2.7 +2.6 +1.9 
Germany  +2.2 +2.4 +2.7 +1.5 
France  +2.4 +2.9 +2.1 +2.2 
Belgium  +2.4 +2.5 +2.3 +2.2 
The Netherlands  +2.5 +2.4 +2.8 +2.4 
Austria  +2.6  +2.9 +2.7 +2.3 
Mediterranean Model  +2.6 +3.0 +2.4 +2.3 
Greece  +2.8 +2.9 +1.5 +4.1 
Italy  +2.3 +3.1 +2.0 +1.4 
Portugal  +3.1  +3.5 +3.9 +2.1 
Spain  +3.2  +2.7 +3.0 +3.8 
Scandinavian Model  +2.3 +2.5 +1.5 +2.9 
Denmark  +2.0  +2.6  +1.7 +2.1 
Finland  +2.9  +3.4 +1.5 +3.7 
Sweden  +2.1  +1.9 +1.5 +3.0 
Liberal Model +2.5  +2.2 +2.5 +3.1 
Ireland  +5.2 +3.8 +5.1 +7.1 
United Kingdom  +2.3 +2.1 +2.3 +2.8 
EU-15  +2.4 +2.7 +2.4 +2.3 
United States  +3.1  +3.2 +2.9 +3.2 
 
It is not surprising that the catching-up process results in higher long-run 
growth for countries with a low initial level of GDP per head (e.g., Southern 
Europe, Ireland). Therefore we ran a regression of GDP growth on GDP level 
per head and calculated the per capita growth rate which could be expected for 
each country given its initial level of GDP per head in PPS (i.e., the 
convergence process). The difference between the actual and the ‘hypothetical’ 
growth rate per capita gives us an indicator of relative economic performance. 
According to this indicator, economic performance since 1970 has been the 
highest in Ireland, Austria and Finland. Greece, Portugal, France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain were under-performing.  
Table 2.2: Economic Performance 
 
Real GDP Growth  
Per Capita 
(Per Cent p.a.) 
Actual Minus Hypothetical 
Real GDP Growth  
Per Capita 
(Per Cent. points p.a.) 
     
 1970/2006 1990/2006 1970/20061 1990/20062
     
Continental Model  +1.8 +1.3 -0.1 +0.0 
Germany  +1.8 +1.3 -0.1 -0.1 
France  +1.8 +1.3 -0.2 -0.2 
Belgium  +2.1 +1.6 +0.2 +0.3 
The Netherlands  +1.8 +1.8 +0.1 +0.4 
Austria  +2.3 +1.8 +0.4 +0.7 
Mediterranean Model  +2.2 +1.5 -0.1 -0.5 
Greece  +2.2 +2.5 -0.4 -0.7 
Italy  +2.2 +1.1 -0.1 -0.4 
Portugal  +2.6 +1.7 -0.3 -1.5 
Spain  +2.4 +2.2 -0.1 -0.5 
Scandinavian Model  +2.1 +2.0 +0.3 +0.7 
Denmark  +1.7 +1.9 -0.0 +0.5 
Finland  +2.5 +2.2 +0.3 +0.6 
Sweden  +1.8 +1.8 +0.2 +0.6 
Liberal Model +2.2 +2.2 +2.2 +0.4 
Ireland  +4.1 +5.1 +1.3 +2.4 
United Kingdom  +2.1 +2.1 +0.1 +0.3 
EU 15  +2.0 +1.6 -0.0 -0.1 
United States  +2.0 +1.8 +2.0 +1.8 
1.2. Hypothetical growth is the rate which could be expected for each country 
given its initial level of GDP per capita, based on the following regression 
equations for 13 EU countries: 
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(1)   Y = 3.2523 – 0.5115*Yti 
R2 = 0.60  (9) (25) 
1970/2006 
(2)  Y = 3.0049 – 0.0835*Yti 
R2 = 0.28  (21) (49) 
1990/2006 
Y  GDP per capita in 1,000 PPS, Y  growth of real GDP per capita p.a. 
EU15 countries except Ireland and Luxembourg 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, WIFO calculations. 
 
Growth differentials between EU countries have become larger since the 
nineties. In the 1990 to 2006 period, per head GDP growth was substantially 
higher in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries than in Continental and 
Mediterranean Europe. The strikingly good long-run economic performance 
of Scandinavian countries and Austria makes it dubious to blame the welfare 
state for poor economic performance. Public social expenditure is much higher 
in Scandinavian countries and Austria than in the average EU.  
 
Figure 2.1: Public Social Expenditure and Economic Performance 
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Source: Eurostat, OECD, WIFO calculations. 
 
A cross-country diagram (see Figure 2.1) gives the impression that 
countries with healthy social standards had a better economic performance. 
Blaming the welfare state for low growth and weak competitiveness may be 
premature. Although the Scandinavian countries display the highest level of 
state intervention, i.e. high taxes and large public social expenditures, these 
countries have performed very well in the last decade. We may infer that the 
asserted trade-off between efficiency and equality or between economic 
competitiveness and social justice is rather shaky. Economists are inclined to 
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see the financial burden of social services and public transfers but to discount 
individual and public costs of social exclusion and large inequalities, in 
particular, in terms of public security and health. They rarely point to the 
productive effects of the welfare state, of social cohesion, general public 
education, public health services, and cooperative industrial relations.  
The employment rate is closely related to economic performance. It is the 
highest in Scandinavia, followed by the Anglo-Saxon countries. Public services 
(child care etc.) largely explain the high employment rate in Scandinavia, 
marketisation of household services (low-wage service jobs) the high 
employment rate in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The classification in term of 
unemployment rate is practically the reverse, even if there are some anomalies, 
due to female activity: Sweden and France seem to have too many unemployed 
people; Italy and Ireland too few. In the full-time equivalent employment rate, 
there is a gap of about 12.5% (16%) between Continental (Mediterranean) 
countries and Scandinavian ones. 
Table 2.3: Economic Indicators 
 GDP Per Capita Employment Rate 2005 
Unemployment 
Rate 
      1991     2006  Full-time equivalent         2006 
      
Continental Model  108.0 103.6 65.3 60.2 8.1 
Germany  109.7 102.1 65.4 60.4 8.4 
France  104.9 99.1 63.1 59.7 9.4 
Belgium  109.5 109.5 61.1 57.1 8.2 
Netherlands  107.1 116.4 73.2  60.9 3.9 
Austria  114.6 114.0 68.6  63.7 4.8 
Mediterranean Model  90.9 88.9 60.4  58.4  7.7 
Greece  67.5 78.9 60.1  59.2 8.9 
Italy  106.0 92.2 57.6  55.5 6.8 
Portugal  69.1 65.3 67.5  65.6 7.7 
Spain  79.4 90.5 63.3  60.9 8.6 
Scandinavian Model  105.8 108.8 72.4 67.7 6.3 
Denmark  107.4 113.8 75.9  69.4 3.9 
Finland  98.3 105.4 68.4  65.3 7.7 
Sweden  108.9 107.6 72.5  68.0  7.0 
Liberal Model 92.9 109.4 71.4  65.3 5.2 
Ireland  77.3 129.7 67.6  64.6 4.4 
United Kingdom  94.3  107.6 71.7  65.4 5.3 
United States  132.1 136.8 71.5  67.0 67.0 
Source: Eurostat, OECD. 
 
Male employment rates are relatively low in Scandinavian and liberal 
countries because of the size of incapacity benefits. By contrast, female 
employment rates are very high in Scandinavian countries, while it is the 
opposite for Mediterranean countries, the UK and continental countries being 
in an intermediate position. Lastly older workers’ employment rates are high in 
Scandinavian countries, low in continental countries and very low in 
Mediterranean countries (and also in Belgium and Austria). Mediterranean 
countries are thus characterised by a specific social choice where employment 
is focused on adult males. This choice is not sustainable with low fertility rates 
and demographic prospects in these countries. Moving towards the 
Scandinavian model becomes a necessity. Older workers’ low employment 
rates may also be viewed like a social choice (like in Austria) or the pernicious 
effect of persistence of wrong economic choices made in times of high 
unemployment rates.  
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Table 2.4: Activity Indicators (2005) 
                                    Activity Rate Part-time Rate 
     
 Male 25-54 Female  25-54 55-64  
     
Continental Model  93.3 79.4 46.6 19.9 
Germany  93.6 79.1 52.1 21.8 
France  93.8 80.7 43.6 13.6 
Belgium  91.8 76.8 33.5 18.1 
Netherlands  91.4 77.8 47.0 35.7 
Austria  92.8 79.9 33.0 16.2 
Mediterranean Model  92.8 67.5 39.6 12.5 
Greece  94.7 68.1 43.1 6.1 
Italy  91.7 64.6 32.6 14.7 
Portugal  92.5 81.8 53.8 9.8 
Spain  92.4 69.0 45.9 11.4 
Scandinavian Model  91.5 85.5 65.8 14.2 
Denmark  91.1 84.1 62.9 18.0 
Finland  90.3 85.2 56.4 11.2 
Sweden  92.4 86.5 72.8 13.5 
Liberal Model 91.0 76.9 58.0 23.2 
Ireland  92.2 69.6 53.2 18.6 
UK 90.9 77.5 58.4 23.6 
United States  90.5 75.3 62.9 12.8 
Source:  OECD. 
 
Activity rates have risen noticeably in Continental and Mediterranean 
countries in the last decade (Table 2.5), although the potential labour force has 
already started to decline in some countries (Germany, Greece, Italy). 
Unemployment rates have therefore hardly declined. Labour productivity 
growth has been slow in continental Europe as compared to Scandinavian or 
liberal countries, but it is difficult to disentangle the effect of slow 
technological progress from the effect of economic policy measures 
introduced to increase the number of unskilled jobs.  
Table 2.5: Economic Performance 1996-2006, in % Per Year 
 15-64 Population 
Activity     
Rate 
Unemploy-
ment Rate 
Employ-        
ment 
Product-
ivity GDP Growth
       
Continental Model        
Germany  -0.3 0.7 0.0 +0.4 +1.1 +1.5 
France  0.5 0.3 -0.2 +1.0 +1.2 +2.2 
Belgium  0.3 0.5 -0.1 +0.9 +1.3 +2.2 
Netherlands  0.6 0.7 -0.2 +1.5 +0.9 +2.4 
Austria  0.7 0.0 0.0  +0.7 +1.6 +2.3 
Mediterranean Model       
Greece  -0.1 0.9 -0.1 +0.9 +3.2 +4.1 
Italy  -0.1 0.9 -0.4 +1.2 +0.2 +1.4 
Portugal  0.3 0.7 0.0  +1.0 +1.1 +2.1 
Spain  0.6 1.9 -0.9  +3.4 +0.4 +3.8 
Scandinavian Model       
Denmark  0.2 0.2 -0.2 +0.6 +1.5 +2.1 
Finland  0.5 0.4 -0.7  +1.6 +2.1 +3.7 
Sweden  0.4 0.1 -0.3 +0.8 +2.2 +3.0 
Liberal Model       
Ireland  2.5 1.2 -0.7 +4.4 +2.6 +7.1 
United Kingdom 0.8 0.1 -0.2 +1.1 +1.7 +2.8 
       
United States  1.4 -0.1 -0.1 +1.4 +1.8 +3.2 
Source: European Commission, OFCE calculations. 
 
 
There exists a broad consensus in contemporary growth theory on the 
crucial role played by human capital accumulation and by the diffusion of 
knowledge on the medium-term growth rate of advanced economies. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the capability to support the growth of 
human capital and of productivity is an acid test for the welfare state.  
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Investments into the future may be an important reason for diverging 
economic developments. High investment in R&D, ICT, education and 
infrastructure are crucial for long-run economic development. R&D 
expenditure has been particularly high and strongly increasing in Scandinavia, 
but it has been surprisingly low in Ireland. In Germany, R&D ratios have been 
relatively high, but slightly decreasing. Most countries of Southern Europe 
have been lagging behind with respect to their use of information technologies 
(Table 2.6).  
Table 2.6: Growth Drivers: Investment in the Future 
 Expenditure on R&D 
IT 
Expenditure 
Youth 
Education 
Attainment 
Level1)
    
 2005 2005   2005 
         Per Cent of GDP Per Cent 
Continental Model  2.3  3.3 77.3 
Germany  2.5  3.1 71.5 
France  2.1  3.4 82.6 
Belgium  1.8  2.9 81.8 
Netherlands  1.8  3.9 75.6 
Austria  2.4  3.0 85.9 
Mediterranean Model  1.0  1.8 69.1 
Greece  0.6  1.2 84.1 
Italy  1.1  1.9 73.6 
Portugal  0.8  2.2 49.0 
Spain  1.1  1.7 61.8 
Scandinavian Model  3.4 3.9 83.5 
Denmark  2.4  3.4 77.1 
Finland  3.5  3.7 83.4 
Sweden  3.9  4.4 87.5 
Liberal Europe  1.7  4.0 78.8 
Ireland  1.3  2.0 85.8 
United Kingdom  1.7  4.2 78.2 
EU 15  1.9 3.1 74.6 
United States  2.7 4.0 – 
Source: Eurostat. 1) Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper 
secondary education. 
 
Indicators on working conditions highlight the role played by human capital 
in the performance of European socio-economic models. Qualitative 
indicators support the view that Scandinavian countries come closest to 
achieving the aim of creating not only more, but also better jobs (Table 2.7). 
Whereas in Mediterranean countries only 67% workers share the opinion that 
they are learning new things at work, among countries belonging to the 
Scandinavian group almost 90% workers have a positive view of their learning 
curve on the job. Both Anglo-Saxon and Continental countries are between 
these two extreme positions, with the Netherlands as outliers that come close 
to the Scandinavian group. There is a strong correlation between the responses 
to this question and the findings with respect to the amount of training 
undergone by workers. The levels of training are not very high in general in 
European countries, with an average of less than 30 percent in the 15 ‘old’ 
Member States, and they have been fairly constant over the last 10 years 
(European Foundation, 2006). Again, however, there are significant differences 
across countries, with the Scandinavian group at the top and Mediterranean 
countries at the bottom of the distribution. A similar, although less clear-cut 
pattern results from the answers to the question whether or not workers feel 
that they are able to apply their own ideas at work. Further evidence on job 
quality comes from cross-country differences in the share of workers who 
think they will be able to carry out the tasks associated with their current job at 
a later stage in life. On average, 70% of workers in Scandinavian countries 
believe that they are able to do the same job when they are aged 60. The 
equivalent proportion is lower in Anglo-Saxon and Continental countries. In 
Mediterranean countries, only 55% workers think that their current 
 
76 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA: FORECASTS AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
employment is suitable for older persons. These results correlate highly with 
satisfaction levels with working conditions. 
 
Table 2.7: Qualitative Indicators of Employment Situations 
 Job Content and Training 
     
 
Paid training 
in previous 12 
months 
Learning new 
things 
Able to apply 
own ideas in 
work 
Able to do the 
same job 
when 60 
  
 Per Cent of Total Responses 
     
Continental Model  28.0 71.7 58.7 63.0 
Germany  25.3 66.1 49.8 73.6 
France  24.4 72.3 64.5 48.6 
Belgium  40.5 74.4 64.1 52.3 
The Netherlands  31.6 83.6 70.8 72.1 
Austria  37.5 76.8 60.2 59.9 
Mediterranean Model  17.1 66.8 58.1 55.0 
Greece  13.1 61.9 56.8 40.5 
Italy  16.9 71.9 58.4 59.9 
Portugal  15.1 69.1 62.1 45.7 
Spain  18.9 60.0 57.3 53.5 
Scandinavian Model  46.3 88.4 70.5 69.2 
Denmark  36.3 86.4 72.0 68.8 
Finland  52.6 90.0 64.3 65.2 
Sweden  51.0 89.3 73.1 69.7 
Liberal Model 38.5 69.2 59.7 62.7 
Ireland  37.3 76.9 68.1 53.2 
United Kingdom  38.6 68.6 59.0 63.5 
EU 15  27.4 70.5 59.2 60.8 
Source: Fourth European Working Conditions Survey (2005); WIFO calculations. 
 
Recent research has highlighted the vital role played by the first years of life 
for future cognitive development. Spending on the youngest groups of 
population can be scrutinised on its own account. The share of GDP that goes 
to child care and pre-primary education is considerably higher in Scandinavian 
countries and in France than in the other European countries (Table 2.8).  
 
 
Table 2.8: Expenditure on Pre-primary Care and Education 
 Public Expenditure 
    
 Childcare Pre-primary Education Total 
    
 Per Cent of GDP 
    
Continental Model  0.2 0.5 0.7 
Germany  0.0 0.4 0.4 
France  0.5 0.7 1.2 
Belgium  0.2 0.6 0.8 
The Netherlands  0.2 0.4 0.5 
Austria  0.2 0.4 0.6 
Mediterranean Model  0.1 0.4 0.5 
Greece  0.2 0.2 0.4 
Italy  0.1 0.4 0.6 
Portugal  0.4 0.4 0.8 
Spain  0.1 0.5 0.5 
Scandinavian Model  0.8 0.5 1.3 
Denmark  1.0 0.7 1.6 
Finland  1.0 0.3 1.4 
Sweden  0.8 0.5 1.3 
Liberal Model 0.2 0.3 0.6 
Ireland  0.1 0.1 0.2 
United Kingdom  0.2 0.3 0.6 
EU 15  0.2 0.4 0.7 
Source: OECD, Family and Education Database; WIFO calculations. 
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2.2 INDICATORS OF SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The political target is not only high economic performance, but also high social 
and environmental performance (Lisbon strategy). We chose a number of 
indicators to explore this (Tables 2.9):  
1. Life satisfaction is the highest in Scandinavian countries (and in the 
Netherlands); it is the lowest in Mediterranean countries.  
2.   Income inequality: Scandinavian countries show the more equal income 
distribution, Mediterranean and liberal countries the more unequal. 
3.   Poverty rates are significantly higher in liberal and Mediterranean models, 
this reflects the unequal income distribution. 
4.  Life expectancy is lower in the Anglo-American countries than in 
Scandinavia (except in Denmark), Continental Europe and the 
Mediterranean countries. 
5.  Infant mortality - an indicator of the efficiency of the health system – is 
substantially higher in liberal countries. Denmark seems to have a specific 
problem.  
6.  Hours worked: It appears that high GDP per capita in liberal countries is 
largely due to a high number of hours worked. Labour productivity per 
hour is relatively high in continental countries.  
7.   Prisoners: The share of prisoners is very high in the United States, and 
also relatively high in the United Kingdom. It is small in Scandinavian 
countries.  
8.  Trust in people is more common in Scandinavian countries (and in the 
Netherlands) than in other countries. This shows that the Scandinavian 
model is based on social practices that are deeply rooted in peoples’ minds 
and that it may be difficult to extend it to other countries where such 
practices are not a tradition (Algan and Cahuc, 2006) 
Globally, the social performance in the United States and in the liberal 
European countries is worse than in Scandinavian and Continental European 
countries. 
 
Tables 2.9: Social Indicators  
 Life Satisfaction 
Inequality of 
Income 
Distribution 
Poverty 
Rate 
Life 
Expect-
ancy at 
Birth 
Infant 
Rate 
Mortality 
per 1,000 
Births 
 2006 1996- 2006    2005 2005  2004  2004  
Continental Model  2 +2 4.0 13 79.1 4.1 
Germany  17 -1 4.1 13 78.9 4.1 
France  19 +7 4.0 13 79.6 3.9 
Belgium  31 +6 4.1 15 79.1 4.3 
Netherlands  44 -2 4.0 11 78.5 4.1 
Austria  23 -6 3.8 12 79.2 4.5 
Mediterranean Model  16 +4 5.7 19 79.6 3.9 
Greece  11 +2 5.8 20 78.3 4.1 
Italy  14 +2 5.6 19 80.2 4.1 
Portugal  4 ±0 8.2 20 77.5 4.0 
Spain  22 +8 5.4 20 79.7 3.5 
Scandinavian Model  48 +7 3.6 11 79.2 3.5 
Denmark  66 ±0 3.5 12 77.3 4.4 
Finland  33 +6 3.6 12 78.7 3.3 
Sweden  46 +11 3.3 9 80.3 3.1 
Liberal Model 34 +5 5.6 19 78.5 5.1 
Ireland  37 +3 5.0 20 77.9 4.9 
United Kingdom  34 +5 5.6 19 78.5 5.1 
EU 15  23 +3 4.7 16 79.2 4.1 
United States  – - - - 77.5 6.9 
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 Hours Worked 
Productivity 
by Hours 
Prisoner Rate 
(per 100,000) 
Trust in 
People 
     
 2004      2005    2005  
Continental Model  1,443 98.3 97 0.31 
Germany  1,443 94.1 97 0.33 
France  1,441 101.5 88 0.21 
Belgium  1,522 110.7 90 0.29 
Netherlands  1,357 105.7 127 0.59 
Austria  1,550 85.1 108 0.31 
Mediterranean Model  1,695 75.0 115 0.30 
Greece  1,925 70.8 90 0.20 
Italy  1,585 77.4 97 0.32 
Portugal  1,694 50.3 123 0.10 
Spain  1,799 76.7 143 0.35 
Scandinavian Model  1,586 85.9 77 0.63 
Denmark  1,454 87.8 77 0.64 
Finland  1,736 81.5 75 0.57 
Sweden  1,585 87.3 78 0.64 
Liberal Model 1,667 86.7 139 0.29 
Ireland  1,642 104.1 85 0.35 
United Kingdom  1,669 85.2 143 0.29 
EU-15  1,565  109 0.32 
United States  1,824 100 738 0.36 
Source: EIRO; OECD; UNDP; WIFO calculations. 
2.3 HAPPINESS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
The world economy has been doing quite well in recent years, but does this 
make people happy? Layard (2003) pointed out that GDP per capita has risen 
enormously over the last fifty years, but ‘happiness’ – as it is being measured 
by surveys – hardly changed at all.  
In surveys (e.g., Eurobarometer) people are asked whether their overall 
situation is satisfactory or not and whether it improved or got worse during the 
last five years. According to Eurostat surveys, happiness in the European 
Union has been rather stable over decades, although GDP per head increased 
substantially. However, the country ranking (see Figure 2.2) of the change in 
life satisfaction is a mirror of recent economic and labour market 
developments. 
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Figure 2.2: Present Situation Compared with 5 Years Ago 
Balance of responses (‘Improved’ – ‘Got worse’) as per cent of total responses 
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Source: Eurobarometer 
 
There is also a positive relationship between GDP per capita and life 
satisfaction across countries (see figure 2.3). Life satisfaction is very high in 
Scandinavian countries. They have been able to combine economic efficiency 
with decent social standards. Happiness is also relatively high in the 
Netherlands, which is close to the Scandinavian model, and in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. In Mediterranean countries, life satisfaction is rather low. There is a 
pronounced North-South-trend with respect to GDP per head and life 
satisfaction, which may be explained by religion, climate and other factors. 
Surprisingly, happiness in Austria has been relatively low and it deteriorated 
over time despite relatively good economic performance; the increase in 
unemployment may explain this development. Across EU countries there is a 
close negative relationship between life satisfaction and unemployment.   
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Figure 2.3: Life Satisfaction in Different EU Countries in 2006 
Per Cent of Total Responses 
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Figure 2.5: High Life Satisfaction and Unemployment Rate 
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Source: Eurobarometer, Eurostat. 
 
2
What factors may explain differences between these mo
and employment? Is the weight of social contributions 
such social contributions have a counterpart in terms of benefits and hence 
allow for lower wages. Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 2.6, high 
employment rates cannot be associated with low tax-to-GDP ratios. Similarly, 
there is no link between GDP growth and the weight of social protection in 
terms of GDP.  
The extreme model types, namely the liberal Anglo-Saxon model and the 
Scandinavian uni
e first model type would be in line with the hypothesis of blaming the 
welfare state, the second contradicts this hypothesis. The worst performance is 
seen for the Continental model and the Mediterranean family-oriented model, 
which produced low growth and high unemployment. 
The Scandinavian countries were able to reform their institutions and 
incentives in a way to be competitive in the globalising
iods of turmoil). They made their economies more flexible in a managed 
and balanced strategy and reduced both government deficits and debt. But 
most importantly they went for a strategy of excellence in innovation, 
education and technology diffusion. The same adaptability is not to be seen in 
the big continental European countries. 
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Figure 2.6: Employ ent Rates and Taxation Rates (in 2003) 
ast decade than the Scandinavian countries and a much better one 
a
people do not want, and a Scandinavian model that 
would not be easily implemented in large heterogeneous countries with no 
tradition of co-management between social partners and with high 
unemployment rates. At the EU level, the situation is not easy to address. 
Successful countries will not be willing to change their model and the 
convergence towards Scandinavian or Liberal models cannot be a choice made 
at the EU level. How then to encourage a change in the Continental model? 
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The liberal Anglo-American countries showed a slightly better performance 
during the l
th n the continental European countries. However, regarding social indicators, 
these countries are lagging behind. 
Blaming the welfare state for low growth and weak competitiveness in the 
EU is premature; The Scandinavian countries and Austria having the highest 
taxes and the largest public social expenditure performed very well in 
economic terms during the last decades. The assumed trade-off between 
competitiveness and social justice (or efficiency and redistribution) is shaky. 
Social cohesion, education, health and cooperative industrial relations are 
productive resources. Social protection can be an asset in providing education 
and training, facilitating labour mobility, and disconnecting the wage costs and 
living standards of unskilled labour. Solidarity or individual risk-taking is a 
matter of preferences, not of economics 
Three elements of success may therefore be found from the experience of 
Scandinavian and liberal countries: the employment legislation and 
unemployment allowances rules; the role of social partners in the face of 
shocks affecting the economy, a sector or a firm; the importance of economic 
innovation and education. 
Continental countries may have failed because of their inability to design a 
model able to adapt to globalisation, a model between the liberal model, source 
of inequalities which their 
 
 3.1 SIX CHALLENGES FOR THE MEMBER STATES 3.  
European Social 
Protection 
Systems, Facing 
Financial 
Constraints and 
New Challenges 
The European Social Model faces six challenges: financial sustainability, 
globalisation, the crisis of the continental model, too low fertility rates, social 
changes, reforms of the funding. 
1) How can the financial sustainability of the system be ensured? The 
pressures for higher spending on health, old-age benefits, old-age care and 
fight against exclusion are almost unavoidable. They have structural causes:  
- Population ageing generates a rise in pensions, health and long-term 
care spending. 
- The rising trend in health spending is explained partly by population 
ageing and also by technological progress that allows for longer life 
expectancy but does not generally reduce the level of spending.  
- The decrease in fertility rates - and thus of the number of young 
people - reduces the need for family benefits, especially as the number 
of children per family decreases, and for education spending, but the 
young need more education to acquire higher skills and many 
countries (like Germany, Italy, Spain, etc) are considering policies to 
increase fertility and family incentives. 
- Rising female activity increases the number of families with two wage-
earners and reduces the number of poor families, but implies that 
there is a need for substantial childcare financial support. Social 
evolution leads to a rise in the number of single parent families in 
need of support. 
- The improvement in the labour market situation may allow for lower 
unemployment and assistance allowances but may require costly 
measures in order to bring people back to work (in terms of training, 
social contributions cuts, etc…). 
How this rise in spending needs be addressed? Four global strategies may 
be considered.  
- The first strategy consists of cutting progressively the level of benefits, 
for instance by indexing them to prices only or by reducing 
reimbursement rates for medical expenses. The drawback of this 
strategy is that it will lead to an uncontrolled reduction of the size of 
the welfare state. For instance, would it be fair that the relative 
situation of families or the poor is worsened? The reliability of the 
welfare state would be damaged without any alternative solution being 
socially and politically decided.  
- A second strategy consists in maintaining the Welfare state, with a 
stabilisation of replacement rates, social minima and family benefit to 
wage ratios, etc. In the health area, the government, medical workers 
and patients would have to implement a social supervision of 
reimbursed spending, based on medical evaluation. As concerns 
pensions, the retirement age would have to increase so that the ratio 
of number of years in retirement/number of years at work remains 
stable. Such a strategy would maintain social cohesion in Europe. It 
may imply some rise in contributions paid by active people (for 
pensions and unemployment) and by all households (for health and 
assistance), but companies’ competitiveness would not be affected and 
tax harmonisation in Europe should allow countries to tax their 
residents.  
- The third strategy consists in breaking down social protection into two 
sectors: one sector would remain public (assistance, family and 
unemployment benefits) at its current level. A second sector 
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(pensions, health) would be transferred to individual or occupational 
private insurances, which would allow tax-to-GDP ratios to decrease. 
But private health insurances may select risks and deny reimbursement 
of some expenses. Private health insurances would thus need to be 
closely supervised, be mandatory and requested to reimburse a certain 
basket of health care. There is no certainty that private insurance is 
less costly than public insurance. In the long term, private pension 
funds will be less costly than public funds if the rate of return of 
invested funds is clearly above the GDP growth rate augmented by 
the increase in the number of years in retirement. But the transitory 
phase would be costly for generations who would have to pay for 
older generations while simultaneously accumulating assets to provide 
their own pensions. There would be a gain only in the long run. 
- The fourth strategy would consist of targeting social protection 
towards the poorer (like in the Anglo-Saxon model) and letting the 
market play for the rest of the population. However a two-speed 
framework raises issues: the wealthiest and the employees of large 
companies would benefit from a good insurance, while employees in 
small companies, employees with short-term work contracts and the 
socially excluded would have to rely on national solidarity. The middle 
class would lose in that system, because they would have to pay both 
for themselves and the poor while the sustainability of the system 
would be uncertain: ‘benefits for the poor are poor benefits’. There is 
a risk that the system deteriorates in losing the support of a substantial 
part of the population.   
A solution seems to have reached a consensus view today and allows, 
effectively or fictively to avoid choosing between the four strategies, by raising 
substantially employment (for older workers and females in Southern 
economies). This solution would provide a double dividend in terms of old-
age, unemployment and exclusion benefits and would give room for 
manoeuvre in terms of health and long-term care. This strategy however raises 
several issues: it often focuses on bringing unskilled workers back to work in a 
situation where supply for unskilled labour exceeds demand, at the risk of 
increasing unemployment and reducing wages of that group of workers. Rising 
demand for unskilled labour has a cost in terms of lower social contributions. 
Can this strategy be implemented through work incentives? This would mean 
increasing the gap between assistance and work incomes, which is often 
obtained by cutting assistance benefits thus  increasing the poverty risk for 
those who cannot find a job. For instance, it is often suggested that the 
retirement age should be made neutral from an actuarial point of view to give 
older workers an incentive to work until 65. Instead of getting a pension with 
80% of replacement rate if they retire at 60, workers would be offered the 
possibility to get 80 % if they decide to retire at 65 or 60 % if they retire at 60. 
This would increase the income gap between workers, depending of whether 
they can or cannot work until they are 65 (e.g; between managers and manual 
workers). The same issue arises for the disabled and women with children. 
Should social benefits be reduced for economically inactive single mothers 
with young children or for families with one worker, although they are already 
the poorer households? Thus, in general, work incentives should increase 
workers’ incomes, for instance in increasing the offer of free childcare, rather 
than in reducing the incomes of those without a job, but this would strongly 
reduce the financial returns of the measure.  
2) Globalisation tends to dismantle national societies, which reduces 
solidarities, both national and between workers. Incomes inequalities rise: the 
wealthiest no longer want to pay for the poor, high skilled workers for the 
unemployed; companies do not wish to locate their production in countries 
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where social protection is too generous. Lastly the Internal Market places EU 
countries in direct competition and increases the risk of a race-to-the-bottom 
in social and taxation areas. In the absence of tax coordination in Europe, the 
possibilities of national redistribution could be reduced. For instance all 
countries have been obliged to abolish personal wealth taxation.  
3) The continental ESM is facing strong criticism, accused of being too 
costly, too protective, damaging work incentives and preventing flexibility and 
innovation. How could the continental model be reformed? The liberal model 
(full employment through economic constraints and flexibility) raises fears 
while the Scandinavian model (full employment with solidarity) seems difficult 
to extend to large, open and heterogeneous economies where unemployment 
is high. Abolishing employment protection could reduce one of the main 
advantages of the ESM: the investment by workers in their companies, the 
incentive for companies to train their employees. Increasing work incentives 
could oblige them to accept more incomes inequality and more poverty. 
4) Should the decrease in fertility rates be accepted and possibly lead to 
increased immigration or should measures be taken to stop the decrease 
through subsidisingchildcare for mothers who stay at home and/or work? 
Should child poverty be reduced, through financial support for mothers who 
do not have a job (the poorer) or through work financial incentives (work 
being the best insurance against precariousness). Should family policies focus 
on the poorer (in order to prevent child poverty) or should they benefit all 
families (to support fertility)? Should benefits be in kind or cash? The 
experience of Scandinavian countries and of France shows that it is possible to 
raise female employment rates and fertility rates through a generous family 
policy and socially organised and financed childcare.  
5) Social protection systems need to adapt to sociological changes (gender 
equality, couples instability). But should the measures in favour of women (like 
reversion pensions) be abolished, although women still have lower wage 
earnings and employment rates than men? Should social benefits and taxation 
become individual, which could be a work incentive for women but would 
make redistribution less accurate? With the actual fertility situation in Europe, 
it is not envisaged that a reform of taxation and benefits will be undertaken 
which would be detrimental to families with children.  
6) How to finance social protection? Initially in Bismarkian countries, social 
protection was linked to wage-earning and thus financed by employers’ and 
employees’ contributions. Social protection has now become universal as 
concerns health and family. Health and family benefits should therefore be 
financed by general taxation, while unemployment and old-age allowances 
should be financed by contributions, insofar as these allowances are linked to 
contributions.2 There are thus economic justifications for reducing the share of 
social benefits financed by wages, especially for lower wages. It is not justified 
that contributions levied on activity incomes finance family or health benefits, 
as in most continental and liberal countries (see Table 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
2 The best system would be a system where each old-age person would be entitled to a flat 
pension (amounting for instance to 80% of the minimum wage). This pension would be funded 
by general taxation and contributions would apply only to the part of wages above the minimum 
wage. Similarly, if all people of working age and without incomes are entitled to a minimum 
income equal to 50% of the minimum wage, the unemployed should be entitled to this 
minimum income funded by taxation and employees should pay contributions at a reduced rate 
for the part of their wages below the minimum wage. 
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Table 3.1: How Main Risks are Financed in the EU-15 
 Health (in kind) Old-age Unemployment Family Work injury 
      
Belgium SC+AI SC+AI SC+AI SC+AI Ass. 
Denmark AI AI + SC 
(supplementary) 
SC AI SC 
Germany SC SC + Gov SC AI SC 
Greece SC + Gov SC + Gov SC SC SC 
Spain AI SC SC AI SC 
France SC + AI SC + AI SC SC + AI SC 
Ireland AI SC SC + Gov AI SC 
Italy SC +AI SC +Gov SC SC SC 
Neths SC +AI SC +AI SC Gov — 
Austria SC SC SC SC + Gov SC 
Portugal Gov SC SC SC + Gov Ass. 
Finland AI SC + AI +Gov SC +Gov Gov SC 
Sweden Gov SC + Gov SC + Gov Gov SC 
UK SC + Gov SC SC + Gov Gov Gov 
Notes: SC means funding through social contributions, AI: funding through affected tax, Gov: funding through the general 
budget or permanent government grant. 
Source: MISSOC, European Commission. 
 
This being said, more resources remain to be found to compensate for the 
reduction of contributions based on wages.3 Four suggestions can be made.  
1. A part of the burden may be transferred from workers to old-age 
pensioners or people with financial incomes through personal income 
taxation (like with the French CSG). However, pensions are expected 
to be cut in most EU countries and it would be difficult to add a tax 
increase. It would be more interesting to investigate an increase in 
financial incomes taxation, but the amount of potential new resources 
is limited 
2. VAT is deductible from investment and thus weighs only on labour. 
Transferring social contribution to VAT would therefore have no 
favourable impact on the capital/labour relative cost. In the short run, 
the main effect is a gain in price competitiveness since VAT weighs on 
imports and can be deducted from exports. It is a sort of hidden 
devaluation, allowing for competitiveness gains paid by rising inflation. 
The risk is that, following the example of Germany in 2007, EU 
countries introduce the same king of non-cooperative strategies, 
without any net advantages. 
3. A contribution on added value (like the Italian IRAP) would be a tax 
levied on companies’ value added, without export and investment 
deductibility and impacting on imports. The transfer of employers’ 
contributions to a contribution based on value added would raise the 
cost of capital and decrease labour costs which could have a positive 
effect on employment in countries with mass unemployment. But it is 
a delicate strategy which would be positive for labour intensive sectors 
but detrimental to capital intensive sectors.  
4. Environmental taxation could provide a double dividend, in 
supporting employment and fighting against the deterioration of the 
environment. The double dividend will be obtained only in countries 
in unemployment situations. The reform supposes costly adjustments 
by firms. It would strongly affect some sectors that could be tempted 
to relocate in countries with lower environmental taxation. It thus 
requires coordination at least at the EU-level. 
 
3 This point has been widely debated in France in 2006 (see Bernard et al., 2006). 
 
   EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL(S) AND SOCIAL EUROPE 87 
 
Table 3.2: Taxes, as a Percentage of GDP in 2005 
 Labour Capital Environment Consumption 
Belgium 23.8 10.4 2.4 11.3 
Denmark 24.8 9.6 5.8 16.1 
Germany 22.3 6.4 2.5 10.1 
Ireland 10.5 8.8 2.3 11.4 
Greece 14.1 8.4 2.3 12.0 
Spain 16.1 10.2 2.0 9.8 
France 23.3 9.4 2.4 11.4 
Italy 20.4 10.1 2.8 10.1 
Netherlands 17.7 8.3 4.0 12.1 
Austria 23.3 6.7 2.6 12.1 
Portugal 14.7 6.6 3.1 12.8 
Finland 23.3 6.9 3.0 13.7 
Sweden 31.1 7.0 2.9 13.1 
UK 14.4 11.1 2.5 11.4 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
3.2 PENSION REFORMS 
Many national reforms of pension systems have already been introduced in the 
EU in order to address the issue of ageing populations. In general, the strategy 
of raising social contributions has not been chosen. The strategies 
implemented include cuts in pension benefits, (often through abolishing the 
indexation to wages), postponement of retirement age or increases in the 
number of years of working life required to be entitled to a full pension and 
sometimes the introduction of a notional fund which guarantees that pension 
systems are automatically in balance. Pension reforms have often been 
complemented by the introduction of a pension fund, mandatory or favoured 
by tax incentives.  
Cuts in pension benefits and notional funds generate considerable 
uncertainty on the future level of pensions. According to the projections 
collected by the Commission (see table 3.3), pensions cuts will be especially 
large in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Portugal and Sweden. Is this socially 
acceptable? There is a strong risk that old-age pensioners will tomorrow be 
among the poorer as  was the case in the past. Only France and Sweden 
recognise this cut in pensions (see Table 3.4). Some countries announce they 
will compensate for lower pensions through the development of pension funds 
(Germany, Denmark, Italy, see Onofri, 2007). In other countries, the 
announcements show some inconsistency (Austria)4. 
Most countries announce that their pension systems will be in balance 
owing to a strong rise in female employment (Spain, Belgium, Italy) or older 
workers (55-64) employment (Austria, Spain France, Italy), but these countries 
have not launched reforms that would promote  such rises in employment: 
reforming family policy and childcare and organising mobilisation of social 
partners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Lassila and Valkonen (2007) discuss the strategy for financial sustainability while taking in 
account demographic uncertainty. 
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Table 3.3: Change in Public Pensions as a Percentage of GDP, According to the Commission 
 Pension Benefits,  % of GDP** 
Explicative Factors, 
of which: 
       2005      2050 Trend 2050 
Employment 
Rate Impact 
Number of 
Pensioners 
Impact 
Replacement 
Ratio Effect 
Germany 11.1 13.0 18.6 -1.2 -0.6 -3.8 
Austria 13.2 12.2 24.5 -1.4 -6.2 -4.6 
Belgium 10.4 15.5 18.1 -1.6 -0.4 -0.6 
Denmark 9.6 12.8 16.8 -0.4 -3.0 -0.6 
Spain 8.7 15.7 21.1 -2.0 -2.5 -0.8 
Finland 10.3 13.7 19.2 -1.0 -3.5 -1.0 
France 12.8 14.8 21.5 -1.0 -2.0 -3.7 
Ireland 4.6 11.1 12.5 -0.6 -1.5 0.8 
Italy 14.3 14.7 25.8 -2.1 -3.5 -5.6 
Netherlands 7.4 11.2 13.7 -0.2 -1.8 -0.5 
Portugal 11.5 20.8 25.2 -0.2 -1.0 -3.2 
Sweden 10.4 11.3 15.2 -0.6 -0.2 -3.0 
UK 6.7 8.6 11.4    
EU-15 10.5 12.8 18.7 -1.0 -1.8 -3.1 
Source: European Commission. 
Table 3.4: Replacement Rates at the Average Wage Level 
                        2004                     2050 
 1st 
pillar 
2nd 
pillar 
GRR/NRR 1st 
pillar 
2nd 
pillar 
GRR/NRR 
Germany 43 0 43/63 34 15 48/67 
Austria 64  65/80 69  69/84 
Belgium 39 4 43/67 37 10 47/74 
Denmark 45 4 48/71 39 24 64/76 
Spain 90  90/97 85  85/92 
Finland 57  57/63 54  54/64 
France 66  66/80 49  49/63 
Greece 105  105/115 94  94/106 
Ireland 31 35 67/78 34 33 67/78 
Italy 79  79/88 64 16 80/92 
Netherlands 30 42 71/93 30 45 75/97 
Portugal 75  75/91 70  70/92 
Sweden 53 15 68/71 40 15 59/62 
UK 17 50 66/82 19 50 69/85 
Note: GRR: gross replacement ratio; NRR: net replacement ratio.  
Source : Social Protection Committee (2006)  
 
Reforms also apply to early retirement schemes (where new entrants are not 
allowed) and incapacity schemes (that are tightened). There is a risk that 
income inequalities increase among pensioners and that some pensioners - 
especially manual workers - become poorer if older workers’ employment rates 
do not increase. Giving work incentives for older people may generate 
difficulties for the 55-64 year-old jobless and those working in declining 
sectors. It may also introduce strong inequalities between those who will be 
able to work longer and those who will have to retire earlier (manual workers, 
workers in declining sectors). Thus such a strategy requires specific schemes 
for given groups of workers (manual workers).  
Is it necessary to implement today policies to cut public spending in order 
to have room for manoeuvre to pay tomorrow’s pensions? This is the strategy 
implemented by Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain. Finland and 
Sweden have chosen to accumulate public pension funds. Pension funds have 
a strong role in the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland. But this is no longer an 
option for other countries where demographic deterioration is already under 
way. Countries like Germany, France or Italy did not have sufficient private 
demand to undertake a fiscal consolidation strategy.  
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Table 3.5: Net Public Debt, as a Percentage of GDP 
 Level, end 2006      2006-1995 
Germany 52 +20 
Austria 42 -4 
Belgium 77 -28 
Denmark 7 -29 
Spain 48 -21 
Finland -61 -57 
France 43 +5 
Greece 87 -4 
Italy 95 -3 
Netherlands  52 -18 
Portugal 47 +22 
Sweden -16 -41 
UK 42 +3 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
In the field of pensions, the Commission started to intervene in the 
framework of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs). The objective 
was to avoid a rise in public pension expenditure, which could have increased 
government deficits and debt. Since July 2001, countries have been requested 
to provide projections on the long-term impact of demographic prospects in 
their Stability Programme. The Barcelona Council of March 2002 also invited 
MS to try and postpone the average effective retirement by 5 years by 2010. In 
2002, the BEPGs requested the MS to ‘move towards a greater reliance to 
funding’ and to reduce public debt from now. The creation of the Social 
Protection Committee (SPC) and the introduction of the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) may be seen as an answer by social affairs ministers and 
DG Employment and Social Affairs to the attempts of the economics and 
finance ministers and the DG-ECFIN to address social protection issues, 
especially pensions.  
However, even if the Commission warns on the risk that some countries 
may be tempted to finance pensions through government deficits, countries 
are well aware that their pension systems should be in balance. With all 
countries being committed to ensure that their systems are financially balanced 
(through postponing the retirement age, cutting benefits or raising 
contributions), the future of pensions does not threaten public finance 
stability. Pensions contributions having a direct counterpart in terms of 
pension benefits should not be included in tax revenues. They do not reduce a 
priori work incentives. For a worker, they constitute an investment which 
profitability (rate of growth of wage bill plus rate of growth of years in 
retirement) may be compared to financial assets profitability. There is no 
economic justification for disconnecting totally these two types of savings. The 
level of social contributions must be considered independently of the 
objectives of lower tax to GDP ratios, the level of pensions must be 
disconnected from public spending cuts.  
The introduction of the OMC led to a first joint Report in December 2002. 
This report has three main objectives: ensuring financial sustainability of 
pension systems, ensuring the adequacy of pensions and modernising pension 
systems. The report is less normative than BEPGs recommendations, 
reflecting the interventions of social affairs ministers. However the strategy is 
based on four pillars: using coming years to reduce public debt; promoting 
employment for the 55-64 year old; postponing the effective retirement age by 
5 years; reducing the level of pensions paid by pay-as-you-go systems, making 
them more contributory and with higher actuarial neutrality through linking 
them more to years worked and age of retirement; developing pension funds.  
The option of increasing contributions is rejected without any discussion. 
But the Report insists also on the need to ensure that pensioners do not fall 
into poverty, by ensuring incomes floors and on the need to ensure adequate 
replacement ratios. The Report recognises the need to ensure decent pensions 
to workers who have seen their career interrupted, or have worked part-time 
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(which is in contradiction with the third pillar). The report recognises several 
risks: indexing pensions to inflation induces a risk of rising pensioner poverty, 
having too low pensions would not be socially sustainable. The report 
recognises that pay-as-you-go pension system should remain the main axis of 
the system. Here also some contradictions remain. The Social Protection 
Committee has been able to include very relevant indicators in the list of 
pension adequacy indicators, like pensioner poverty rates and replacement 
ratios ensured by the pension system.   
Table 3.6: Two Indicators of Pension Adequacy in 2004 
 PT PL HU AT DE FR NL SI SK IT CZ SE EL FI ES BE UK DK IE 
A 109 109 101 95 92 90 88 87 85 84 83 80 79 75 75 73 72 70 65
B 63 59 61 67 45 66 43 42 55 58 51 58 49 46 56 42 .. .. 43
A) Income of 65+relative to complementary age groups, in %; B) Replacement ratio in %. 
Source: European Commission 
 
In 2005, the BEPGs were transformed into a set of ‘24 integrated 
guidelines for employment and growth’. Three guidelines address the pension 
issue. Guideline 2 asks countries to tackle the issue of population ageing in 
reducing their public debt (but this ageing generates a rise in savings ratios, 
hence a higher demand for public bonds), to reform their pensions and health 
systems (i.e. to cut benefits) and last to increase employment rates. Guideline 
17 reaffirms the objectives in terms of employment rates, especially the 
objective of 50% for workers aged 55-64. Guideline 18 suggests increasing the 
labour supply of older workers through the modernisation of social protection 
systems, i.e. in abolishing early retirement schemes, in reducing pensions in 
cases of early retirement, in giving financial incentives to postpone retirement 
age. This induces three risks: increasing poverty among older workers if 
companies do not want to hire them, cutting the total level of pensions, 
increasing inequalities between blue-collar workers (who will have no choice 
but to leave their job early) and managerial workers (who will have the 
opportunity to work longer and to save in pensions funds).  
In 2006, the joint report on social protection and social inclusion of 2006 
highlights 5 issues: the definition of a minimum income for old people, the 
introduction of a close correlation between contributions and benefits, the 
lengthening of working life through more flexible retirement conditions, the 
development of private pensions, governance. The joint report of 2007 
observes that most countries anticipate substantial falls in replacement ratios 
that will need to be offset through a longer working life or the development of 
private systems.  
The golden age of retirement is finished in Europe5. The risk is that 
financial constraints will progressively induce a strong decrease of 
pension/wage ratio in European countries, so that a higher proportion old 
people will be in poverty. The chosen strategy – the rise in older workers’ 
activity- is only part of the solution. In accordance with the logic of the ESM, 
countries should introduce pensioner minimum incomes above the at-risk-of-
poverty line, and should ensure that replacement ratios are satisfactory (at least 
for low and middle wage earners), that specific measures apply to manual 
workers and that the postponement of effective retirement age accounts for 
the effective employment of older workers.  
3.3 HEALTH SYSTEMS 
Public health spending amounted to 6.4% of GDP in the EU-15 in 2005 – 
varying from 5.1% in Greece, 5.8% in Italy, 6% in Germany and 7.7% in 
France. According the Commission’s projections, they will rise to 8.1% in 
 
5 The annex by Ruzik presents the situation in NMS. 
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2050, i.e. by 1.7 percentage point. Table 3.7 shows that there is no single 
relation between life expectancy and public spending. Life expectancy is high 
and health spending low in some countries (Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta) while 
spending is high for intermediate results in terms of life expectation in other 
countries (France, the Netherlands). Public health spending is low in the NMS 
but life expectancy is shorter in these countries than in the “old” members 
states (the reorganisation of the systems is described in Sowa, 2007).  
All countries face similar problems. What is the rise in expenditure required 
to match populations’ needs and the rise which is attributable to a bad 
governance of the system resulting from information asymmetry and wasted 
money? How to curb down the rise in health spending without affecting the 
poorest: nationalising or privatising, two speed system, spending control, rise 
in the share of spending paid by the patients as a disincentive to consume 
medical goods and services. How to control suppliers?  
In the recent past, countries have tried to cut spending in several areas:  
- In many countries, general practitioners have a gate-keeper role; their income 
depends on the number of patients they have and not on the number of 
consultations. Some countries have maintained a less costly public service. In 
both cases the risk is that the richer can get round the system by paying for 
practitioners outside the system, which leads to a two-speed system.  
- Some countries are introduced a medical control of spending.   
- Other countries let competition play between health funds (see CPB (2007) 
on the Dutch case and Sowa (2007) on NMS). But this is an area where 
competition is a delicate issue (selection risk, problem of asymmetry of 
information). 
Table 3.7: Life Expectancy and Health Spending 
 Life Expectancy 
in 2004-Men 
Life Expectancy 
in 2004-Women 
Health Expenditure 
Per Head, PPS 
Sweden 78.1 82.4 2,171 
Italy 77.3 83.2 1,548 
Spain 76.6 83.4 1,285 
France 76.2 83.4 2,267 
Greece 76.4 81.4 1,210 
UK 76.4 80.9 2,016 
Cyprus 76.3 80.8 732 
Austria 76.2 82.1 1,910 
Germany 76.1 81.7 1,963 
Netherlands 76.2 80.8 2,388 
Malta 76.2 80.7 749 
Belgium 75.5 81.6 2,017 
Ireland 75.5 80.7 2,012 
Finland 75.3 81.9 1,647 
Luxemburg 75.0 81.4 2,704 
Denmark 75.2 79.6 1,664 
Portugal 74.2 81.0 1,174 
Slovenia 72.6 80.2 1,321 
Czech Rep. 72.4 78.8 1,055 
Poland 70.5 78.5 435 
Slovakia 69.7 77.8 677 
Hungary 68.5 76.8 827 
Lithuania 66.5 77.6 400 
Estonia 65.5 76.9 449 
Latvia  64.9 77.6 269 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
In the field of health and long-term care, the OMC should allow the 
exchange of experience and ‘good practices’ in order to improve health and 
reduce costs. Three objectives must be simultaneously achieved, according to 
the Barcelona European Council of March 2002: equal access to health for 
everyone, high level of health quality, long-term financial sustainability. The 
joint report by the Commission and the Council ‘Supporting national strategies 
for the future of health care and care for the elderly’, March 2003 justifies 
Union’s action for three reasons: health policies must comply with the internal 
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market rules of free movement of persons, of goods and of services and free 
provision of services (but are these worries crucial in the health area?), the EU 
has a responsibility in the area of public health (Article III – 278,  Treaty 
establishing a constitution for Europe). Last the EU must monitor the long-
term sustainability of public finances (but countries should be allowed to raise 
their health expenditure if households agree to finance the rise). The 2004 
Communication tries to make a link between health and employment, insisting 
on health problems for people at risk of social exclusion, employment in the 
health and long-term care sectors.  
Table 3.8: Main Features of Health Systems in the EU 
Germany Decentralised system managed by health Funds, practitioners’ associations 
and hospital groups. Health legislation is public. Spending is high.  
 
Belgium  Public universal insurance. Free access to health care. 22% of spending 
paid by patients. Ceiling of spending to be paid by patients. High spending 
and high rise in spending. Introduction of an objective of rate of growth of 
spending.  
 
Denmark Universal insurance. Free hospital spending. Health care are managed by 
regions. 16% of spending paid by patients.  
 
Ireland NHS supplemented by a voluntary private insurance system (covering 44% 
of the population. 22% of spending paid by patients. Insufficient supply.  
 
Greece NHS supplemented by a private insurance system. 46% of spending 
remain paid by patients. 
 
Spain NHS supplemented by a private insurance system. GP gate-keeper. 23% of 
spending  paid by patients. Spending is relatively low. 
 
France Health insurance, universal coverage and supplementary insurance. Free 
access. High and rising spending. Annual target for spending growth.  
 
Italy  NHS, regionalised plus supplementary insurance. GP gate-keeping. 20% of 
spending  paid by patients. Plan of rationalization. 
 
Portugal NHS and supplementary insurance. 29% of spending paid by patients. High 
spending. 
 
Sweden NHS managed by regions and towns. GP as gate keepers. 13% of 
spending paid by patients. High spending. 
 
UK NHS, free health care but long waiting time. 
 
Netherlands Compulsory private insurance in competition, but under regulation. High 
spending. 
 
Finland NHS managed by municipalities. GP as gate-keepers. 
 
Austria Health insurance, almost universal coverage with GP as gate-keepers. 26% 
of spending paid by patients. Relatively low spending. 
 
The 2007 Communication summarises the first year of the OMC. All 
countries commit themselves to entitling the access to all for adequate care, 
but in practice they ask for a rising share of spending to be paid by patients, 
even if there are cases with 100% payment and expenditure ceilings. The share 
of non covered health spending is higher than 30% in Portugal, Austria, the 
Netherlands, Latvia and Greece (48%), Cyprus (52%). Long-term care should 
be professional (and not left to families and women) and its funding should 
increase and become autonomous and guaranteed. Insufficient labour supply 
appears in some countries (nurses and other workers in the health sector). In 
some countries health supply is insufficient which generates waiting times and 
rationing. Some countries find they spend too much on health. But the OMC 
does not really address the issue of the diversity of health systems, their 
governance, the appropriate methods to reduce cost. Until now there has been 
a non EU strategy promoted for health. There is a strong contradiction 
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between recognising the need for higher spending and financial constraints 
(which lead to try to reduce public employment and expenditure, to prefer 
private to public insurance. The OMC does not address directly major issues: 
- how to finance a rising share in health spending? 
- how to conciliate a satisfactory level of health spending insurance and to give 
incentives to households to reduce their consumption?  
- how to supervise the behaviour of health suppliers?  
- how to finance long-term care spending: universal benefits (everyone would 
be entitled to long-term care spending reimbursement, but this would be very 
costly, assistance benefits (benefits would be targeted to the poorer and be 
refundable on wealth and inheritance), mandatory private insurance.  
3.4 UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Unemployment insurance spending is high in Scandinavian countries (in 
particular in Denmark and also in the Netherlands) and very low in 
Mediterranean countries and in the UK (see Tables 1.2 and 3.9). Two models 
seem efficient in terms of full-employment: the liberal model with low 
unemployment benefits, flexible wages, but also with full-employment being 
obtained at the price of a significant number of poor workers, the Danish 
model where unemployment benefits are high and are accompanied by 
substantial training efforts and activation policy for bringing the unemployed  
back into employment. It is therefore difficult to set EU objectives in terms of 
replacement rates, but the Danish model seems more in line with the ESM. 
Until recently, it was however difficult to apply the Danish model in large 
heterogeneous countries with high unemployment. Training and support to 
some groups of the population (low-skilled, long-term unemployed, older 
workers, the young, single mothers with young children) was difficult to 
implement in a context where labour demand was too low. In the years to 
come, the deceleration of labour supply growth and more robust GDP growth 
may make it easier to implement such a policy.  
Table 3.9: Employment Policy Expenditures, 2005 
  Spending % of GDP            Generosity* 
   Unemployment   
(%) Active Passive           Rate     Active Passive 
Germany 0.97 2.35 11.3 8.6 20.8 
Austria  0.62 1.51 5.2 11.9 29.0 
Belgium  1.08 2.37 8.1 13.3 29.3 
Denmark 1.74 2.51 4.2 41.4 59.8 
Spain   0.78 1.45 9.2 8.5 15.8 
Finland 0.89 1.90 8.5 10.5 22.4 
France 0.90 1.62 9.9 9.1 16.4 
Greece 0.05 0.35 9.8 0.5 9.7 
Ireland 0.63 0.83 4.3 14.7 19.3 
Italy 0.54 0.82 7.8 6.9 10.5 
Netherlands 1.33 2.02 5.2 25.5 38.9 
Portugal 0.69 1.39 8.1 8.5 17.2 
Sweden 1.32 1.20 7.8 16.9 15.4 
UK 0.49 0.19 4.7 10.5 4.0 
* Unemployment expenditures/Unemployment rate 
 Source: OECD. 
 
 
The future of the incapacity benefits system is an issue in several countries, 
because the system is costly (Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Denmark) and 
reduces activity rates significantly (Finland, Italy, Sweden, UK). Conversely, 
incapacity benefits can be a flexible and adaptable way at the individual level to 
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tackle the issue of older workers in declining industries. But the schemes need 
to remain flexible with the potential for adjustment when the economy comes 
close to full-employment.  
 
Box 1. The European Globalisation Fund 
The introduction of a ‘European globalisation adjustment fund’ was proposed 
by the Commission in March 2006. This fund could be a positive development 
for the future of Social Europe. It recognises that there are workers affected by 
globalisation. The aim is to identify these workers and to provide a financial 
support in ‘re-training or concrete assistance to find new jobs’. In practice the 
fund will provide a support to the direct victims of globalisation, to workers in 
an industry sector directly hit by competition from low-wage countries. The 
fund will not facilitate job creation or help people keep their job, although in 
most cases a whole geographical area is hurt and new job opportunities are 
limited. Some social expenditure will be directly covered by the EU with this 
fund. It is an attempt to raise the EU budget and influence. However, the 
current expenditure ceiling is very low (500 million euros per year, i.e. 0.2% of 
MS unemployment allowances spending). If it is recognised that globalisation 
as a whole makes victims (low skilled workers) and winners (high skilled 
workers, capital income earners), the fund does not allow for transfers of the 
magnitude of the challenge. 
3.5 FAMILY POLICY 
Family policy has until now not been a topic for discussion and coordination at 
the EU level although it has been addressed in some recent reports (like the 
Report of the High level group on the future of social policy, May 2004). 
However, fertility rates are higher than 1.8 in only two countries - France and 
Ireland - out of the EU-15 countries and below 1.4 in six countries. Countries 
with very low fertility rates are likely to have very high dependency ratios in the 
future: Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and to a lesser extent Germany and 
Austria, despite high immigration flows. Population is likely to fall substantially 
in Portugal (4% until 2050), Germany (6%), Italy (7%). Rising birth rates is a 
crucial issue for these countries. In particular, the preservation of their pays-as-
you go pension system will be will be questioned if birth rates do not raise or 
net immigration does not grow substantially. 
Family policy should include three main elements:  
- Allowing mothers with young children to work, which is the best way 
to prevent the risk of poverty and to give women incentives to have 
children. This requires a childcare system available everywhere and 
financed by public spending. Countries with low fertility rates are also 
countries with the lowest female activity rates (Greece, Italy). A 
contrario some countries succeed in combining high fertility rates and 
high female activity rates: Denmark, Finland, Sweden and France. 
These countries have a high level of pre-primary care and education 
spending (see Table 2.8) and also relatively high level of family policy 
expenditure (see Table 1.2). 
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Table 3.10: Activity Rates and Fertility Rates 
 Activity Rates 15-55 year-old          Fertility Rates 
(%) Male 2005 Female 2005                   2005 
Germany  93.6 79.1 1.34 
Austria  92.8 79.9 1.40 
Belgium  91.8 76.8 1.64 
Denmark 91.1 84.1 1.80 
Spain   92.4 69.0 1.35 
Finland 90.3 85.2 1.80 
France 93.8 80.7 1.94 
Greece 94.7 68.3 1.33 
Ireland 92.2 69.6 1.86 
Italy 91.2 63.6 1.31 
Netherlands 91.4 77.8 1.71 
Portugal 92.5 81.8 1.40 
Sweden 92.4 86.5 1.77 
UK 90.9 77.5 1.78 
Source: European Commission, 2005. 
 
- Ensuring that all children have a minimum income level, health and 
education. Accounting for the importance of education from the 
younger age in terms of school education and in the future society, 
European societies cannot spoil the potential of children of poorest 
classes.  They must benefit from social services like specific help for 
education, health and cultural activities. A minimum income must be 
provided to families (even if this reduces the incentive to work for 
parents. Table 3.9 shows that child poverty rates are higher that adult 
poverty rates in many countries: the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, the UK 
and Portugal. Social assistance targeted at poor families should be 
increased.  
- Family benefits and income taxation should ensure similar income levels 
for families and couples without children earning the same income. 
Table 9 shows that family benefits are too low in all EU countries: to 
have the same income level than a couple, a family with two children 
should have an extra-income of 40% according to OECD scale; it has in 
fact between 13 % (Austria) and 1.5% (Spain).  
Table 3.11: Extra Income for a Family with Two Children as Compared to a 
Couple* 
(%) 2006 
Germany  11.3 
Austria  13.3 
Belgium  12.6 
Denmark 8.2 
Spain   1.5 
Finland 7.7 
France 8.2 
Greece 7.9 
Ireland 9.6 
Italy 6.4 
Netherlands 7.6 
Portugal 6.1 
Sweden 8.5 
UK 6.6 
* Husband earning the average wage, wife 33% of the average wage. 
Source: Taxing wages, 2005. 
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At the European level, the countries should commit themselves on some 
objectives: availability of childcare, child poverty rates, minimal income for 
families with children, relative income for families with children. 
3.6 FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION  
Poverty rates vary quite substantially in the EU, from around 9-12% in social-
democrat countries to around 18-20% in Liberal and Southern countries (see 
table 3.12). Poverty results mainly from insufficient family and pension 
benefits and from precarious jobs, with low wages.  
In almost all EU-15 countries, there is a minimum income amounting to 
around 50% of the median income (and thus it does not prevent individuals 
from falling into poverty at 60%). The minimum income system is more 
generous in Denmark and much less so in Southern countries. The marginal 
income tax rate for incomes rising from the minimum income to wages at the 
level of 50% of the median wage is higher than 80% in most countries; it is of 
course lower than 50% in Southern countries, but there are nevertheless quite 
a lot of unemployed or poor people in these countries.  
Table 3.12: Poverty Rates in the EU, 2005 
 Total 0-15 year-old 16-25 year-old Older than 65 
EU-15 16 18 18 20 
Sweden 9 8 23 11 
Netherlands 11 16 16 5 
Denmark 12 10 29 18 
Finland 12 10 22 18 
Austria 12 15 13 14 
Germany  13 13 14 15 
France 13 14 18 16 
Belgium  15 19 17 21 
UK 18 22 19 26 
Italy 19 24 23 23 
Spain 20 24 18 29 
Greece 20 19 23 28 
Portugal 20  24 20 28 
Ireland 20 22 19 33 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Table 3.13: Minimum Income Levels in 2005 
 Single People Couple, 2 
Children 
At-Risk of 
Poverty Line 
Marginal Income 
Tax**, % 
Germany 672 1590 856 89 
Belgium 625 1185 822 66 
Denmark 1173 3333 1106 103 
Greece No minimum income  471 16 
Spain At the regional level  529 47 
France 667 1264 796 80 
Ireland 718 1341 936 88 
Italy 250 542 719 14 
Netherlands 549 1099 849 93 
Austria 414 1090 900 87 
Portugal 171 515 359 54 
Finland 362* 1079 870 81 
Sweden 364* 1094 865 98 
UK 704 1690 936 78 
* Excl. Housing. ** 
Source: European Commission. 
 
The OMC on social inclusion was launched in 2000. The objective was to 
bring a ‘decisive contribution of the eradication of poverty and social exclusion 
by the year 2010’, but poverty rates have hardly decreased in the EU since 
2000. Social exclusion has risen in the EU from the 1980’s and social 
protection systems have no tool or institutions to tackle this. Owing to the 
OMC, all countries have been requested to include the fight against poverty as 
a new element of their social protection system. In 2000, the Communication 
focused on the need for people to be in employment, the right for all to 
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financial resources (although without imposing minimum income standards), 
preventing exclusion, supporting the more vulnerable, and involving all 
players. But contradictions were not between minimum income and work 
incentive, between economic modernisation of social protection (that leads 
companies to be more demanding on the quality of their workers) and 
inclusion. The joint report in 2002 showed the link between social expenditure 
as a share of GDP and the reduction in the number of those at risk of poverty. 
A large number of indicators were introduced to account for the different 
aspects of exclusion. The Communication from 2005 highlighted 7 priorities: 
being in employment; modernising social protection, inequalities in education 
and training, child poverty, right to decent housing, entitlement to social 
services, fight against discrimination. The 2007 Communication focused on the 
fight against child poverty. This raises the issue of the return of their parents in 
work, of combating school failure and of the integration of immigrant 
children. The fight for active inclusion aims to facilitate the return to work, but 
the risk is that this is obtained by deteriorating the situation of those who do 
not find a job.  
All in all the value added of the OMC lacks visibility because no numerical 
targets were announced and no strategy is adopted due to the diversity of 
national systems. An advantage of the OMC could be to highlight  the issue of 
poverty situations and to be an incentive for countries to set ambitious 
objectives but the work of the OMC is not adequately advertised. It would be 
more effective to set out common objectives in terms of poverty rates, child 
poverty rates, minimum incomes (as a % of the poverty line). 
3.7 HOW TO ADAPT THE ESM? NATIONAL REFORMS OR A 
EUROPEAN PILOT?  
OFCE Contribution (Mathieu et al., 2007) deals with the respective roles of 
national and European institutions in the evolution of the ESM (or ESMs). 
The single market makes it more and more difficult for national protection 
systems to coexist: the EU has until now only organised the coexistence 
through systems coordination. There are three incentives for moving beyond 
this: the functioning of the single market would be facilitated, European 
citizenship would be strengthened, the risk of social competition would be 
reduced. But, all social protection systems are based on solidarity ; solidarity remains 
today at the national level and there is no EU solidarity. How to combine such 
different models and move from systems based on domestic foundations to a 
European system? Can convergence take place if national models are deeply 
anchored in different social institutions and practices? Social systems cannot be 
unified at the EU level, without accounting for national traditions, debates and 
specificities. Building a European social protection in that way would be at the 
expense of the role of national social partners and would weaken the support 
for social protection. Such a strategy could lead to unify systems towards the 
bottom in the name of competitiveness rather than to the development of a 
rejuvenated ESM. 
Europe must choose between five strategies. The liberal one consists of 
letting social competition play. But what competition between social systems 
means in a situation of free movement.  Will countries where redistribution is 
higher be able to stand competition from less redistributive countries, knowing 
that the wealthiest will leave the country while the poorest will settle there? 
There is no evidence that competition will lead to a satisfactory system. The 
sovereignist one leaves each country free to choose their system, but allows 
them to defend themselves from unfair competition. But, this view makes 
difficult any further progress for a European citizenship. It supposes that 
Economic integration would remain relatively limited. The Big Bang strategy 
proposes to organise explicitly the progressive merging of the systems, but  the 
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only system that could be easily extended would be a liberal system with a 
minimum solidarity 
The strategy of a Social Europe aims at favouring social convergence 
through the gradual implementation of binding common social objectives 
(wages and minimum income, replacement ratio). But Anglo-Saxon countries 
and the new MS do not want to be constrained to move towards a model that 
is widely felt to be in crisis today; a model that has failed to avoid high 
unemployment, rising exclusion and which financial prospects are under 
question 
In the current strategy, European authorities try to initiate progressive but 
converging reforms aimed at modernising national social protection systems. 
Such a convergence would be obtained through soft methods, like the BEPGs 
or the Lisbon Agenda, i.e. through a set of objectives elaborated by the 
Commission and then adopted by the European Council, and like the open 
method of coordination, i.e. the definition of common indicators and 
objectives, the confrontation of domestic experience and peer pressure guided 
by the European Commission. Each country however keeps its autonomy in 
social areas. This process has the advantage of leaving national sovereignty 
intact. But it is necessarily slow and not visible for economic agents and 
populations. It remains disconnected from national debates and reforms. The 
BEPGs and the OMC are dialogue processes between European and national 
administrations and do not really involve national social players, as they are 
hardly debated at the country level and in the general public. How should the 
process be democratised and strengthened? Currently the process is not 
mobilising and does not lead to the emergence of a Social Europe project. 
Moreover, its content raises questions. In practice the role of European 
authorities stands between supporting a specific ESM and questioning it under 
the name of modernisation.  But these issues should be decided after a social 
debate by a democratic political process.  
 
 The European Social Model (ESM) is at the heart of the functioning of 
European economies and societies. Social Models are diverse in the EU, but 
European integration requires some coordination and convergence. We will 
give three different points of view here. Box 1 stresses the importance of 
guaranteeing social cohesion in the Member States, by reducing income 
inequalities and ensuring a high level of social protection, in particular for 
people who cannot work, because of their age, their handicap, their family 
situation or the economic situation. The disincentive effect of social protection 
is judged of second order and it is considered that rich countries can accept it. 
Box 2 expresses the importance of restoring work incentives, by accepting 
initially some increase in income inequalities. Making work pay will increase 
production and will give more resources to the Social security system, assuring 
its financial sustainability. Box 3 suggests a new architecture of welfare state in 
Europe, inspired by the Scandinavian model, so the impact of social protection 
as a productive factor increases.  
4.  
Conclusion: 
Debates on a 
New Welfare 
State in Europe  
 
 
BOX 1: Preservation and Development of the European Social Model 
          (from OFCE) 
Maintaining and developing the ESM is part of European Construction and is as 
important as the Internal Market. The ESM should have a precise content which needs 
to be politically debated. The ESM should include: 
- In terms of pensions, a minimum income for the elderly and a decent 
replacement rate for workers at low or medium wage earnings. 
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- Retirement legislation ensuring that older workers, whom firms do not want 
to employ any more, do not fall into poverty. This raises the issue of work incentives 
for older workers.  
- Health insurance available to all, either through a universal or an occupational 
insurance system associated with free health insurance entitlement to the 
poor. But this raises the issue of the control of health spending.  
- A minimum income. But this raises the issue of work incentives for low-wage workers.  
- Unemployment allowances ensuring a minimum income and a satisfactory 
replacement ratio for low or medium wage workers. But this raises the issues of 
work incentives for the unemployed.  
- Family benefits ensuring a minimum living standard for children and a 
satisfactory living standard for families relative to single people.  
- Childcare benefits and collective infrastructure supporting female 
employment, especially for mothers with young children.   
- Some degree of product market regulation to ensure that universal public 
services are provided. But this raises the issue of the efficiency of such services.  
- Some employment protection legislation to ensure that companies invest in 
their workers and that workers invest in their company. But this makes the 
productive system more rigid.  
- A tax system targeting the reduction of income inequalities. But this reduces 
work and savings incentives  
- An ambitious social and economic policy needs to be financed. This requires 
leaving to the MS the possibility to decide their company and personal 
taxation, thus implementing a strategy of taxation coordination in Europe  
- The evolution of European systems must be done under the impulse of a 
democratic OMC, with a larger involvement of national social partners. 
Minimum social standards, increasing with the economic development of 
countries, should support convergence.  
- There is a need for an active and contra-cyclical macroeconomic policy in 
order to maintain full employment. This will require a robust demand (in 
particular through low interest rates and an appropriate exchange rate level), 
coordinated policy measures to address imbalances between countries (which 
will prevent non-cooperative strategies). The Stability Pact will need to be 
reconsidered to allow governments to borrow in order to finance the 
investment required to support growth. Being close to full employment is a 
prerequisite for efficient strategies of work incentives for older workers, the 
disabled and the unemployed. 
           Two issues are more difficult to address: 
- Should Europe open more widely its frontiers to immigration in order to 
compensate for demographic slowdown? This would mean keeping unskilled 
jobs and some social inequalities (as in the case of the US and Anglo-Saxon 
countries)? Or should Europe aim first of all at maintaining full-employment, 
to raise skills levels and facilitate the reduction in unskilled jobs? 
- Should everything be done to bring older people, disabled people and 
mothers with young children back to work? Yes, of course, because a job is 
socially rewarding and is a means of integration in the Society. But such a 
policy may entail a reduction in living standards for the targeted groups of the 
population who do not succeed to find a job. Also, is any job valuable? Is it 
necessarily socially useful? Perhaps productivity gains could be partly used to 
reduce working time and the importance of labour?  
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BOX 2: Design of an Efficient Welfare State (from CPB) 
The term welfare state is used as a catchall for public institutions that are related to the 
income and expenditures of people over their life cycle. This includes programs for 
pensions, disability, survivor and unemployment insurance, medical expenditures and 
perhaps even education. In this box, we structure the discussion along three functions 
of the welfare state, namely Redistribution, Risk and insurance, and Reallocation over the life 
cycle. For each of these three R’s of the welfare state, we demonstrate the key trade-offs 
and explore opportunities to improve combinations between them through efficiency 
enhancing reforms. 6
R1: Redistribution between People 
People differ in their talents or abilities. The welfare state aims to reduce inequality 
between people by means of redistribution. This creates, however, several labour-
market distortions, such as lower labour supply, less training and higher 
unemployment. This trade-off between equity and efficiency applies to various 
institutions such as the progressive tax-benefit system, benefits in kind, indirect taxes, 
subsidies and wage compressing institutions.  
Universal income support, such as a basic income, does not seem an optimal form 
of redistribution. It is expensive and raises marginal tax rates across the board, thereby 
causing large distortions in labour supply. Targeting support to families with low 
incomes would be more efficient. This creates, however, distortions at the bottom of 
the labour market due to the poverty trap. It reduces the gains from targeting. 
Designing an optimal redistributive system therefore requires careful consideration of 
the distortions at both the participation margin and the intensive margin of labour 
supply.  
In-work benefits have the advantage of reducing the benefit replacement rate, 
without hurting the income of benefit recipients. It leads to a lower rate of involuntary 
unemployment, especially if it is targeted at the low skilled. However, by phasing out 
benefits among middle income groups, targeted relief is particularly distortionary for 
the intensive margin of labour supply.  
In-work tax relief can be targeted on female workers who possess relatively large 
labour supply elasticities, e.g. compared to male breadwinners. Subsidies on 
complements of female labour, such as childcare expenditures, are typically desirable 
features of an optimal tax-benefit system as they mitigate distortions at the intensive 
margin of labour supply. Also an individualised income tax system yields better labour 
market incentives than a system that takes the family as the tax unit, especially for 
females. Individualising social benefits is less attractive, however, since it will raise 
marginal tax rates at the participation margin of secondary earners.  
Redistribution is also achieved through wage compressing institutions, e.g. due to 
trade union behaviour. However, this raises unemployment among the low-skilled. 
Lower minimum wages or less wage compression will relax this problem, but this 
raises inequality. Society may alternatively shift from wage compressing institutions 
towards fiscal redistribution or provide tax relief for employers hiring low-skilled 
employees. 
Since reforms in the redistributive system have social costs, complementary 
instruments may be considered to escape the inevitable trade-offs in redistribution. For 
instance, modern welfare states increasingly rely on the integration of vulnerable 
people in the labour market by combining the carrot of positive financial incentives 
with the stick of punitive work mandates.  
R2: Risk and insurance 
Risk of disability or unemployment is dealt with by social insurance. In designing a 
social insurance contract, society aims to minimise the adverse implications for the 
labour market caused by moral hazard. A less generous social insurance, e.g. through 
lower levels of unemployment and disability benefits, shorter unemployment benefit 
 
6 De Mooj (2007) presents an evaluation of such reforms in the Dutch case. 
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duration, or substitution towards individual saving accounts, can help reduce 
unemployment rates and raise labour-market participation by combating moral hazard. 
It yields, however, less insurance. Hence, there is a trade-off between insurance gains 
and incentives to fight moral hazard. Savings may be more appropriate than insurance 
in the case of small risks and large moral hazard, e.g. for small unemployment spells. 
For larger risks, however, insurance is typically more efficient than savings.  
For a given level of insurance, the key policy challenge is to minimise moral hazard. 
The government may use stringent job search requirements and mandatory obligations 
to raise the exit from social insurance. An efficient administration should engage in 
tight monitoring and claim assessment and invest in activation of benefit claimants.  
Insurance can be supplemented by active labour-market policies. Yet, whereas 
harsh measures like sanctions and mandatory workfare tend to significantly increase 
outflows from the insurance schemes, empirical evidence provides mixed evidence on 
the effectiveness of more lenient forms of active labour-market policies. Lock-in 
effects and reduced search activities seem to render some forms of active labour-
market policies even counterproductive in raising employment in the market sector. 
Still, active labour-market policies may be a social imperative, rather than a way to 
increase employment in the open market. Moreover, some types of active labour-
market policy, such as job-search assistance and vouchers for the long-term 
unemployed, yield more positive effects. 
Employment protection and firing taxes may be efficient to reduce moral hazard in 
inflows into unemployment insurance. Moreover, it encourages commitment and thus 
stimulates employment durations and investment in firm-specific human capital. 
However, employment protection also creates a social cost by increasing 
unemployment duration and hampering innovation. It hurts especially the labour 
market position of youngsters, women and immigrants. Financial incentives, e.g. via 
experience rating in unemployment insurance, tend to be more efficient than 
administrative procedures to reduce excessive job separations.  
R3: Reallocation of the Life Cycle 
The welfare state plays a role in consumption smoothing over the life cycle. Capital-
market imperfections, impatience and distortions associated with redistribution and 
insurance provide a rationale for this. European governments are substantially 
involved in reallocating income over the life cycle: estimates suggest that between 60 
and 80% of the welfare state actually concerns intrapersonal reallocation of income 
over the life cycle, rather than redistribution between the life-time rich and poor. An 
alternative for collective smoothing via the welfare state would be mandatory or 
subsidised individual saving schemes. While these schemes may reduce the overall tax 
burden compared to collective smoothing via transfers, they may bring other 
distortions. Hence, the government faces a dilemma. It applies to areas of life-long 
learning, the combination of work and family care and early retirement. 
Life-long learning is a vital pillar for our welfare state. While investment by the 
government seems important in initial education, the value added of government 
intervention is less clear in adult learning. Some subsidies may help to alleviate training 
distortions imposed by progressive taxes and generous social insurance provisions.  
The argument for large-scale public investment in on-the-job training is weak though. 
Facilities for the combination of work and care for children is important for 
combining high female participation and high fertility; Female participation benefits 
from increased labour-market flexibility and child-care facilities. Subsidies for parental 
leave may support fertility, but typically come at the expense of labour market 
participation in terms of hours worked.  
A number of distortions in retirement decisions have recently been removed in 
Europe. Indeed, the system has been reformed towards a more actuarially neutral 
system for early retirement. Still problematic for the participation of the elderly is, 
however, the rigidity of the labour market. Indeed, the combination of fixed wage 
contracts with seniority wages, employment protection and mandatory retirement 
hampers the mobility of older workers and increases unemployment durations. Moving 
towards a more flexible labour market can increase employment, improve allocative 
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efficiency and allow for more flexible retirement patterns. It calls, however, for a 
breakdown of the implicit contract.  
Subsidiarity. 
According to CPB these reforms to improve the trade offs of the three R’s should be 
conducted by the Member states themselves. Lejour (2007) recalls that since the Treaty 
of Maastricht in 1992, EU Member States have applied the subsidiarity principle in 
arranging the division of competencies between individual Member States and the EU. 
There may be solid arguments for centralised European coordination, if there are scale 
or external effects. But these effects are not really present in social security 
expenditures and labour market regulations. Moreover there are considerable 
differences between countries in terms of their welfare states expressing different 
preferences and circumstances. These preferences and circumstances could better be 
matched by social welfare policies at the Member State level. Lejour estimates that 
countries will converge over time in terms of their welfare states. The harmonised 
social regulations will be expensive for the majority of new Member States and will not 
match their level of economic development now. Differences in regulations need not 
in fact be harmful; they can help the economic development of new Member States 
because they will be able to attract more capital and strengthen their competitiveness 
with lower social standards. Western European consumers will ultimately also benefit 
from this through increased trade and specialisation. Convergence could then 
subsequently lead to adaptation of social policy to the EU norms. If on the other hand 
high social standards are imposed on the new Member States immediately, this could 
make it more difficult for them to achieve the growth necessary to catch up with the 
West.  
 
BOX 3. Key Elements of a New Welfare State Architecture (from Wifo)  
European societies are facing a number of demanding challenges, which will intensify 
in the years to come and call for institutional reforms in European welfare systems: 
There is, on the one hand, from a societal perspective, a process of individualisation 
underway that is related to women's growing preferences for personal independence 
and life long careers. This process entails substantial changes in demographic and 
family behaviour which results in new and more flexible family arrangements, meaning 
a declining number of children living together with both mother and father and an 
increasing number of single-parent families. This development mirrors new insecurities 
and increasing poverty risks. 
On the other hand, looking at the economy and the labour market, processes of 
global integration, technological transformation and structural economic change are 
going on which result in a shift from production to knowledge-intensive service 
economies creating new risks in the labour market. While the number of decently paid 
and secure jobs of low- and medium-skilled standard production workers are rapidly 
declining, a dualistic perspective on the labour market is unfolding: The main route is 
in favour of skilled and highly professional, well-paid jobs, but at the other end a 
sizeable market of precarious jobs for those with weak human capital facing either low 
wages or unemployment. At the same time the pressure to increase wage disparities 
continues to rise (Reich, 1991). 
To prevent a bleak perspective of life-long precariousness and rising poverty risks 
for an increasing number of people, our societies have to provide, on the one hand a 
highly efficient education system which leaves nobody behind and fosters life-long 
learning as well as strong mobility opportunities on the labour market and, on the 
other hand, a system of social security with a tight safety net at the low-income end but 
strong activating incentives and supportive instruments, e.g., active labour market 
policy. In knowledge-intensive post–industrial economies individuals’ life chances 
depend on their learning abilities and their accumulation of human capital. Hence, the 
impact of social inheritance will become of utmost importance - “in particular with 
regard to cognitive development and educational attainment” as Esping-Andersen (2002, 
p. 3) pointed out. And he proceeded:  “..we cannot afford not to be egalitarians in the 
advanced economies of the twenty-first century. ….there is a very good argument that 
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equality of opportunities and life chances is becoming sine qua non for efficiency … Our 
human capital constitutes the single most important resource that we must mobilise in 
order to ensure a dynamic and competitive knowledge economy. We are facing huge 
demographic imbalances with very small working age cohorts ahead, and to sustain the 
elderly we must maximise the productivity of the young.”  
While the post-war welfare states mainly concentrated on equalising living 
conditions by supporting the victims of destructive outcomes of market forces through 
income maintenance guarantees, the policy challenge of the future is to empower 
people to be adequately equipped to satisfy their welfare needs within the market. 
Thus, social policy – as seen by the Lisbon agenda - is about to become a productive 
resource; i.e. a supply side policy instrument to empower and activate people to be able 
to succeed in the market.  
The Lisbon growth strategy is based on three ambitious objectives: making Europe 
a zone of economic prosperity, with a high level of social protection and a 
responsibility in terms of the environment. If one considers that these three objectives 
are linked and that European construction should aim at a progressive unification of 
European Societies, then European construction should aim at making the European 
social models converge towards a single one. Increasing economic efficiency in 
Europe, facilitating changes and strengthening investments important for the future 
should be accompanied by a determined social policy. If one considers that the 
continental model lacks flexibility, that the Liberal model is too costly in terms of 
social cohesion and inequalities, then Europe should move towards a Scandinavian 
model, knowing that the task will not be easy because institutions and traditions that 
have paved the way for the success of these models do not exist in other countries or 
not to the same extent.  
The Scandinavian system remains inclusive and tight, but social benefits are partly 
made dependent on the input of the individual and transfers become conditional on 
certain obligations; replacement rates are lower than they used to be in order to 
provide stronger incentives to work but are still high by international standards. 
Scandinavian countries turned out to be the best performers in combining a high level 
of equality and low poverty rates with high levels of employment and high economic 
growth (section II). Accordingly, they seem to be best prepared to tackle the emerging 
societal and economic challenges of the future.  
As key elements for a new welfare state architecture we pick out:  
• ‘A child-centred and women-friendly social investment strategy’, as Esping-
Andersen (2002) has proposed. This strategy can be seen as the backbone of an 
activating reform which takes into account the preconditions of a highly flexible, 
knowledge-intensive society with high activity rates of economically independent 
men and women. While post-war welfare states provided both a high degree of 
income security and, together with marital stability, sufficient caring facility within 
the traditional family, young families today have a less stable life-course 
perspective both economically as well as in their partnership. At the same time, 
the prerequisites for a good life and working career are rising steadily. Life chances 
depend increasingly on investment in human capital by both parents and society 
in early childhood. Good cognitive abilities which have to be developed in early 
childhood are absolute preconditions for educational attainment and life-long 
learning. 
 For demographic reasons as well as due to the high cognitive requisites of a 
‘knowledge economy’, we cannot afford to leave any child behind in her 
intellectual development. Accordingly, one of the key goals of reform strategies is 
to reduce social inheritance and to improve the cognitive potential of every child, 
irrespective of her social origin. Thus, policies aimed at improving the availability 
of affordable high-quality child-care facilities in early childhood as well as policies 
to prevent child poverty and safeguard welfare must be seen as social investments 
which are central pillars of any activating welfare state reform. 
Together with higher working-time flexibility and part-time employment 
possibilities, the availability of high-quality and affordable care facilities for both 
children and elderly is also an important precondition for parents and – in 
particular for women – to find their life-work balance in combining family 
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obligations with individual career preferences. In the face of demographic ageing 
this is an increasingly important issue for both increasing fertility rates and 
women’s labour market participation. Improving the relative income of families 
with children should also contribute to bringing fertility rates back to satisfactory 
levels. 
• High investment in human capital to increase educational attainment and literacy 
levels among younger cohorts and to institutionalise life-long learning to improve 
the likelihood of attending successful retraining at advanced ages, thus reducing 
one of the barriers to labour market participation of older workers.  
• Increasing social services. The welfare state of the future will have to provide 
more services to meet the requirements of more individualistic societies and 
service economies. By providing sufficient high quality care facilities for children, 
the aged and the handicapped the state empowers people to combine gainful 
employment with family obligation, thus fostering (female) participation, welfare 
production and equality in the modern ageing society.  
• A ‘flexicurity’ strategy or managed and balanced flexibility in the labour market. 
Increasing competition in goods and labour market due to world-wide economic 
integration as well as rapid technological and structural changes demand higher 
labour market flexibility. To prevent poverty risks, higher standards of social 
security are needed. Here, the Nordic – in particular Danish – experiences with 
‘flexicurity’ offer examples of good practise by combining, on the one hand, 
deregulation of the labour market with extensive active labour market policy and, 
on the other hand, generous income protection in the case of unemployment 
paired with strong incentives to resume employment fast.  
• Government and public institutions have to play a proactive role in promoting 
competition, innovation, efficiency and structural change. Technology policy and 
enhancing the adoption of new technologies are fostering growth and welfare. 
Industries hurt by globalisation must be restructured or the reconversion of their 
workers must be supported. This contradicts the approach that governments just 
need to deregulate markets and wait for the expected innovation and growth 
rebound to automatically follow.  
 
EUROFRAME-EFN Contributions 
The following Annexes are available to download on the Euroframe homepage 
(www.euroframe.org) 
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